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ANALYTICAL COMPENDIUM TO  
A CUMULATIVE DISSERTATION 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Digital monitoring technologies at work 
Today’s workplaces are becoming increasingly digitalized.1 Digitalization has 
created many economic and societal benefits and advantages to employers and 
employees, such as increased flexibility and autonomy, the potential to improve 
work-life balance, etc., but has also triggered a number of ethical, legal and 
employment related challenges.2 One of these challenges is the increasing use of 
technology to monitor applicants and employees, which is accompanied by inten-
sification of the processing of their personal data and possible intrusions to 
privacy.3 Still, employers’ quest for knowledge about employees and thus employer 
surveillance of employees is nothing new. Supervision and monitoring4 have long 
been assumed as necessary to ensure managerial goals; for example, to protect an 
                                                                          
1  The concept of the digital workplace originates from 1990s. In recent years, in response to 
rapid technological developments and as part of wider concerns surrounding the future of work 
and organizations, the term digital workplace has gained renewed attention. Williams, S. P. 
and Schubert, P. argue that the digital workplace is being conceived as: an integrated technology 
platform that provides all the tools and services to enable employees to effectively undertake 
their work, both alone and with others, regardless of location and is strategically coordinated 
and managed through digital workplace designs that are agile and capable of being adapted to 
meet future organizational requirements and technologies. Williams, S. P., Schubert, P. Designs 
for the Digital Workplace. – Procedia Computer Science 2018/138. See also: Köffer S. 
Designing the digital workplace of the future – what scholars recommend to practitioners. 
International Conference on Information Systems 2015.; Marks, A., Briken, K., Chillas, S., 
Krzywdzinski, M. The New Digial Workplace: How New Technologies Revolutionise Work. 
Macmillan Publishers Limited 2017. 
2  European Parliament resolution of 21 January 2021 with recommendations to the Com-
mission on the right to disconnect 2019/2181(INL).  
3  See for example: Simits, S. Reconsidering the Premises of labour Law. – European Law 
Journal 1999/5 (1); Ajunwa, I., Crawford, K., Schultz, J. Limitless worker surveillance. – 
California Law Review 2017/105 (3); Moore, P., Upchurch, M., Whittaker, X. (Eds.) Humans 
and Machines at Work. Monitoring, Surveillance and Automation in Contemporary 
Capitalism. Palgrave Macmillan 2018.  
4  This dissertation uses monitoring as an all-embracing concept that covers all kinds of 
activities with employee data. However, it is worth noting that some researchers differentiate 
monitoring from surveillance. They confine monitoring to capturing work-related activities 
and consider surveillance as more intrusive form of monitoring, as it employs technologies 
that cover a broader range of information, such as both work- and non-work related activities. 
See for example, McNall, L. A., Stanton, J. M. Private eyes are watching you: Reactions to 
location sensing technologies. – Journal of Business and Psychology 2011/26; Sadeghian, P., 
Abdollahian, F., Hamidi, K. Workplace surveillance: review of surveillance and control of 
workplace. – Advanced Social Humanities and Mangement 2017/4 (1).  
9 
organization’s assets and property rights, track performance and optimize pro-
cesses, ensure occupational safety and compliance with legal requirements and 
prevent criminal or fraudulent activities. However, today, managing employees is 
becoming data-driven5 as advances in technology allow for constant electronic 
monitoring and data gathering. New applications and smart devices enable 
employers to collect enormous quantities of employees’ personal data from a vast 
array of sources, all of which can be done within a reasonable time and by in-
expensive means.6  
In the employment context, data collection can be done in a variety of ways7, 
such as through interviews, games, digitized tests, internet searches, e-mail moni-
toring, phone tapping, tracking computer content and usage times, video moni-
toring, global positioning system (GPS)8 tracking, and biometric9 monitoring. 
Employers with an interest in monitoring employees may use different digital 
monitoring technologies, such as wearable technology (bracelets, wristbands, 
high-tech caps, helmets or vests and bionic suits or exoskeletons)10, or request 
employees to install applications on devices such as computers or mobile phones11. 
In the context of the present dissertation, ‘digital monitoring technologies’ is used 
as a common denominator, covering all possible technologies – both existing and 
emerging – that leave digital trails that can be collected and mined for insights 
into how employees work. 
Digital monitoring technologies collect different data, such as location infor-
mation, usage information, vitals data and other information relating to the user, 
                                                                          
5  Patil D., Mason, H. Data Driven. Creating a Data Culture. O’Reilly Media 2015; There 
will be little privacy in the Workplace of the Future. – The Economist 28.03.2018.  
6  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work. 
2017 WP 249; Valerio, De S. Negotiating the algorithm. Automation, Artificial Intelligence 
and Labor Protection. – Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 2019/41 (1).  
7  Bodie, M. T., Cherry, M. A., McCormic, M. L., Tang, J. The Law and Policy of Big Data 
and People Analytics, University of Colorado Law Review 2016.; op cit Ajunwa, I., Craw-
ford, K., Schultz, J.; op cit Moore, P., Upchurch, M., Whittaker, X.  
8  GPS is a global navigation satellite system whereby data are transmitted from satellites in 
space to earth-bound receivers to notify them of their location. GPS can localise and trace 
goods and people when used in combination with mobile systems such as geography infor-
mation systems and advanced internet applications. Kanngieser, A. Tracking and tracing: 
geographies of logistical governance and labouring bodies. – Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 2013/31. 
9  Biometric technologies refer to all processes used to recognize, authenticate and identify 
persons based on physical and/or behavioural characteristics. European Commission. Bio-
metrics technologies: A key enabler for future digital services 2018. 
10  See for example: Greenbaum, D. Ethical, Legal and Social Concerns Relating to 
Exoskeletons. – CM SIGCAS Computers and Society 2015/45 (3); Rogers, A. We Try a New 
Exoskeleton for Construction Workers. – WIRED 28.04.2015; Ajunwa, I. Algorithms at 
Work: Productivity Monitoring Applications and Wearable Technology as the New Data-
Centric Research Agenda for Employment and Labor Law. – Saint Louis University Law 
Journal 2018/63 (1). 
11  op cit Ajunwa, I., Crawford, K., Schultz, J. 
10 
so that the data can be used to automatically track employees and measure their 
speed and efficiency, give insight into the employee’s work patterns or indicate 
medical necessity.12 These technologies are increasingly ubiquitous and allow for 
connectivity anytime and anywhere. For example, location-sensing technologies 
relying on radio frequency identification (RFID)13 devices can be used to provide 
always-on-time and real-time location tracking of the whereabouts of employees. 
With emotion-sensing technologies, employee monitoring can go beyond moni-
toring productivity to detecting employees’ emotions.14 Sometimes these techno-
logies also allow employers to easily monitor employees’ activities outside of 
work hours or place of work.15 For example, health and workout apps promoted 
among employees may lead employers to consider sleep patterns or dietary habits 
for the purpose of determining employee benefits or compensation.16  
In addition, as researchers point out, data collected through digital monitoring 
technologies is often analysed using artificial intelligence (AI)17, allowing 
                                                                          
12  op cit Greenbaum, D.; op cit Moore, P., Upchurch, M., Whittaker, X.; op cit Valerio, De S. 
13  RFID devices are known as a technology for the remote identification. RFID uses tags (or 
transponders) in a microchip to locate, identify and transmit information on items (or people) 
carrying the chip. RFID does not require contact or line-of-sight for data capture. The RFID 
system consists of three components: a chip (which can be implanted into the employee), the 
reader (which is used to read chip’s data without contact) and the backend database (to manage 
the data from the chip). The role of the reader is to interrogate the chip and retrieve its stored 
data. To do this the reader broadcasts an electromagnetic signal that any RFID chip within 
range and operating on the same frequency will respond to. Drawing its power from this signal, 
the RFID chip will respond with an encrypted signal. The RFID reader will decode this and 
pass the resulting information to the backend system. The backend system is where data is 
manipulated and stored, and forms the data resource for the system users. See for example: 
Gille, D., Wohlgemuth, S., Strüker, J. RFID in Germany in A Structured Collection on Infor-
mation and Literature on Technological and Usability Aspects of Radio Frequency Identi-
fication. Future of Identity in the Information Society 2007; op cit Kanngieser, A.; 
Graveling, R., Winski, T., Dixon, K. The Use of Chip Implants for Workers. European 
Parliament 2018; MHI. Automatic Identification and Data Collection. –   
https://www.mhi.org/ fundamentals/automatic-identification (30.07.2021). 
14  Kinni, T. Monitoring Your Employees’ Every Emotion. – MITSloan 15.09.2016.; 
Whelan, E., McDuff, D., Gleasure, R., Brocke, J. How Emotion-Sensing Technology Can 
Reshape the Workplace. – MITSloan 05.02.2018. 
15  Vatcha, A. Workplace Surveillance Outside the Workplace: An Analysis of E-Monitoring 
Remote Employees. – iSCHANNEL 2020/15 (1). 
16  Tran, A. H. The Internet of Things and Potential Remedies in Privacy Tort Law. – 
Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 2017/50 (2). 
17  The definition adopted by the European Commission refers to AI, which uses machine 
learning and deep learning tools to extract information from an enormous number of data and 
to generate new value based on models built with those data. AI system can, for a given set of 
human-defined objectives, generate outputs such as content, predictions, recommendations, or 
decisions influencing the environments they interact with. European Commission. Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules 
on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending certain union legislative 
acts. – COM/2021/206 final. See also: Brynjolfsson, E., Rock, D., Syverson, C. Artificial 
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employers to monitor employees’ activities to an extent unthinkable in the past, 
as well as to process enormous amount of data about employees.18 A range of AI-
enabled applications enable employers to assign work tasks, predict employees’ 
behaviour and guide day-to-day decision-making in the workplace.19 This 
developing field of people analytics involves injecting data mining20 into human 
resource management, aiming to use systemic and supposedly scientific data 
analysis as a tool to guide hiring, promotion, demotion, scheduling, wages, and 
discharge determinations.21 Hence, algorithms control various aspect of work, 
from sorting through job applications22 to continuous tracking of employees’ 
behaviour to performance evaluations.23 From the vast quantity of information, 
and the predictive analysis associated with it, employers are encouraged to gain 
managerial tools.24 Thus, algorithmic predictive analysis that is based on large 
quantities of data and digital monitoring technologies are becoming instrumental 
in how employment is managed.25 The drawback, as argued by researchers, is that 
big data analytics and AI draw on highly diverse and feature-rich data of 
                                                                          
intelligence and the modern productivity paradox: A clash of expectations and statistics. 
Working Paper No. 24001, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge 2017; Orga-
nization 2019. – https://www.ilo.org (30.07.2021); Eurofound. Game-changing technologies: 
Transforming production and employment in Europe. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union 2020. 
18  op cit Moore, P., Upchurch, M., Whittaker, X.; op cit Valerio, De S.; Prassl, J. What If Your 
Boss Was an Algorithm? Economic Incentives, Legal Challenges, and the Rise of Artificial 
Intelligence at Work. – Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 2019/41 (1). 
19  Algorithmic Management – A Trade Union Guide. UNI Global Union 2020. – 
https://www.uniglobalunion.org (30.07.2021). 
20  Data mining is an automated analysis of data, using mathematical algorithms, in order to 
find new patterns and relations in data. Custers, B. Data Dilemmas in the Information Society: 
Introduction and Overview. In Custers, B., Calders, T., Schermer, B., Zarsky, T. (Eds.) Dis-
crimination and Privacy in the Information Society. Springer International Publishing 
2013. 
21  See for example: op cit Custers, B.; op cit Bodie, M. T. et al.; op cit Ajunwa, I., Craw-
ford, K., Schultz, J.; Digitalization and decent work implications for Pacific Island Countries. 
International Labour Organization 2019. – https://www.ilo.org (30.07.2021); Aloisi, A., 
Gramano, E. Artificial Intelligence is Watching You at Work: Digital Surveillance, Employee 
Monitoring, and Regulatory Issues in the EU Context – Comparative Labor Law & Policy 
Journal 2019/41 (1). 
22  Non-tech businesses are beginning to use artificial intelligence at scale. – The Economist 
28.03.2018.; Managing human resources is about to become easier. – The Economist 
28.03.2018. 
23  Berg, J., Furrer, M., Harmon, E., Rani, U., Silberman, M. S. Digital labour platforms and the 
future of work. International Labour Organization 2018. – www.ilo.org (30.07.2021).  
24  Barzilay, A. R. Data Analytics at Work: A View From Israel on Employee Privacy and 
Equality in the Age of Data-Driven Employment Management. – Comparative Labor Law & 
Policy Journal 2019/40. 
25  See for example: Adams, A. Technology and the Labour Market: the Assessment. – 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 2018/34 (3).  
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unpredictable value, and create new opportunities for discriminatory, biased, and 
invasive decision-making.26 
While digital monitoring technologies can help to ensure compliance with 
rules on working time, trace employer’s assets and enhance workplace safety, 
they have raised further concerns about poor working conditions, such as in-
creased work intensity and higher levels of stress and anxiety, erosion of the 
demarcation between work and personal life, reduced work autonomy and 
diminished trust towards management.27 According to research, employees who 
are aware of the monitoring most or all of the time are bound to adjust their 
behaviour accordingly, suggesting that monitoring violates an individual’s 
autonomy in a way that is often associated with dystopian characteristics.28 As 
these technologies enable more intrusive employee monitoring, they raise con-
cerns about the ability of employers to control employees in insidious new ways 
and further enhance power imbalances between employees and employers.29 
Digital monitoring technologies may also have an effect on the fundamental 
rights of employees to organize, set up employee meetings and communicate 
confidentially.30 If misused, digital monitoring technologies can present a serious 
threat to employees’ freedom of association and potentially weaken employees’ 
negotiating power.31  
Furthermore, technological advances in monitoring allow employers to utilize 
information about their employees; oftentimes personal data, raising serious 
concerns about the lack of employees’ privacy in regard to controlling infor-
mation about themselves and determining how it will be used, and keeping 
personal facts and feelings to themselves.32 These possibilities and functions of 
digital monitoring technologies have highlighted privacy concerns related to 
workplace monitoring and given both European and national legislators new and 
ever-evolving sets of issues arising from technological change in the area of 
employee monitoring. As digital monitoring technologies are in constant 
                                                                          
26  Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B. D. A right to reasonable inferences: Re-thinking data pro-
tection law in the age of Big Data and AI. – Columbia Business Law Review 2019/1.; op cit 
Barzilay, A. R.  
27  Sprague, R. Survey of (Mostly Outdated and Often Ineffective) Laws Affecting Work-
Related Monitoring: The Piper Lecture. – Chicago-Kent College of Law Review 2018/93; 
Eurofound. Employee monitoring and surveillance: The challenges of digitalisation. Luxem-
bourg: Publications Office of the European Union 2020. 
28  Torpey, J. Through thick and thin: Surveillance after 9/11. – Contemporary Sociology 
2007/36 (2); Ball, K. Workplace surveillance: An overview. – Labour History 2010/51 (1); 
Zuboff, S. The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier 
of power. New York: PublicAffairs 2019. 
29  op cit Ajunwa, I., Crawford, K., Schultz, J.; Hirsch, J. M. Future Work. – University of 
Illinois Law Review 2020. 
30  op cit Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. Opinion 2/2017. 
31  op cit Eurofound. Employee monitoring and surveillance. 
32  op cit Barzilay, A. R. 
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development and becoming more sophisticated and increasingly affordable, 
enabling intrusive employee monitoring, regulatory provisions at the EU level 
and individual member states are often out of step with technological develop-
ments.33 Hence my publications (publications I, II, III, IV, V) and the present 
dissertation examine how the current privacy and data protection framework in the 
EU is equipped to protect employees from privacy-invasive monitoring practices.  
 
 
1.2 Setting the problem 
1.2.1 Privacy concerns in a digital workplace  
The dissertation contributes to the discussion of privacy and data protection by 
exploring the possible ways employers could make use of and rely upon different 
digital monitoring technologies. The choice to focus both on privacy and data 
protection is inevitable because the discussion concerning digital monitoring 
technology should be based on both topics – it can be argued that the distinction 
between privacy and data protection is made not to separate these rights but to 
provide more specific norms governing privacy protection.34 Although some-
times data protection is regarded as detached from privacy,35 researchers mostly 
contend that data protection rules are intended to ensure privacy as they help to 
protect fundamental values of human dignity and individual autonomy.36 As 
Poullet noted, ‘privacy, now protected through personal data protection legis-
lation, thus becomes the fundamental freedom, and the necessary condition for 
all other freedoms’.37 Overall, data protection is said to be founded on our existing 
ideas of privacy and seen as a tool of transparency38 – setting terms under which 
it is possible to collect and use personal data. Therefore, data protection should 
                                                                          
33  op cit Eurofound. Employee monitoring and surveillance. 
34  Purtova, N. Private Law Solutions in European Data Protection: Relationship to Privacy, 
and Waiver in European Data Protection Rights. – Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
2010/28 (2). 
35  De Hert, P., Gutwirth, S. Privacy, data protection and law enforcement. Opacity of the 
individual and transparency of power. In Claes, E., Duff A., Gutwirth, S. (Eds.) Privacy and 
the criminal law. Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia, 2006.; Lynskey, O. The Foundations of EU 
Data Protection Law. Oxford University Press 2015. 
36  Bygrave, L. A. The Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law. – University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 2001/24 (1); Rouvroy., A., Poullet, Y. The right to informational self-
determination and the Value of Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy 
for Democracy. In Gutwirth S., Poullet Y., De Hert P., de Terwangne C., Nouwt S. (Eds.) 
Reinventing Data Protection? Springer 2009. 
37  Poullet, Y. Data protection legislation: What is at stake for our society and democracy? – 
Computer Law & Security Review 2009/25 (3). 
38  op cit Poullet, Y.; Andrade, N. Data Protection, Privacy and Identity: Distinguishing Con-
cepts and Articulating Rights. In Fischer-Hübner, S., et al. (Eds.) Privacy and Identity 
Management for Life: 6th IFIP WG PrimeLife International Summer School. Springer 2011. 
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not be built or discussed separate from privacy. On the basis of the above 
explanations, both privacy and data protection issues are tackled in the present 
dissertation in the context of digital monitoring technologies. More specifically, 
data protection is considered as a part of privacy.  
In addition, it is important to clarify, that my publications concentrate on 
privacy and data protection issues concerning three specific digital monitoring 
technologies – social media monitoring (publication I and II), monitoring micro-
chipped employees (publication III) and digital monitoring technologies used 
during COVID-19, such as contact tracing technologies (publication IV and V). 
Two of the publications (publication IV and V) discuss workplace monitoring 
during the spread of COVID-19 as employers who needed to respond to the threat 
posed by the virus had to implement measures to protect their employees’ health 
and safety. In many workplaces, the need for a safe working environment resulted 
in deepening control over employees (e.g. monitoring of teleworkers)39 and rise 
of new monitoring practices40. My publications cover these specific digital 
monitoring technologies (social media, microchips and contact tracing appli-
cations) due to their newness and their possibility to reveal vast amounts of data 
in a covert manner concerning employees. They also allow increased access to 
the employee’s personal sphere and undeniably add an additional dimension to 
the employment relationship highlighting contradictory interests, namely 
employers’ power of control and employee’s privacy and data protection rights. 
Furthermore, in the shift towards greater sophistication of the new ‘dataveil-
lance’41 technologies and their acceptance in the workplace, employee’s privacy 
and data protection are challenged by evolving capabilities of these technologies 
and increasing data processing. Taking the above into consideration, the next 
sections give an overview of digital monitoring technologies analysed in my 
publications, provide insight about the potential privacy problems related to their 
adoption in the workplace and refer to current research on this topic. 
 
 
                                                                          
39  Hodder, A. New Technology, Work and Employment in the era of COVID-19: reflecting 
on legacies of research. – New Technology, Work and Employment 2020/35 (3). 
40  See for example: Chesler, C. Coronavirus will turn your office into a surveillance state. – 
Wired Daily. 04.05.2020; As employees return to the office, banks explore surveillance tech. – 
Reuters. 21.05.2021; Watkins, K. Security and Privacy of COVID-19 Contact-Tracing Apps. 
Symantec Enterprise Blogs 2021. – https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com (30.07.2021); 
Fragala, M. S., Goldberg, Z. N., Goldberg, S. E. Return to Work: Managing Employee Popu-
lation Health During the COVID-19 Pandemic. – Population Health Management 2021/24 (1). 
41  Dataveillance is a form of continuous surveillance through the use of (meta)data. Raley, R. 
Dataveillance and Countervailance. In Gitelman, L. (Ed) ‘Raw Data’ is an Oxymoron. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2013; van Dijck, J. Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big 
Data between scientific paradigm and ideology. – Surveillance & Society 2014/12 (2). 
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1.2.2 Social media  
First, let us look at social media42 as a possible source of applicants’ and 
employees’ data. The widespread use of social media has led employers in 
Estonia and all over the world to routinely use information found on social net-
working sites (e.g. Facebook) to employ and manage their workforce.43 Various 
studies and court cases indicate that processing of employee data on social media 
may have a considerable effect on human resource decisions, including hiring, 
training, promotion and termination.44 The growing popularity of using social 
networking sites is usually justified by the fact that such an approach is quick and 
inexpensive and enables conclusions to be drawn about the applicant’s and 
employee’s character.45 This approach has been considered promising by various 
human resources and popular media accounts which highlight the importance and 
benefits of managers’ use of big data46 analysis, noting for example that 
recruitment is superior when based on data collated from numerous social media 
sources (e.g. Facebook, LinkedIn), together with other sources such as CV data-
bases.47 This is because the use of social media enables employers to obtain 
                                                                          
42  Social media is defined as the Internet-based platforms based upon Web 2.0 that allow 
users to generate and exchange their own content. Kaplan, A. M., Haenlein, M. Users of the 
world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of Social Media. – Business Horizons 2010/53 (1). 
43  boyd, d.n., Ellison, N. B. Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship. – 
Journal of Computer Mediated Education 2007/13 (1); Visamaa, K. Veebipõhiste sotsiaal-
võrgustike kasutamine töötajate värbamisel [The use of social networking sites in recrui-
tment], Bachelor thesis. University of Tartu 2011; Ivask, E.-L. The Use of Facebook as 
Evaluation Method for Job Candidates in Service Sector Organizations. Bachelor Thesis. 
University of Tartu 2013. 
44  Brown, V. R., Vaughn, E. D. The Writing on the (Facebook) Wall: The Use of Social Net-
working Sites in Hiring Decision. – Journal of Business and Psychology 2011/26 (2); Abril, P. 
S., Levin, A., Del Riego, A. Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-First-
Century Employee. – American Business Law Journal 2012/49 (1); Landers, R. N., Schmidt, 
G. B. Social Media in Employee Selection and Recruitment: An Overview. In Landers, R. N., 
Schmidt, G. B. (Eds.) Social Media in Employee Selection and Recruitment. Theory, Practice, 
and Current Challenges. Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016. 
45  Clark, L. A., Roberts, S. J. Employer’s use of social networking sites: A socially irrespon-
sible practice. – Journal of Business Ethics 2010/95 (4); Guilfoyle, S., Bergman, S. M., 
Hartwell C., Powers, J. Social Media, Big Data, and Employment Decisions: Mo’ Data, Mo’ 
Problems? In Landers, R. N., Schmidt, G. B. (Eds.) Social Media in Employee Selection and 
Recruitment. Theory, Practice, and Current Challenges. Springer International Publishing 
Switzerland 2016. 
46  Big data refers to large amounts of data produced very quickly by a high number of diverse 
sources. Data can either be created by people or generated by machines, such as sensors 
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information to predict an individual’s potential to perform job-related tasks, 
complement the social structure of the organization48 and help to predicting 
employees’ behaviour (e.g. who is likely to quit work)49. An employer may also 
gather and assess behavioural metadata, such as ‘likes’, shares, retweets, and 
follows, using big data techniques to infer psychological traits that are tradi-
tionally assessed during the selection process.50  
The use of social media as a monitoring tool has led to the blurring of boun-
daries between the personal and professional lives of employees and applicants 
and has started to create both legal and ethical challenges for employers.51 
Scholars have indicated two main legal and ethical issues surrounding these 
practices – the right of the employer to access an employee’s or applicant’s online 
information, and the permissibility of basing hiring, promotion or dismissal 
decisions on the discovered information.52 These issues indicate that although 
social media monitoring may prove to be a potentially promising source of data 
on applicants or employee data, it is also fraught with potential risks for the 
employee.  
As discussed in publication I, studies carried out among employees show that 
employees consider background checks conducted by employers on social media 
profiles unacceptable as compromising employees’ privacy on social media may 
result in various types of harm. Social media monitoring may reveal job-irrelevant 
information53, lead to premature conclusions about employees’ personality and 
skills and result in the loss of employment opportunities as information presented 
in one context is used in another (also referred as information injustice54). Due 
the possible harm that may arise from social media monitoring, the widespread 
use of this practice and employees’ hesitations concerning the monitoring, the 
questions of privacy and data protection are imminent.  
 
 
                                                                          
48  Carr, C. T. An Uncertainty Reduction Approach to Applicant Information-Seeking in 
Social Media: Effects on Attributions and Hiring. In Landers, R. N., Schmidt, G. B. (Eds.) 
Social Media in Employee Selection and Recruitment. Theory, Practice, and Current 
Challenges. Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016. 
49  op cit Barzilay, A. 
50  Youyou, W., Kosinski, M., Stillwell, D. Computer-based personality judgments are more 
accurate than those made by humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
2015/112 (4). 
51  Vinson, K. E. The blurred boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal Field: Just ‘Face’ 
it. – University of Memphis Law Review 2010/41. 
52  op cit Abril, P. S., Levin, A., Del Riego, A. 
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and Current Challenges. Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016. 
54  van den Joven, M. J., Weckert, J. Information Technology and Moral Philosophy. Cam-
bridge University Press 2008. 
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1.2.3 Microchips 
Unlike social media monitoring, the use of microchips implanted under an 
employee’s skin is still in its infancy, however, the practice has become a reality 
in many workplaces. There are various examples of microchips being implanted 
into employees in different parts of the world (US, Mexico, Sweden, Belgium).55 
This rising new trend is also apparent in Estonia where a few companies have 
taken the lead in microchipping their employees.56 The reason for the escalating 
use of microchips lies primarily in advanced miniaturization and continuously 
falling prices, which makes the use of chips economically viable.57 Also, pre-
liminary findings indicate that our technology saturated society is becoming 
increasingly accepting of insideable technologies (e.g. subcutaneous techno-
logies)58 and the practice of microchipping employees may become even more 
common through commercialization of these chips.59 At the same time, in some 
countries, the trend of microchipping employees has also been met with raised 
concerns. For example, in Britain, trade unions have expressed reluctance about 
the prospects of British companies implanting staff with microchips.60  
In the majority of occasions, microchip implants are currently used to replace 
artefacts such as credit cards, keys, passwords and bracelets that allow users to 
automatically open doors, trigger computers or printers and pay for purchases.61 
Chips are therefore linked to convenience in everyday activities, but as the cost 
of implementing RFID systems drops and the functionality of chips grows, 
organizations may choose to use this technology to track employee productivity, 
improve security and reduce theft62 as microchips may make it possible to log 
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61  Op cit Gauttier, S. 
62  Scassa, T., Chiasson, T., Deturbide, M., Uteck, A. An Analysis of Legal and Technological 
Privacy Implications of Radio Frequency Identification Technologies. Report Prepared under 
the Contributions Program of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2005. – 
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employees’ movements and location and to measure their working time and pace. 
In addition to these functions, chips can also be characterized by their continuous 
presence and lack of control by the employee. As discussed in my publication III, 
the use of microchips may raise several data protection concerns, such as the 
possibility of covert and constant surveillance, profiling and digital discrimi-
nation.63 Due to their features and concerns they reveal, the use of microchips in 
a manner that is respectful of privacy is crucial to maintaining human dignity in 
the employment context.64 Again this technology challenges the privacy and data 
protection framework enacted in the EU. The European Parliament has also 
acknowledged data protection concerns microchips could mean for the employee 
and published a study on possible issues arising from microchipping in the work-
place.65 As discussed in publication III, analysis in that report is too generic and 
the issue needs further examination. 
 
1.2.4 Contact tracing apps and health monitoring technologies 
As discussed in my publications IV and V, not only technology but also critical 
situations may lead to new monitoring practices that have an impact to 
employees’ privacy and data protection rights. This has been evident during the 
COVID-19 crisis. According to the International Labour Organization, 94% of 
the world’s employees lived in countries with some sort of workplace closure as 
a health and safety measure in 202066, indicating that workplace lockdowns 
affected a large proportion of the workforce. Thus, all EU member states and 
organizations alike are trying hectically to find solutions for slowing the spread 
of the disease to enable employees to return to work safely. In the case of infec-
tious diseases such as COVID-19, workplaces are effective focal points for the 
dissemination of information and activation of occupational health and safety 
measures,67 and different data collection and monitoring technologies can 
potentially be introduced in order to ensure a safe working environment. As 
discussed in my publication IV, this has forced EU and national data protection 
authorities in Europe to address questions concerning privacy and data protection 
to determine what personal information employers need to, or can, collect about 
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67  COVID-19 and the world of work: Impact and policy responses. International Labour 
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employees to limit the spread of the virus.68 Furthermore, several researchers 
have indicated possible deficiencies concerning privacy and data protection in 
employment in the context of COVID-19. For example, both Mangan, Gramano 
et al.69 and Hendrickx, Taes et al.70 have discussed employers’ obligations con-
cerning data processing to ensure health and safety in the workplace and have 
raised questions about the extension of the employee’s duties to cooperate with 
employers to limit the spread of the virus.  
Considering that employers must maintain safe workplaces and prevent 
work-related injuries and illnesses71 means that employers are also required to 
limit and, if necessary, track cases of COVID-19 caused in work settings. As 
COVID-19 is a contagious disease that spreads through close social interaction 
between humans, contact tracing, i.e. the practice of identifying persons who are 
in close contact with the infected person so that exposed individuals can be 
informed to self-isolate and go into quarantine, has become one of the most 
important mechanisms for containing the spread of the virus.72 Although no 
evidence has been currently found on the effectiveness of automated contact 
tracing apps to reduce infected cases or the number of infected contacts identified73, 
many different app providers e.g. various health protection agencies; non-health 
agencies within a federal government or local government; health insurers; 
employers; non-profit organizations; and universities; have developed new kinds 
of COVID-19 response technologies.74 Therefore, in deciding how to manage 
COVID-19 detection and control in a workplace, employers have a number of 
different options. 
As discussed in my publication V, employers may use contact tracing apps 
developed at the national level or use solutions generated for mitigating the 
spread of COVID-19 at an organizational level. One of the easiest options for the 
employer would be to make use of the contact tracing apps initiated on the state 
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level as these are free and widely available almost in every EU member state.75 
Employers may also use custom-built solutions to monitor employees during 
COVID-19, i.e., employers have the option of building their own contact tracing 
apps, sourcing one from app developers, or subscribing to workplace contact 
tracing systems offered by private companies. Whether government owned or 
developed by a private company, each of these technologies brings forth the 
inevitable rise of surveillance in a workplace and presents different challenges 
from a privacy and data protection perspective. As discussed in my publication V, 
recent analyses provide insights about the potential problems related to the 
adoption of digital contact tracing. Many authors writing on this topic have 
addressed various concerns related to privacy, including security and risks 
associated with the use of data76 and data privacy in particular77 as well as  
ethical challenges of using public health surveillance technologies78. Although 
scholars have voiced their concerns about governments offering surveillance 
solutions79, and app users have brought actions against app developers and health  
departments after COVID-19 contact tracing apps have exposed sensitive data  
of individuals who used the platform80, less attention has been paid to  
employer-employee power relationships and ubiquitous surveillance in the 
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workplace in this context81. The issue of privacy and data protection in the EU is 
even more relevant as the advice given by the European Data Protection Board 
(EDPB)82 concerning contact tracing in the workplace has been generic,83 and 
during the COVID-19 outbreak, EU data protection rules enacted in the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)84 have been both praised and criticized in the 
context of contact tracing apps. For example, Labour MP and chair of the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights Harriet Harman has said that the GDPR is totally 
inadequate for ensuring the security and privacy of data collected by the 
government’s COVID-19 contact tracing app85. Scholars, however, have stated 
that the EU data protection legal framework was designed to be sufficiently 
flexible and as such, is able to allow for both an efficient response in limiting the 
pandemic and for protecting fundamental human rights and freedoms.86 
 
 
1.3 The research problem  
Today, work technology advancements, have given rise to new organizational 
behaviour regarding the management of employees and prompted new legal 
questions regarding the protection of employees’ rights.87 The invasive nature of 
digital monitoring technologies makes it of utmost importance to question how 
an employee’s right to privacy and the protection of their personal data can be 
safeguarded against possible privacy-invasive monitoring practices. The issue is 
particularly relevant as scholars argue that increasing technology innovation 
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appears destined to further challenge regulatory frameworks as digital monitoring 
technologies can be expected to develop in the future.88 However, regardless of 
increasing monitoring practices and public concern89, academic discussion of 
emerging technologies and the legal and ethical aspects of employees’ rights  
vis-a-vis workplace monitoring, is still growing and has mainly been carried out 
in the US. This is understandable, as scholars argue that there are no real federal 
laws in the US limiting the collection of data received from digital monitoring 
technologies and the applicability of various federal statutes in the context of 
surveillance is extremely narrow.90 This gives US employers broad licence to 
monitor employees. However, in recent years scholars, legislators, experts and 
employee representatives in the EU have also started to discuss possible concerns 
related to digital monitoring technologies on a greater scale.91 For example, the 
European Trade Union Confederation has called for an EU directive on privacy 
at work92 and the European Trade Union Institute has highlighted the need for the 
development of a governance framework in relation to the use of AI (along with 
other new technologies).93 The pressure of new technologies has led EU institutions 
to initiate possible legislative initiatives. Firstly, the European Commission has 
launched a legislative proposal for an Artificial Intelligence Act that provides a 
legal framework for the use of AI.94 Secondly, due to the widespread increase in 
telework and taking into consideration that technological advances have added a 
new layer of complexity to monitoring in the workplace, in 2021 European 
Parliament called on the European Commission to come up with a law allowing 
employees to disconnect from work during non-work hours without con-
sequences and setting minimum standards for remote work.95 In the course of this 
initiative, the Parliament also acknowledged that the use of intrusive digital 
monitoring technologies in the workplace is to some extent addressed and 
regulated only in some member states.96  
In the EU, employee monitoring is not explicitly regulated, but privacy and 
data protection rights that may be violated by employee monitoring are regulated. 
The normative basis for privacy in the EU derives from the provisions of privacy 
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and data protection regulated in Article 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)97, Article 7 and 
8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the GDPR. 
Without underestimating the important value added by the Charter to privacy and 
data protection in the European Union, this dissertation focuses on the ECHR and 
the GDPR. The Charter is left out from the analysis for several reasons: 1) the 
wordings in Article 8(1) of the ECHR and in Article 7 of the Charter concerning 
private life are almost identical; 2) the right to private life regulated in the Charter 
should be given the same meaning and scope as in the ECHR98; 3) the protection 
afforded to privacy by the Charter may not lower the level of protection provided 
for in the ECHR99; 4) the concept of privacy regarding monitoring in the work-
place has had a long time to develop under the rulings of the European Court of 
Human Rights (hereinafter ‘ECtHR’) and 5) the right to data protection estab-
lished in the Charter is further materialized in the GDPR, which in 2018, replaced 
Data Protection Directive100 with the intent of strengthening and unifying data 
protection for all individuals with EU and setting forth rules to make sure people’s 
right to personal data protection remains effective in the digital age.101 
Employers must therefore rely on the legislation cited above when they keep 
track of their employees using digital monitoring technologies. As discussed in 
publications I–V, in the case of workplace monitoring, both employers and 
employees must navigate complex topics regarding data protection and privacy 
as both the ECHR and the GDPR do not specifically address employee’s rights 
in the employment context and therefore fail to give a set of uniform rules that 
regulate workplace monitoring. The struggles that parties to employment contracts 
face indicate possible challenges for the legal clarity of the existing privacy and 
data protection framework. Also, it can be argued that neither the ECHR nor the 
GDPR offers specific guidelines for the implementation of its provisions with 
respect to employee monitoring. EDBP and its predecessor, the Article 29 
Working Party,102 have given various guidance concerning collection of data 
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under the GDPR. However, these guidelines often do not address specific 
monitoring activities at all or do so in a generic manner. Also, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union has only handed down limited case law on the use of 
digital monitoring technologies at work. Due to the general guidance and lack of 
jurisprudence at EU level, national data protection authorities play an important 
role in clarifying the relevant rules and have issued opinions and guidance on 
employee monitoring in general, as well as on specific forms of monitoring in the 
workplace. However, as discussed in publication V, their guidance is often 
country-specific and varies in the case of digital monitoring technologies.  
Today, specific rules at the national level are allowed by laws or collective 
agreements under Article 88(1) of the GDPR. Member states may therefore intro-
duce specific provisions with regard to the processing of employee data for a 
variety of purposes, from recruitment to health and safety, under this article. For 
these reasons, it can be argued that it is in the remit of the member state or social 
partners to rectify possible concerns related to employee monitoring. However, 
according to the research carried out by Eurofound, national legislation struggles 
to keep pace with technological advances and often does not account, sufficiently 
or at all, for employers’ use of state-of-the-art technologies for monitoring pur-
poses.103 In many countries (especially in eastern EU member states), the topic of 
employee monitoring is not high on the policy agenda of the government or social 
partners.104 These member states (e.g. Estonia) have no specific rules concerning 
data collection in employment and therefore apply the rules enacted in the GDPR. 
In other countries, a wide range of different practices is available as several 
member states have enacted laws or allowed derogations under collective agree-
ments concerning data collection in employment and employee monitoring 
(e.g. Finland) and others rely on individual provisions in data protection laws that 
address the same issues (e.g. Germany).105 In most member states, legislation 
follows a technologically neutral approach (as also used in the GDPR), setting 
general rules of wide applicability that in principle cover all types of monitoring 
and data processing.106 Still, a handful of countries in the EU have also regulated 
the use of some intrusive digital monitoring technologies in the workplace, such 
as biometric monitoring.107 Similarities can be cited with the US, where some 
states have responded to the growth potential of microchipping, increased use of 
social media and biometric monitoring by proactively adopting legislation that 
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addresses specific technologies to contain the threat posed to employees.108 Also, 
the framework agreement on digitalization adopted by the European social 
partners in 2020 is reminiscent of Article 88 of the GDPR and the possibilities to 
establish more specific rules in collective agreements on the protection of the 
rights and freedoms in relation to the processing of personal data in the context 
of the employment relationship.109 The reasoning in the agreement states that the 
use of digital technologies and AI surveillance systems poses new risks, potentially 
compromising human dignity and contributing to a deterioration of working 
conditions. In summary, different legal approaches in EU member states, the agree-
ment of the European social partners and the evolving technological landscape all 
continue to widen the differences between countries and open the door for various 
and contradicting practices concerning the use of digital monitoring technologies.  
To conclude, EU has one of the recent and most substantial data protection 
frameworks in the world; however, employee monitoring is not explicitly regu-
lated, which spawns a wide range of national practices. The main problem analysed 
in the present dissertation is that privacy and data protection regulation in the 
ECHR and in the GDPR lack clarity and specificity with regard to the use of 
digital monitoring technologies at work. The problem is not specific to digital 
monitoring technologies referred in subchapters 1.2.2–1.2.4, as the use of existing 
technologies or uptake of any new technology might lead to the same problem 
with existing regulation. However, it can be argued that the problem has emerged 
critically due to digital monitoring technologies that enable constant and covert 
monitoring of employees and has escalated during the COVID-19 pandemic when 
employers had to limit the spread of the disease and used different methods of 
monitoring to do so. The problem is escalated further still by the rise of AI and its 
use in the workplace. If the problem is ignored, it might lead to further deterio-
ration of employees’ rights, increase the discretionary power of employers and 
therefore lead to invasive monitoring practices. 
 
 
1.4 The aim and research questions 
In the context of digital monitoring technologies, it is important to discuss 
whether the rules enacted in the ECHR and the GDPR create a framework that 
enables employers to monitor employees so that employees’ rights concerning 
their privacy are not unjustifiably hindered, and consider whether there is a 
necessity for additional protection of employees. For this reason, the aim of the 
dissertation is to ascertain whether there is a need for specific rules at the EU 
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level that regulate privacy and data protection in case an employer uses digital 
monitoring technologies at work and on what conditions employee monitoring 
using these technologies should be allowed. More specifically, the dissertation 
contains critical analysis of employee privacy and data protection rights enacted 
in the ECHR and the GDPR in the context of digital monitoring technologies to 
determine whether the EU legislature should enact a directive or regulation that 
deals with employee’s privacy rights. If the analysis indicates that EU legislation 
is needed to protect employees, the dissertation proposes to supplement EU 
legislation.  
The dissertation outlines the current privacy framework under the ECHR and 
the GDPR to determine under what conditions employers can monitor employees 
and what the possible challenges are related to employee’s privacy when using 
digital monitoring technologies. Since assessment of the entire GDPR would be 
superfluous, the analysis in the present dissertation is limited in scope and I con-
centrate on the applicability of data protection rules under the GDPR, compare 
different legal bases that employers may use for workplace monitoring and 
discuss issues concerning data protection principles to draw conclusions whether 
the EU needs a set of specific rules concerning workplace monitoring. Although 
all data protection principles must be followed for data processing, the dissertation 
concentrates on the principles of lawfulness, purpose limitation, fairness and 
transparency that raise the most questions in the context of digital monitoring 
technologies.  
To achieve the research aim laid out above, the main research questions 
addressed in the context of digital workplace monitoring practices are as follows:  
1) How does the ECHR protect employees if digital monitoring technologies are 
used by the employer in the digital workplace? 
2) Under which conditions does the GDPR apply if the employer uses digital 
monitoring technologies? Which monitoring practices used by employers in 
the digital workplace under the GDPR could potentially invade the privacy 
and data protection rights of employees? Which monitoring practices used by 
employers in the digital workplace do not fall under the scope of the GDPR 
but should be regulated to protect employees’ privacy? 
3) Which legal bases used by employers in the digital workplace to monitor 
employees under the GDPR could potentially invade the privacy and data pro-
tection rights of employees? 
4) What protection do the data protection principles offer to employees if the 
employer monitors employees in the digital workplace?  
 
The dissertation is organized so that each research question is addressed in a 
separate chapter: the first research question is discussed in the second chapter, 
the second research question is analysed in the third chapter, and the third and 




1.5 Methods and sources 
I used doctrinal research110 to discuss application and interpretation of Article 8 
of the ECHR and rules in the GDPR to ascertain whether there is a need for 
specific rules at the EU level to regulate privacy and data protection in case 
employer uses digital monitoring technologies at work and on what conditions 
employee monitoring using these technologies be allowed. As appropriate to this 
traditional research method, I aimed to systematize, rectify and clarify the law111 
on employee monitoring by analysing texts that consist of primary and secondary 
sources. Therefore, a systemic analysis of relevant rules in the ECHR and the 
GDPR was carried out as well as analysis of additional sources, including legis-
lation, preparatory works, scholarly writings, jurisprudence, studies and guide-
lines. More specifically, I examined the scholarly writings concerning the legal 
regulation of digital monitoring technologies and their different aspects and 
possible concerns related to privacy, security and ethics. Also, more voluminous 
literature on privacy and data protection has been referred and discussed. 
Additionally, as the topic of digital monitoring technologies is novel, empirical 
studies and popular science articles from private and public sources were occa-
sionally relied upon. I used these sources to get a better understanding of different 
digital monitoring technologies, their features, privacy and security risks and 
advantages. Furthermore, different guidelines and studies by several institutions, 
for example, research from the European Commission, European Parliament and 
International Labour Organization and guidance from the Article 29 Working 
Party (later EDPB) and national data protection authorities has been analysed. 
However, it needs to be acknowledged that the traditional method of doctrinal 
research does not fully allow to experience the law in action as argued by 
scholars, and the method focuses on rules of law and does not permit systematic 
and regular reference to the context of the problems the laws were supposed to 
resolve, the purpose they were to serve and the effect they in fact have.112 There-
fore, as the pure doctrinal analysis has been criticized for its ‘intellectually rigid, 
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inflexible and inward-looking approach’113 I did not limit myself only to normative 
comparisons and also paid attention to the context around the topic of digital 
monitoring technologies. In publication II, written together with supervisor Andra 
Siibak, we also used non-doctrinal research, known as socio-legal research, to 
better understand the possible consequences of digital monitoring technologies 
on employee expectations and behaviours.114 The aim of publication II, which 
uses the socio-legal approach, was to study the social reality surrounding the data 
processing practices employers and employees engage in on social networking 
sites. The publication makes use of the data collected during semi-structured 
individual interviews with Estonian employers and employees in order to study 
whether there is a mismatch between the social reality of data subjects and the 
data protection principles. The analysis in publication II demonstrated that this 
mismatch applies regardless of which sector employers and employees’ work in. 
Furthermore, the mismatch was apparent even if the employers involved in the 
study had not encountered any actual (e.g. reputational) problems due to their 
employees’ social media posts, and despite the fact that there were specific social 
media guidelines issued by the organization. 
I also used international and comparative legal research so as to acknowledge 
certain trends and developments and to forecast future developments115. The aim 
of this research is to facilitate our understanding of the operation of international 
law and legal systems.116 Comparative research can be used to enrich the imagi-
nation and increase the set of alternatives117 to be taken into account when drafting 
possible future rules concerning data protection and privacy at work. Unfor-
tunately, the possible deficits of this method also need to be considered as the 
differences of EU legislation and national legal systems of different member 
states is not simply a question of differences of doctrine. Problems may be far 
more fundamental and complicated and may have their roots in the legal system 
as a whole and in society as whole.118 In publication I, taking these concerns into 
account, I compare the privacy approaches in the US and Europe to investigate 
whether a job applicant actually has a right to privacy if they have a profile on a 
social networking site, and then examine the practices in a set of European 
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countries (Estonia, UK, Germany, Finland) to analyse under what conditions 
employers are allowed to carry out background checks on social media and 
whether the employer may base their hiring decision on the information found on 
these public domains. Comparative research has also been used, for example, in 
publication IV, which studies the guidance issued by data protection authorities 
and the EDPB. In particular, I have compared and analysed the guidance issued 
by national data protection authorities in 20 European countries. Also, in all 
publications as well as in this dissertation, I have used examples from legislation, 
jurisprudence, guidance and studies around the world (e.g. US, India, Canada) to 





2. Protection of employee privacy under the ECHR 
2.1 The notion of privacy 
The right to privacy has been called one of the most open-ended rights, which has 
not received a comprehensive definition as there are conflicting interpretations of 
which types of privacy warrant legal recognition and protection.119 One of the 
possible definitions of privacy has been provided by Warren and Brandeis, who 
argued that humans have a natural right to be left alone to determine to what extent 
their own thoughts and emotions are communicated to others.120 Privacy has also 
been described as a freedom from the judgments of others121 or seen as ensuring 
a personal zone of non-interference.122 Our current understanding of infor-
mational privacy is based on how an individual relates to and controls access to 
information about themselves.123 A specific and relevant notion of privacy has 
been given by Poullet, who said the right to privacy is associated with ‘discretion, 
anonymity and solitude’ or ‘escape and withdrawal’ that are necessary for an 
individual to think about or to question their life and to develop their personality 
and relationships with others.124 Poullet’s interpretation of privacy is also relied 
upon in the present dissertation when discussing the employee’s right to privacy 
protection.  
Standards in relation to the protection of privacy, including in employment 
relationship, have been established by the international human rights framework, 
most notably the ECHR and its case law. Article 8(1) of the ECHR states: 
‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence’. Researchers argue that term ‘private life’ in the ECHR is used by 
European legislature as a synonym of privacy that denotes the right to live one’s 
own life with a minimum of interference.125 The ECtHR case law has systemati-
cally stretched and redefined the notion of privacy and gone far beyond the limits 
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of traditional wording of the Convention. According to the case law, the ECHR 
is a ‘living instrument’ that must be construed ‘in the light of present day con-
ditions’,126 which means that ECtHR interprets the right to privacy in the context 
of changing social, economic and technological developments.127  
Although Article 8 of the ECHR does not refer to work or workplace in its 
wording, the ECtHR has, over the course of time, introduced the concept of 
privacy in the context of work under the scope of this provision and in voluminous 
case law, the court has analysed whether the actions by the employer may be 
considered an unjustified interference in the employee’s private life.128 This has 
led the researchers in Eurofound to argue that the ECHR has so far proven to be 
flexible enough to address some of the issues arising from technological develop-
ments at work.129 However, Otto criticizes the ‘open-texture’ of Article 8 and 
points out that the article is not sufficiently clear and coherent in the context of 
employment relations, leading to inconsistencies in case law and broad discretion 
of employers.130 She emphasizes that digital monitoring technologies have changed 
the character and reach of the traditional instruments of employer supervision and 
considerably challenged assumptions concerning the employee’s expectations of 
privacy, noting that enclosing privacy in employment context is a particularly 
difficult task.131 The present dissertation contributes to the discussion by analysing, 
in the following sections, how the ECHR protects employees if digital monitoring 
technologies are used by the employer in the digital workplace. 
 
 
2.2 An employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
To better understand the notion of privacy in an employment relationship, it is 
important to analyse different cases of the ECtHR. In the case of Niemietz vs 
Germany, the court argues that the professional activities should fall within the 
range of Article 8 as ‘respect for private life must also comprise to a certain 
degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings’ 
and explains that ‘it is, after all, in the course of their working lives that the majority 
of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relation-
ships with the outside world.’132 Later cases have confirmed that right to privacy 
according to the ECtHR in the employment context relies on ‘the right to establish 
and to develop relationships with other human beings, especially in the emotional 
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field for the development and fulfilment of one’s own personality’.133 Since 
Niemietz vs Germany, the ECtHR has expanded the scope of Article 8 of the 
ECHR in employment matters, however, the question how to determine whether 
the monitoring was excessive and in contradiction with employee’s privacy is 
still under construction in case law.  
The ECtHR case law dealing with employee privacy has relied on the 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy test’.134 The notion of reasonable expectation 
of privacy is not new and has been shaped in US jurisprudence for years.135 
Today, this notion is the fulcrum on which employee monitoring cases in US turn 
and, therefore, a further explanation concerning US practice is discussed below.  
US case law confirms that a reasonable expectation of privacy is an objective 
entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted community norms.136 
When considering invasion of privacy claims, courts generally weigh the 
employee’s expectation of privacy against the employer’s asserted business pur-
poses for monitoring its employees.137 When it comes to privacy expectations for 
employees, many courts have found that employees do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy when employer-owned equipment or technology is 
involved, the employer has a legitimate business interest, and the intrusion occurs 
during normal work hours.138 Courts have recognized that lack of notice and con-
sent typically support employees’ invasion of privacy claims.139 Therefore, in the 
US, the case law often concentrates on information distribution. For example, in 
United States vs Simons, the court held that employees do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding their use of the internet when the employer has 
policies in place that allow to ‘audit, inspect, and/or monitor’ employees’ internet 
use.140 However, scholars in the US are not ready to accept this approach as final. 
According to experts, future research agenda needs to further define ‘a reasonable 
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expectation of privacy’ for employees.141 According to Ajunwa, as employees are 
obliged to interact with emerging technologies in the workplace, the question of 
what constitutes or should constitute a reasonable expectation of privacy for 
employees remains an important one for legal scholars in the US.142 Also, the US 
Supreme Court has emphasized that modern communications technology and its 
role in a society is still evolving. In City of Ontario vs Quon, the court stated that 
it is difficult for them to predict how employees’ privacy expectations will be 
shaped by technological changes or the degree to which society will be prepared 
to recognize those expectations as reasonable.143 As the court explained, the more 
pervasive and essential or necessary digital monitoring technology becomes for 
an individual’s self-expression or identification, the stronger is the case for an 
expectation of privacy.144 
Similarly to the US case law, the main criteria established by the ECtHR to 
assess if an employee has a reasonable expectation to privacy under Article 8 of 
the ECHR is knowing whether the employer had warned the employee in advance 
about the existence of the monitoring measures.145 This means that the employee’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy may be limited by a notification, privacy policy 
or implied conditions of an employment contract. This leads to the conclusion 
that if employee is aware of monitoring activities, it is not reasonable for them to 
expect that their activities will be private. From the perspective of the employer, 
a notification, policy or a contract may be used to set clear boundaries for the 
employees. However, as noted by Abril et al., employers should be particularly 
careful in that written policies must be carried out, enforced consistently and 
incorporated into the organization’s culture to form the rational foundation of 
employees’ privacy expectations.146 Otherwise, as argued by Broughton et al., the 
mere existence of a policy may not be sufficient, as policies can be too broad, 
ambiguous or unwise147 and it is not self-evident that employees find the time to 
examine them.148 According to Otto, reliance on prior notice shows the weakness 
of the ECtHR case law, as the existence of a policy or a notice should not cancel 
employees’ right to privacy.149 Similarly, as explained by Ford, the approach taken 
                                                                          
141  op cit Ajunwa, I., Crawford, K., Schultz, J.; Anderson, A., Private Government: How 
employers rule our lives (and why we don’t talk about it). Princeton University Press 2017.  
142  op cit Ajunwa, I., Crawford, K., Schultz, J. 
143  City of Ontario, California et al. vs Quon et al., 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
144  Ibidem. 
145  ECtHR 62617/00, Copland v. the United Kingdom; ECtHR 420/07, Köpke v Germany; 
ECtHR 61496/08 Bărbulescu v Romania. 
146  Op cit Abril, P. S., Levin, A., Del Riego, A. 
147  Broughton, A., Higgins, T., Hicks, B., Cox, A. Workplaces and social networking – The 
implications for employment relations. Brighton: Institute for Employment Studies, 2009. 
148  Lamoureux, S. Implementing the General Data Protection Regulation. The experiences of 
three Finnish organizations. Master’s thesis in Governance of Digitalization. Åbo Akademi 
2020. 
149  Op cit Otto, M. 
34 
by the court enables privacy to be set aside by management decisions, considering 
that an employer who informs employees that they are monitored removes any 
expectation employees had of privacy.150 In publication II, interviews with the 
employees revealed that although there were social media guidelines and policies 
in some of the interviewees’ organizations, not a single interviewee was actually 
well informed about the content of these documents. In a majority of cases, 
interviewed employees had simply forgotten the content of these documents, but 
there were also some who said they had never even read the guidelines. To con-
clude, it would appear unjust to leave employees without privacy protection solely 
over the fact that a notice, policy or a contract clause warned them of possible 
invasive monitoring activities. Mere notification would probably not justify 
invasions into employee’s privacy using technologies that enable covert and 
continuous monitoring at work.  
 
 
2.3 Balance of interests  
Recent case law has taken a step back from the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test by classifying it as ‘a significant though not necessarily conclusive factor’ to 
decide on the existence of an interference with private life.151 In a ‘a landmark 
privacy ruling’152 Bărbulescu vs Romania, the court reduces the ambiguity sur-
rounding the legality of employee monitoring and emphasizes that the employee 
should also be allowed a certain degree of personal life at work as the employer’s 
instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero.153 In this 
case, the ECtHR carries out a proportionality test by balancing the interests at 
stake, and in doing so provides instructions on the factors that need to be con-
sidered when balancing the interests of employers and employees. More specifi-
cally, in Bărbulescu vs Romania, the ECtHR gives a number of relevant criteria 
for domestic courts to assess when dealing with monitoring cases, which can be 
summarized as follows: (i) the existence of prior notification on the possibility 
that the employer might take measures to monitor the employee, and of the imple-
mentation of such measures; (ii) the extent of the monitoring by the employer and 
the degree of intrusion into the employee’s privacy; (iii) legitimate aim pursued 
by the employer that could justify the monitoring; (iv) if it would have been 
possible for the employer to establish a monitoring system based on less intrusive 
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methods; (v) the consequences of the monitoring for the employee subjected to it 
and (vi) if adequate safeguards had been provided to the employee. 
Clearly, the balancing of the interests gives a better chance for employees to 
protect their privacy as it gives more protection besides the preliminary formality 
of a prior notice. However, the test given in Bărbulescu vs Romania is not without 
its faults when considering the digital monitoring technologies used at work. One 
fault is because it once again emphasizes prior notice as one of the first and main 
criteria when considering whether monitoring is privacy invasive or not. That 
makes the role of the privacy notice in future cases unclear – will it be only one 
element discussed in the case or will it still have significant impact on the court’s 
decision? Secondly, the ECtHR also takes into consideration the intrusiveness of 
the monitoring measure and whether there are other equally effective ways for 
the employer to monitor employees. In the context of digital monitoring techno-
logies, this seems to be a crucial factor when deciding if the practice is privacy 
invasive or not. However, the notion of intrusiveness can also be criticized as 
being too vague in the context of digital monitoring technologies. For example, 
should social media monitoring be compared to more traditional methods of 
hiring (such as an interview) or would it matter that the search was carried out in, 
for example, social media accounts meant for professional activities (such as 
LinkedIn)? As another example, it is unclear how an employer should ascertain 
the intrusiveness of microchips, which are used to enter the premises in lieu of 
keys, access cards or other similar devices. Due to these questions, it is not clear 
how the ECtHR would classify digital monitoring technologies such as social 
media monitoring and monitoring microchipped employees in terms of their 
intrusiveness compared to other methods of monitoring. With foresight, the Court 
has concluded that ‘the competing interests concerned might well be given a 
different weight in the future, having regard to the extent to which intrusions into 
private life were made possible by new, more sophisticated technologies’.154 The 
court makes it evident that the more pervasive and insidious the monitoring 
deployed, the stronger the legitimate aim pursued has to be. Although court 
practice is forward-looking, ultimately the digital monitoring technologies do not 
comfortably fit in with the criteria introduced by the court. Therefore, legislators, 
judges, employers, and employees are left without a clear direction how to regulate, 
judge, and manage possibly invasive monitoring activities. 
 
 
2.4 Elements of the balancing test 
In this section, analysis of other significant ECtHR cases concerning employee 
monitoring is carried out, a hypothetical case in the context of digital monitoring 
technologies is compiled and components of the balancing test are more closely 
discussed to better understand the protection offered by the ECHR. 
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Indeed, the court has showed in numerous cases155 what an employer should 
do when carrying out monitoring measures on employees; however, these solutions 
may not be suitable in the case of digital monitoring technologies. In Köpke,156 
for example, the court noted that monitoring struck a fair balance between the 
different interests at stake as the covert video surveillance was targeted to specific 
employees, limited in time, processed by a limited number of people, and only 
used for specific purposes. Although reasonable in the case of video surveillance, 
the judgement shows its constraints when considered in another context, such as 
microchips. For instance, it would be impossible to limit the use of microchips 
only for a specific period of time, as employees cannot easily remove or switch 
off the chips. In these cases, the court should probably analyse what information 
is gathered with the help of the microchip (e.g. access times, movements, health 
data from the chip) and rely mostly on the legitimate aim and necessity of pro-
cessing that would justify an intrusion.  
In another case, López Ribalda and Others vs Spain157, the ECtHR decided 
that Article 8 of the ECHR had been violated as employees were not informed 
about the covert video surveillance, the surveillance was not directed towards 
specific individuals (surveillance affected all the employees) and was relentless, 
having lasted for a disproportionate period of time (covered all working hours). 
However, the court also stressed that the intrusion on employees’ private life 
could have been mitigated if, for instance, the employer had informed employees 
about the existence of the monitoring. More specifically, the court pointed out 
that the provision of information to the individual being monitored and its extent 
constitute one of the criteria to be taken into account in order to assess the pro-
portionality of a monitoring measure. However, the court also stated that if such 
information is lacking, the safeguards deriving from the other criteria will be all 
the more important. With this statement, the court highlighted the essentiality of 
information when assessing the legality of employer’s actions. The reasoning in 
this case is questionable in the context of employee monitoring as the court once 
again focuses on the formality of prior notification. Fortunately, the court further 
stressed that the monitoring of employees can be justified when there is a 
reasonable suspicion of serious misconduct. This reasoning of the court makes it 
possible to argue that possibly in future cases where the employee is suspected of 
minor wrongdoing, the court will find covert monitoring privacy invasive (even 
if there is a prior notice).  
Let us now analyse a hypothetical case concerning social media monitoring to 
better understand the possible shortcomings of the circumstantial and broad case 
law of the ECtHR. In this hypothetical case, an employer has used social media 
monitoring for selecting job applicants, limited its activities to a specific period, 
targeted specific applicants and used monitoring only for hiring purposes. At first 
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glance this practice seems to be in conformity with the ECtHR case law as the 
monitoring may not seem particularly intrusive and the employer has a legitimate 
aim. As discussed in my publication I, even if the information that an individual 
places on social networking site is personal or protected, many are convinced that 
a person waives an expectation of privacy to that information when they post it 
on a social networking site.158 According to Warren and Brandeis, the right to 
privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the individual.159 US courts 
have also expressed a disinclination to find rights to privacy in online information 
and according to some US scholars, internet postings are not considered private 
since they are available to the general public.160 Similar ideas are also predominant 
among employers, as discussed in my publications I and II. Empirical studies 
carried out in Estonia reveal that employers believed information on social net-
working site is publicly available and may hence be browsed by them without 
any restrictions.161 On the other hand, I argue in my publication I that compro-
mising applicants’ privacy on social networking site may result in various types 
of harm and might, therefore, intrude into employee’s privacy as discussed below.  
Therefore, to understand the invasion into employee’s privacy in this hypo-
thetical case of social media monitoring, it is also important to discuss the harm 
that this type of monitoring may cause. According to Van der Hoeven and 
Weckert, harm that may arise as a result of the compromise of privacy protections 
is information injustice – i.e. information presented in one context is used in 
another.162 Therefore, negative information conveyed through the applicant’s 
personal profile may not be considered in the proper context, and could result in 
a hasty rejection decision.163 Furthermore, social networking sites represent an 
extensive source of information that may be able to reveal untapped job-relevant 
(and job-irrelevant) applicant characteristics. For example, an internet search 
might reveal job-irrelevant information about the applicant’s political activities, 
national origin, sexual preferences and other information that might not arise 
during a traditional background check. The use of internet screening for selection 
may therefore lead employers to use the available information on public profiles 
to discriminate against applicants on the basis of protected class information 
(e.g. religion, race, sexuality etc.)164, but also due to applicants’ lifestyle and 
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behaviour (e.g. personal relationships, political activities, daily habits, etc.) – 
when lifestyles clash with employers’ interests, ‘lifestyle discrimination’ can 
result.165 Also as discussed in publication I, information on social networking 
sites may vary considerably, which makes comparison between applicants 
unreliable. Shared information on social networking sites might be distorted by 
social desirability or high levels of self-monitoring and social networking sites 
may contain inaccurate information. Despite these different harms that might 
occur, the interviews with Estonian employers indicated that they rarely saw any 
ethical dilemmas when conducting such checks and information found from 
social networking sites truly affected the applicant’s ability to be hired (see 
publication II).  
Finally, let us draw conclusions from this discussion. The harm that may arise 
through social media monitoring or other digital monitoring technologies when 
privacy protection is compromised is alarming. Due to the available information, 
employers are often able to investigate and monitor various pieces of data that 
are out of context, inaccurate, irrelevant, and unreliable. Furthermore, the issue 
is substantial as employers rely on AI tools to extract and sort the information. 
For these reasons, the ECtHR should take into consideration possible harms of 
digital monitoring technology when assessing if a monitoring activity infringes 
on an employee’s privacy. Possible harms that should be considered include 
information injustice, digital monitoring technologies are an extensive source of 
information and may possibly reveal job-irrelevant information, data obtained by 
digital monitoring technologies may vary considerably and be inaccurate. Also, 
the question of necessity – whether the information available from digital 
monitoring technology is even relevant to the job performance or not – should 
have more weight when discussing these technologies. This question can be 
looked at the light of judgement Pay vs UK, where the court noted that the mere 
fact that the monitoring activities did not take place in an entirely private forum 
could not be sufficient to constitute a waiver of the employee’s Article 8 rights.166 
Potentially, this judgement – which endorses the employee’s right to privacy 
outside work and working time – may help in the future cases that concern 
employer monitoring activities that reveal off-duty behaviour of employees (such 
as monitoring employee’s social media accounts). However, it is mere conjecture 
for now how cases related to social media monitoring will be ruled on in the future.  
To conclude, although the ECtHR sets the direction for the future assessments 
of the legality of employee monitoring, it also poses unanswered questions 
concerning digital monitoring technologies. As discussed in this dissertation, 
ECtHR case law regarding monitoring of employees is extensive and trend-
setting. However, the judgements are still limited in scope and based on specific 
monitoring situations. Today, the ECtHR has expanded the reach of private life 
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to telephone conversations,167 video surveillance168 and internet messaging 
applications.169 So far, the court has yet to analyse other forms of monitoring. As 
the ECtHR gives assessment on a case by case basis, researchers argue that the 
case law has led to establishing subjective expectations of privacy in specific 
circumstances.170 As described by Otto, the protection afforded by the ECtHR is 
highly circumstantial and largely dependent upon the employer’s policies and 
practices.171 
Due to extensive remote work during the COVID-19 pandemic, employers’ 
interest in using various digital monitoring applications grew considerably, making 
these issues related to employees’ privacy more pressing than ever. As digital 
monitoring technologies give employers the ability to gather various data con-
cerning employees on a large scale, their use could probably have a chilling effect 
on privacy. Although the test in Bărbulescu vs Romania is a step in the right 
direction, it remains to be seen what components in that test will be used in future 
cases. Reliance on prior notice should lose its importance and intrusiveness of 
monitoring show the need to regulate employee monitoring practices in a more 
precise and comprehensive way. Also, other factors should be added in the 
balancing test so that it is better suited for digital monitoring technologies (such 
as possible harms of digital monitoring technology and necessity of monitoring). 
Pending further cases, digital monitoring technologies will rapidly grow and 
become more efficient in workplaces and the jurisprudence will lag behind. 
Today’s broad ECtHR case law is unlikely to be enough to effectively protect 
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3. Protection of employee’s privacy under the GDPR 
3.1 Significance of the GDPR 
If an employer processes EU employee personal data obtained via digital 
monitoring technology, compliance with the GDPR’s data protection rules will 
need to be considered. Researchers have argued that the GDPR coupled with 
ECtHR judgement in Bărbulescu vs Romania amounts to a coherent framework 
ensuring workplace privacy.172 However, as the ECHR and its case law gives 
guidance but does not really address the digital monitoring technologies used in 
workplaces, it is even more important to look at more specific data protection 
rules as part of privacy enacted in the GDPR. The next subchapters are therefore 
dedicated to discussing the applicability of the GDPR and allowing a better 
understanding of employees’ rights to data protection if an employer uses digital 
monitoring technologies. More specifically, in the next sections I discuss under 
which conditions the GDPR applies if an employer uses digital monitoring 
technologies. I also question which monitoring practices used by employers in 
the digital workplace under the GDPR could potentially invade privacy and data 
protection rights of employees and ask which monitoring practices used by 
employers in the digital workplace do not fall under the scope of the GDPR but 
should nevertheless be regulated to protect employees’ privacy. 
 
 
3.2 Processing employee data 
As the GDPR applies to processing of personal data, its scope is dependent on 
two notions – ‘processing’ and ‘personal data’. Hence, for the GDPR to be appli-
cable, the employer’s monitoring activities have to amount to the processing of 
employee personal data. Pursuant to Article 4(2), the definition of ‘processing’ is 
broad, enabling the GDPR to regulate an indefinite number of activities per-
formed on personal data to fall under its scope, such as collection, recording, 
organization, structuring, storage, use, disclosure, dissemination, erasure and so 
on. In fact, it is difficult to think of anything an employer might do with employees’ 
data that would not be considered as processing. The ‘processing requirement’ is 
therefore readily ascertained in all monitoring activities as the notion encom-
passes every kind of operation possible on personal data. In the context of digital 
monitoring technologies, it is important to note, that the term ‘processing’ covers 
various operations on data regardless of the technical means used.173 The GDPR 
also specifies that it ‘applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly 
by automated means’ and, therefore excludes from its scope of application 
processing operations performed without automated means.  
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The main discussion and concern here is related to the availability of 
increasingly powerful tools that enable processing and analysis of information 
concerning individuals (also referred as ‘people analytics’). The rise of AI in 
general, and machine learning in particular, enables probabilistic analyses of 
large datasets, relying on sophisticated statistical modelling to spot patterns or 
correlations in the data.174 In addition to the sheer quantity of information that can 
be captured and enables algorithmic management of employees, the traditional 
boundary between the workplace and individuals’ private lives is also rapidly 
breaking down. New sources of information can reveal patterns far beyond tradi-
tional employer concerns. Information about an employee’s weekend activities 
harvested from a social media profile can be combined with data from a wearable 
technology that measures Monday morning productivity. The increasing trend of 
self-monitoring with the use of fitness trackers or health-apps on smart phones, 
has created possibilities to combine the result of self-monitoring with data gathered 
in the workplace.175 As argued by Mascheroni and Siibak, the users of health apps 
often ‘simply cannot imagine that their mundane everyday practices and the data 
these evoke could be of any use to anyone’.176 Mascheroni and Siibak emphasize 
that it is crucial to acknowledge that the practice of self-monitoring reproductive 
health tracking apps invite, cannot be separated from the discussions about the 
capitalist data relations and the considerable risk to privacy they pose. According 
to an article published in The Washington Post, for example, popular menstrual 
cycle tracking apps (e.g. Ovia) have been found sharing user data (e.g. current 
trimester; the average time it took employees to get pregnant; the percentage who 
had high-risk pregnancies etc) with employers, indicating that the data traces 
collected through these apps can be used for making various assumptions and 
conclusions in the employment context.177 Taken the above practices into con-
sideration, it is important to note that the GDPR does not distinguish processing 
activities where data collection is limited from other activities were increasingly 
powerful tools can process and analyse information concerning employees and 
spot patterns or correlations in their data. These data practices significantly 
influence employment relationships and communication between employer and 
employee, therefore making it important to consider whether specific EU 
legislation is needed to protect employees from unnecessary and excessive moni-
toring. For example, all the data processing activities often associated with digital 
monitoring technologies, such as collecting the location data of employees, 
looking for patterns in work settings, gathering information concerning employee’s 
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private life (e.g. health information from a contact tracing app) and using AI 
generated datasets and algorithmic management fall under the scope of the GDPR 
and, therefore in principle, are allowed if the employer has legitimate grounds for 
processing (see also subchapter 3.2). Hence, it can be argued that the GDPR 
allows for monitoring practices that are in accordance with the GDPR but still 
could potentially invade privacy and data protection rights of employees.  
It is questionable whether all these processing activities and data received as 
a product of such monitoring should be allowed in the context of employment. 
The breadth of the GDPR may also be considered its weakness when analysing 
employee monitoring. For example, in Finland employers can process only 
personal data that are directly necessary for the employment relationship, thus 
limiting the scope of monitoring activities.178 Some countries have prohibited the 
use of more intrusive digital monitoring technologies or allowed their use to a 
certain extent and others have made covert monitoring unlawful.179 Similarly, 
European Parliament should clarify the scope of employee data processing and 
employee monitoring. For example, EU legislation should clearly indicate that if 
not necessary, employers should refrain from the use of digital monitoring 
technology for the purpose of monitoring particular employees in the workplace. 
Using digital monitoring technologies might be allowed only in case of criminal 
activities or serious wrongdoing or other just causes such as prevention of 
accidents at work.  
 
 
3.3 Identifiable data 
The other criterion established in Article 4(1) that triggers the applicability of the 
GDPR is ‘personal data’, defined as ‘any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person’. The concept of personal data is broad and comprises 
all kinds of information, regardless of their objectiveness or format. Therefore, 
personal data covers a wide range of information and also accommodates data 
relating to ‘working relations or the economic or social behaviour of the indi-
vidual’.180 With the increasing use of digital monitoring technologies, employers 
have readily available different sources of data and are able to collect new types 
of data. Today, data can be collected at a greater level of granularity and scale 
than ever before.181 However, as discussed by Kitchin, the collection, processing 
and use of personal data is ethically, politically, socially and legally complex and 
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it is difficult to draw a clear line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ personal data,182 which 
leaves employers the possibility to process all kinds of data obtained via digital 
monitoring technologies.  
According to Prassl, there are three broad sources of data in the modern 
workplace: digital information, sensors, and the growing trend of employee self-
tracking.183 For example, personal data can be verified or come from an opinion 
or assessment184 expressed in a social media profile or become available with the 
increasing use of devices endowed with sensors/readers (such as microchips) that 
capture every piece of information available about the surrounding work environ-
ment. Today a wide range of ‘embodied computing devices’ – technologies that 
exist in topographical (on the body), visceral (in the body), and ambient (around 
the body) relationships with the body – are available and enable to assist the 
individual in collecting, managing, and preserving various kinds of personal 
information.185 Also, with the help of large number of providers employers are 
able to capture employees’ digital activities, from keystroke logs to screenshots 
taken at regular intervals.186 However not all data captured with these digital 
monitoring technologies falls under the scope of the GDPR.  
It is important to note that the GDPR is applicable if the individual is directly 
or indirectly identifiable. According to Pangrazio & Selwyn, personal data is 
referred to as any ‘personally identifiable information’.187 Westerlund defines 
personal data in the light of the GDPR, stating that ‘[p]ersonal data is charac-
terized as only such data that can be linked to a natural person.’188 Hence, personal 
data is information that is linked to a living individual and can, on its own or 
combined with other information, lead to the identification of that individual. 
Therefore, in order for the GDPR to be applicable, digital monitoring techno-
logies (such as contact tracing apps, wearables, or microchips) have to give out 
information that is linked to an employee and can, on its own or combined with 
other information, lead to the identification of that employee. However, regard-
less of the existence of a legal definition, identifying which information consti-
tutes personal data or even understanding when employers receive personal data 
in the context of digital monitoring technologies is not a clear-cut exercise. As 
discussed in publication III, in the case of microchips, the question of personal 
identifiable data can be a crucial one, as due to different types of technology, the 
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employer may or may not have access to personal data. Hence, the applicability 
of the GDPR depends on what data is accessible from the digital monitoring 
technology to the employer and what form the data is collected and stored in.  
According to Poullet, data obtained by digital monitoring technologies can be 
divided between primary and secondary digital identifiers.189 She argues that due 
to technological developments, employers are today not only able to receive 
primary identifiers directly connected to the person (e.g. name, address, mobile 
phone number, password), but also often get access to secondary identifiers that 
are indirect but based on known information concerning the individual as 
‘cookies’, IP addresses or RFID tag numbers, while not necessarily known to the 
employee, can be associated with an employee or a site or object with which the 
employee is connected.190 Similarly, as I also argued in publications III and V, 
digital monitoring technologies (such as microchips and contact tracing techno-
logies) can collect personally identifiable information that is available to the 
employer (specifically if the app/wearable/microchip has been developed in 
collaboration with an employer or sourced specifically for contact tracing in a 
workplace) and trigger the applicability of GDPR. The applicability of the GDPR 
in respect to digital monitoring technologies is illustrated below by two examples – 
using microchips and contact tracing to monitor employees.  
Microchips may be possible sources of employee’s personal data. As dis-
cussed in publication III, RFID systems may be structured so that the employer 
does not retrieve any personal information about the employee. However, there 
are several ways that the data contained on a chip may become personal data. 
This possibility is also suggested in recital 30 of the GDPR, which does not 
mention microchips, but clearly states that natural persons may be associated with 
online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools, and protocols, 
such as RFID tags. As analysed in publication III, microchipping enables the 
processing of employees’ personal data in two ways. Firstly, the chip itself may 
contain information about the employee. In other words, the chip can function as 
an information carrier, storing data such as the person’s name and address, age or 
medical condition.191 Furthermore, a photograph, a fingerprint or a retinal scan 
may also be included, which would enable facial or biometric identification.192 
When information about an employee is stored on the chip, it is beyond doubt 
that this information qualifies as personal data. Secondly, and more commonly, 
the chip only contains a unique number.193 This unique number is useless as a 
piece of data in isolation. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
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has ruled that a dynamic IP address can be personal data.194 So the question arises 
whether a unique chip identifier can be regarded in a similar manner. In the case 
of microchipping, the backend system typically incorporates a database allowing 
the matching of the data on the chip to other stored information or storing of the 
data itself.195 The unique number becomes relevant if it can be linked to an 
employee and the employee is eventually identifiable with the help of data stored 
in a database.196 In such a case, the information would be considered personal data 
and the GDPR would apply. Therefore, either personal data are directly stored on 
the chip or can be indirectly linked to an employee by combining the chip’s 
unique number with data stored in a backend system. If data from microchips is 
linked to an employee who is identified or identifiable (today or in the future), it 
will become personal data and the processing of their data will fall in the scope 
of the GDPR. However, it is questionable whether this information received from 
the microchip should be used to monitor employees without a serious cause as 
the microchip may enable the gathering of various amounts of detailed data 
concerning the employee. As privacy is the right to anonymity and solitude and 
the possibility to withdraw from others (see subchapter 2.1), this form of digital 
monitoring can be considered too privacy invasive.  
Contact tracing technologies may also be possible sources of employee’s 
personal data. As discussed in publications IV and V, contact tracing apps and 
other technologies that were introduced to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 
gather lots of different data. More conventional personal data that might be 
involved includes identity data such as the user’s name, address, gender, contact 
details. Contact tracing apps and other technological solutions may also process 
data such as health data (whether the user has tested positive to the virus or not) 
and location data or social/proximity graphs that give indication of the inter-
actions between users and the people they came into close contact with.197 How-
ever, depending on the user of the contact tracing app, type of the technology, 
e.g. the architecture and salient features of the app198, employers may or may not 
receive personal data of employees. The choice is often left to employers, who 
may choose what data to collect. For example, Onspota developed the Shield For 
Business app, which enables organizations to define what employee data is col-
lected for the purpose of identifying that employee. Some companies ask that 
employees be identified by name and phone while other companies want their 
employees identified by a number.199 Other Bluetooth contact tracing apps broad-
cast anonymous ‘chirps’ or ‘keys’ from the phone. These keys change frequently, 
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possibly every few minutes. If two phones running an app come in close enough 
contact for a long enough period of time, then the two phones exchange keys.200 
Scholars have said that these unique identifiers, although encrypted, could also 
be linked to the natural person and most likely meet the GDPR definition of 
personal data.201 However, if the employer does not receive these unique identi-
fiers or users are assigned a randomly generated identifier that does not reveal 
any personal information about them,202 the applicability of the GDPR is not 
triggered. This is also the most privacy friendly solution. Again, in the case of 
this digital monitoring technology, employers should only receive employee’s 
personal data in cases where it is necessary (e.g. to mitigate the spread of deadly 
disease in the middle of a pandemic).  
In addition, as information is increasingly organized in machine-readable 
formats, researchers note that information that may be collected and stored in 
anonym zed form can easily be combined from different sources of data to build 
large employee databases, and in principle identify employees.203 In these cases, 
where the analysis of the movement patterns reveals the employee’s identity 
(e.g. implanted employee is demanded to perform tasks in a specific location in 
the workplace), the GDPR should apply even if the employer uses anonymization 
techniques. For example, as discussed in publications III and V, contact tracing 
and RFID enabled systems (such as microchips) may also record the instances 
when a person is present in a specific room every day and from there on it can 
readily be assumed who the person is. Thus, when technologies are used for their 
ability to monitor location and if the traced employee is performing their tasks in 
a specific workplace, it is also possible that, through the analysis of employee’s 
movements, their identity would become known.  
To conclude, the GDPR with its broad wording is applicable to digital moni-
toring technologies if they encompass personal data and the employee is identifi-
able, which is often the case. However, identifying which information constitutes 
personal data or even understanding when employers receive personal data in the 
context of digital monitoring technologies is a complicated exercise. Today it is 
possible to distinguish between primary and secondary digital identifiers, where 
the first is relatively easy to understand as it is directly connected to the person 
(e.g. name, address, mobile phone number), but the latter identifiers are much 
more hidden as they are indirect (e.g. ‘cookies’, IP addresses, RFID tag numbers). 
Digital identifiers are not necessarily known to the employee; however, they can 
be associated with an employee or a site or object with which the employee is 
connected. Contact tracing apps, microchips and other technological solutions 
that use these secondary identifiers may also process various amounts of other 
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data (e.g. health data, location data, behavioural data, social/proximity graphs, 
interactions between users and the people they came into close contact with) and 
do so covertly. These different identifiers make opaque monitoring an even greater 
possibility in the work environment than ever before and therefore EU legislation 
should be considered that enables employees to ascertain when and how moni-
toring is taking place. The monitoring activity should bring forth stricter obli-
gations to employers (e.g. employer’s obligation to give more detailed instruc-
tions to employees; special signs in a workplace to indicate were monitoring is 
taking place) or prohibition on using certain monitoring methods (e.g. prohibition 
of covert monitoring or the inability to gather movement data inside the work-
place). Employees should also have a possibility to choose between ‘new’ and 
more ‘traditional’ monitoring methods (e.g. instead of apps that gather location 
data, employees may be identified by scanning a card at the entrance and exit). 
Also, employers should not be allowed to combine different sources of data 
obtained via digital monitoring technologies to build large employee databases 
that might reveal the employee’s identity even if anonym zed.  
 
 
3.4 Non identifiable data  
In this subchapter, I discuss the possibility that the collection of data from 
unidentified individuals may also violate the employee’s privacy. The GDPR is 
not applicable if the employer receives generalized unidentified information 
about employees. For instance, with the help of data from contact tracing  
apps, employers may get access to analysis of a specific room or workplace 
(e.g. location of users who tested positive for COVID-19 test that show high-level 
hotspots for COVID-19 infections) and overall health status of the workforce 
(e.g. which departments are experiencing COVID-19 symptoms). Although these 
methods of monitoring can be considered justifiable for the purposes of 
mitigating the spread of COVID-19, it is doubtful whether an employer should 
have the option of using similar monitoring methods in ordinary work conditions. 
Regardless of the fact that employees are not identified and the GDPR is not 
applicable, this practice can potentially invade the employee’s privacy. 
Technology enables detailed monitoring of an employee’s life and behavioural 
patterns as increasingly sophisticated sensors allow the capture of physical and 
other information. For instance, Uber pioneered the use of its drivers’ iPhones to 
measure how quickly individuals accelerate and/or break, thus capturing smooth 
and abrupt driving patterns.204 Also, microchips, contact tracing apps or wearable 
devices that allow monitoring the location of employees, their movements, the 
duration of meetings and the level of interaction with colleagues may enable 
employers to uncover patterns on how teams work. Hence, these data collection 
practices can reveal vast amounts of information even if data is anonym zed and 
can be highly invasive as they are aimed at detecting personal elements. Further-
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more, using anonym zed information, an employer may initiate activities and 
guidelines targeted at employees without necessarily knowing their identity. For 
instance, employer may use implanted employees’ location data to release instruc-
tion campaigns based on the attendance of workplace cafeteria or rest areas, 
without associating the chip’s behaviours with a specific employee but a group 
of employees. As discussed in publication V, similar techniques were also used 
during the COVID-19 pandemic to apply social distancing measures in the 
workplace. Also, in case of different tools and wearables that incorporate micro-
phones and voice-pitches analysis, the mood of employees can be apprehended 
without actually recording the content of their conversations.205 Unfortunately, 
these practices leave employees without the protection of the GDPR as anonym 
zed data does not fall into its scope of application (GDPR recital 26).  
To conclude, the employee is left without protection concerning their data and 
privacy if the employer uses the data provided by digital monitoring technologies 
not to identify the employee concerned but simply to profile a computer, tool, 
room, or microchip owner in order to decide on certain actions in regard to the 
employee, such as control and guidance. Due to their possibly invasive nature, 
EU legislation should regulate the employer’s monitoring activities that are aimed 
at profiling employees without identifying them. Employers should generally be 
prohibited from carrying out monitoring of an employee’s life and behavioural 
patterns without a specific purpose (such as health and safety) that should be 
clearly stated in EU legislation.  
 
 
3.5 Controller of data 
An issue that comes up in connection with digital monitoring technologies is the 
status of the employer. In the context of the GDPR, the concepts of controller, 
joint controller and processor play a crucial role since they determine who is 
responsible for compliance with different data protection rules, and how data sub-
jects can exercise their rights in practice.206 Pursuant to Article 4(7) of the GDPR, 
data controller means the natural or legal person, which, alone or jointly with 
others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data. In 
the case of joint controllership, two or more entities determine the purposes and 
means of a processing operation. An important criterion is that the processing 
would not be possible without both parties’ participation in the sense that the 
processing by each party is inseparable, i.e. inextricably linked.207 ‘Data pro-
cessor’ means a natural or legal person which processes personal data on behalf 
of the controller (GDPR Article 4(8)). The differentiation is important as it is the 
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controller who bears responsibility for meeting the data protection obligations 
and may be held liable for data protection violations. Therefore, to ensure account-
ability, the identity of the controller of any monitoring technology should be 
clearly understood.  
As key factors that can be emphasized in an employment relationship are 
control of the employer and subordination of employees208, the controller of 
employees’ data should by default be the employer. However, operations with 
personal data may not be dictated by the employer but instead dealt with by a 
third party. In fact, often the employer only partially or not at all controls the data 
and employees’ data is handled by an employing enterprise, designers, or pro-
viders of a software product. As the required ‘control’ in the GDPR stems from 
‘factual influence’, which requires assessing factual conditions of the case – 
e.g. why is processing taking place, who initiated the processing, who decides the 
means and extent of processing,209 – even if personal data is handled by a third 
party on behalf of the employer, the employer should still be considered the 
controller of data. For example, as discussed in publication V, if the employer 
opted to use organization based technology as opposed to government-sponsored 
contact tracing apps to monitor employees and combat COVID-19 in the work-
place, the employer is most likely the controller of the app and has greater data 
protection responsibilities in respect to any data generated by the app. This can 
be illustrated by the statement from a spokesperson for a contact tracing app 
maker, BrightHR: although the app collects data, that data ‘belongs to the 
customer organization’ – meaning, the company using the app – and therefore is 
subject to the company’s own policies.210 As a controller, the employer has to 
follow the rules of the GDPR (e.g. they must have legal justifications for data 
collection and follow the principles of data processing). This also means that if 
the employer outsources monitoring technologies, they need to choose processors 
(e.g. app developers) who can demonstrate compliance with the GDPR’s data 
protection rules. For example, if an employer uses an external processor, it should 
be the employer’s responsibility to verify that the processor handles the personal 
data as predefined through the purposes and means of processing.211 
However, in practice, digital monitoring technologies and possibilities for 
algorithmic management diffuse responsibility212 and it may be difficult to 
establish who determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal 
data. Furthermore, employees’ self-tracking tools generate more confusion if they 
are used in workplaces due to the encouragement of the employer or on the 
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employer’s orders. As discussed in my publication V, the roles of controller and 
joint controller are not always clear-cut if an employer uses contact tracing 
technologies that are developed by government or large corporations for wider 
use. For example, during the spread of COVID-19, the national health authorities 
should be the controllers of personal data in the case of government-launched 
contact tracing apps, as they determine the purposes and means of data pro-
cessing. However, employers may also wish to make use of government-launched 
contact tracing apps to assure the health and safety of their employees and 
clients. One way of doing this would be to ask employees whether they have the 
app installed on their smartphones and if so, what their status is (i.e. if they have 
received an infection alert). As discussed in publication V, the extent of an 
employer’s responsibility for privacy in relation to such apps will depend on the 
role the employer takes. If the employer is relying on its employees to voluntarily 
pass on relevant information generated from contact tracing government-launched 
contact tracing apps, they are probably not controllers of data for the purposes of 
the GDPR as they do not determine the purposes and means of the processing. 
However, the role of employers inevitably becomes more complicated if they 
insist that employees download and use government apps as a workplace safety 
measure. In this instance, employers have a more active role; however, it is 
questionable whether they define the purpose and means of the processing and 
become controllers of the data for the purposes of the GDPR. Also, the employer 
might not receive any data from the technology (e.g. employer only monitors the 
existence of an app in employee’s or company’s phone) or might not process data 
with automated means and therefore the applicability of the GDPR is not triggered.  
The monitoring activity discussed above – i.e., which is not in the scope of the 
GDPR – should be regulated to protect employee privacy rights. The requirement 
to monitor one’s own health, working speed and time using wearables or apps 
seriously invades employee privacy as it interferes with the employee’s right to 
withdraw on their own terms. Therefore, the employer should not have the right 
to require employees to use digital monitoring technologies such as apps, wear-
ables or microchips to carry out self-controls without a serious cause (e.g. to 
prevent accidents in dangerous work environments or mitigate the spread of a 
contagious disease). I suggest that EU legislation should specify in which situations 
and under what conditions employers may require employees to use digital moni-
toring technologies such as apps or wearables (e.g. smart watches). To avoid 
ambiguities, EU legislation should clearly state that data collection from employee- 
owned sources (e.g. self-tracking app) is prohibited.  
Another factor that complicates the issue of control is the widespread use of 
different forms of work and the greater numbers of ‘atypical’ or ‘non-standard’ 
employees.213 The issue is not discussed further in this dissertation but deserves 
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special mention under the topic of data controllers as it may generate even more 
confusion as these different forms become more normalized. Examples include 
the ‘fissuring workplace’,214 where employer control is exercised by multiple 
parties through outsourcing agreements, the use of temporary agency work, or 
complex corporate groups and false self-employment, where employer control is 
contractually denied through a fictitious independent contractor status.215 Once 
the reality of control is thus camouflaged, employees may no longer enjoy access 
to data-protective norms.216 These topics are not regulated in the GDPR, but 
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4. Legal basis for data processing 
4.1 Lawfulness of processing 
The legal bases in Articles 6 to 10 of the GDPR217 are a precondition for the 
processing of employees’ personal data. Regardless of the monitoring techno-
logies used, employers must first establish a legal basis for lawful processing of 
employees’ data.  
Opinions concerning these legal bases differ. From an employer’s perspective, 
BusinessEurope has welcomed the variety of solutions and noted that the 
‘application of all legal data processing possibilities should be permitted instead 
of forcing one method’.218 Hence, employers seem to prefer a broad approach 
where different legal bases can be used to collect data concerning employees. Still, 
notwithstanding the importance of legality of processing, some researchers have 
been critical of the generalized nature of these legal basis. For example, Otto has 
specifically drawn attention to certain ambiguity concerning the actual scope of 
rather broadly termed legitimacy premises.219 Indeed, the principle of lawfulness 
offers a first set of protection to the employee if workplace monitoring is used, 
and the employer has several possible legal justifications to process employees’ 
personal data (also health data) obtained via digital monitoring technologies used 
at workplaces. However, as argued in publications IV and V, the myriad of pos-
sibilities also causes confusion and finding a legal basis to lawfully monitor 
employees can be challenging. For example, as discussed in publication IV, 
during the spread of COVID-19, the EDBP and national data protection authorities 
referred in their guidance to almost all legal bases enacted in the GDPR as 
relevant, gave sometimes contradictory explanations and left it up to employers 
to choose the legal basis suitable or convenient for them. Furthermore, as brought 
out in publication II, majority of the interviewed employers stated that the use of 
digital monitoring technology (in that case social media monitoring for pre-
employment screening) had become such a routine practice that most of them 
never considered the need for any legitimate grounds for data processing. These 
practices and concerns highlighted above bring forward the need for a closer 
analysis of legal bases enacted in the GDPR. The next subchapters therefore 
concentrate on legal bases to better understand how they are used by employers 
in digital workplace. More specifically, the discussion focuses on the question of 
which legal bases used by employers in the digital workplace to monitor employees 
under the GDPR could potentially invade the privacy and data protection rights 
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of employees. The four main legal bases discussed in the next subchapters that 
may justify employee monitoring are data processing under employment contract 
(Article 6(1)(b) GDPR), under legal obligation (Article 6(1)(c)), by employee’s 
consent (Article 6(1)(a) GDPR) and in accordance with legitimate interests 
pursued by the employer (Article 6(1)(f) GDPR).  
 
 
4.2 Processing of personal data based on employment contract  
Under the employment contract, the employee enters an environment where the 
employer has a strong interest in operating a business efficiently, protecting 
property and mitigating risk. As indicated by researchers220 and stated by the 
Article 29 Working Party221, a certain amount of loss of privacy is an inevitable 
and accepted part of employment relationship, since the sharing of personal 
information is an integral part of this relationship. However, the employment 
contract can only work as a legal basis for the processing of data if this processing 
is necessary for the performance of the contract. For example, the processing of 
an employee’s contacts and bank accounts allows the employer to comply with 
their obligations under employment contract such as paying the salary. These 
particular data processing operations fall under Article 6 (1) (b) of the GDPR and 
hence can deemed lawful.  
Researchers have seen the possibility of using the employment contract to 
justify digital monitoring in some situations. For example, Esfola has argued that 
an employment agreement could implicitly justify positioning of microchipped 
employees, when they pass by readers that receive information from these chips.222 
Similarly, Mangan has stated that in the scenario where an employer wants to 
monitor employee’s social media activity, the employer may argue that it must 
be able to determine whether or not the employee is adhering to contractual obli-
gations and that this is an aspect of the performance of the employment 
contract.223 However, Mangan also notes that an employee may claim that 
observing social media activity is not germane to the performance of contractual 
obligations.224 Overall, it seems that researchers are hesitant to suggest that the 
use of employment contract as a legal basis can be made a general rule, especially 
in the case of more intrusive forms of surveillance, and this is because the activity 
would not be genuinely necessary for the performance of the contract. It is 
doubtful whether the employment agreement as a legal basis for data processing 
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gives the employer certain prerogatives concerning monitoring of its employees 
using digital technologies. Surveillance activities are not indispensable for per-
forming an employment contract and therefore it is reasonable to conclude that 
obligations arising from the contract cannot justify data collection using digital 
monitoring technologies. This argument was also corroborated by the ECtHR in 
Bărbulescu v Romania225, indicating that the legitimate reasons to justify moni-
toring employee’s electronic communications must be weightier than simply 
stating that the employer has the right and the duty to ensure the smooth running 
of the company and the right to supervise its employees performing their pro-
fessional tasks. 
On the other hand, employers have invoked obligations arising from employ-
ment contracts to dismiss employees after monitoring activities revealed inappro-
priate behaviour. For example, social media activity considered inappropriate has 
led to numerous labour dispute cases in the EU and US. In a case in Italy, a prison 
guard was fired because he ‘liked’ a comment on a social network about an 
inmate’s suicide in the prison where he was staffed. The prison’s governing body 
was informed about the conversation and took disciplinary action against the 
employee on the grounds that the guard’s opinion painted a negative picture of 
the penitentiary administration in the public eye. The administrative tribunal 
sided with the employer and ruled against the employee based on the reasoning 
that the opinion embedded in the ‘like’ could damage the reputation of the prison’s 
governing body.226 On the basis of the principle of freedom of expression, 
employees are free to express their ideas about the situation at work unless their 
statements exceed boundaries imposed by national laws and courts. According to 
Topo and Razzolini, labour dispute institutions in Italy have to take into con-
sideration the accuracy of facts, the offensiveness of expressions, whether the 
expression violates the duty not to disclose information on the work organization, 
and how swiftly the employee removed his comment from the web or whether 
the comment reached a wide pool of recipients.227 In conclusion, obligations 
arising from an employment contract should not justify the monitoring of 
employees social media accounts; however, offensive comments or ‘liking’ an 
inappropriate content may still lead to a disciplinary action or dismissal posed by 
the employer.  
To conclude, although an employment contract is a valid basis under the GDPR 
for processing employee data, it should not be applied in the case of workplace 
monitoring. The mere fact that an employment contract is concluded should not 
justify any type of monitoring of employees, and especially not digital monitoring 
technology. Monitoring activities are not indispensable for performing an 
employment contract and therefore obligations arising from the contract cannot 
justify data collection during monitoring activities. This should be the case even 
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if data processing is taking place during trivial operations such as starting up 
computers and entering facilities. Therefore, any kind of monitoring via apps, wear-
ables, microchips or using employees’ phones or computers should not be based 
on the sole existence of a contractual obligation. Hence, contract clauses or policies 
at work should not entitle employers to carry out monitoring activities and should 
not justify employment decisions based on such monitoring (e.g. disciplinary 
actions against employees). Therefore, EU legislation should remove the employ-
ment contract as a possible legal basis for employee monitoring. 
 
 
4.3 Processing of personal data based on legal obligations 
Researchers have argued that it is not always clear as to whether an employer’s 
activities concerning data processing received from digital monitoring techno-
logies are mere contractual obligations, as discussed in the previous subchapter, 
or should be restricted to legal obligations imposed by law.228 The employer is 
often required by law to provide personal data related to those under their direction 
and supervision (e.g. disclosure of employee data to tax authorities). For this, the 
legal ground enshrined in Article 6(1)(c) of the GDPR, ‘for compliance with legal 
obligation to which the controller is subject’ is appropriate. However, processing 
of personal data in the course of monitoring activities is allowed only whenever 
processing is necessary and inevitable for fulfilling legal obligations. For example, 
as illustrated in publication IV, during the spread of COVID-19 most data pro-
tection authorities in EU member states suggested that employers use this ground 
as a relevant means of gathering personal data of employees so that health and 
safety rules can be applied in the work environment. Unfortunately, there is still 
some confusion how the obligations need to be enacted to allow data processing. 
For example, whether a general obligation of health and safety justifies moni-
toring and data gathering or more specific rules need to be put in place for specific 
data collection. 
Therefore, laws may encourage or even require workplace monitoring, which 
places greater pressure on employers to monitor employees and guides them to 
use readily available and often affordable technology. For example, health and 
safety obligations may justify the use of digital monitoring technology. As noted 
by Sprague, in the US, hostile work environment jurisprudence is one area in 
which law may compel surveillance.229 Hence, different digital monitoring techno-
logies are developed and used in workplaces to help to reduce risks at work. 
Various devices (such as wearables and microchips) may be used to augment 
human capabilities, overcome physical limitations and increase safety, especially 
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in hazardous or emergency situations.230 The technology may guide employees 
in performing their tasks more effectively and provide them with useful infor-
mation about their work environment. As an example, wearable technology may 
detect and correct poor posture, prevent falls and monitor deviations from a 
prescribed path.231 Technologically enhanced caps can detect the wearer’s brain 
activity and fatigue levels by reading their brain waves, sensors can measure and 
record information about the wearer’s surroundings and wristbands may alert 
employees when they are entering a hazardous zone.232 These devices may 
present visual overlays of information (e.g. instructions or warnings) or activate 
audio and visual alarms (e.g. when the user’s fatigue level drops or device is 
removed).233 Furthermore, it is probable that employers and employees will start 
to use information received from digital monitoring technologies in workplace 
injury cases.234 For example, better safety and employee performance may lead 
to reduction of damages or compensation schemes in case of work accidents as 
employers are able to get access to real-time reporting of an employee’s location, 
immediate reporting of an employee in distress and measuring of the force of 
impact for diagnosis and treatment of workplace injury.235 In one of the first cases 
of such data being used in a legal proceeding, a Canadian law firm used evidence 
collected by a wearable device (activity data from a Fitbit) in a personal injury 
case to show the effects of an accident.236 Hence, laws that regulate working con-
ditions, such as workplace health and safety, compensation of occupational 
accidents and working time, may lead employers to use obligations enacted in the 
legislation as a justification for employee monitoring. However, the necessary 
cause may often be determined with a digital monitoring technology that might 
be overly intrusive and employers may base their monitoring actions on 
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obligations that are very generic (e.g. need to check working time; guarantee 
employee’s safety).  
Furthermore, laws, collective agreements and court practices can prohibit or 
allow new types of privacy invasive practices used by employers. As an example, 
in the US, employer demands for access to job applicants’ or employees’ social 
media accounts has resulted in the enactment of prohibitory laws in several 
states.237 At the same time, the EU relies on the guidance given by the Article 29 
Working Party, which suggests that there is no legal ground for an employer to 
require potential employees to ‘friend’ the potential employer, or in other ways 
provide access to the contents of their social media profiles.238 Another example 
of regulating possibly invasive monitoring practices can be drawn from the field 
of biometric monitoring. Like the biometric laws in the US (in particular in 
Illinois)239, the topic of biometric monitoring has come under scrutiny in several 
EU member states, such as France, Portugal and Cyprus, which have prohibited 
or regulated specific types of monitoring.240 For example, in Cyprus the use of 
biometrics for monitoring purposes is forbidden.241 Similarly, in Portugal specific 
legal provisions apply in the scope of employment relationships, notably in 
relation to processing of biometric data and stipulate that the processing of 
employees’ biometric data is permitted only for the purpose of monitoring atten-
dance and controlling access to the employer’s premises.242 In France, employers 
must ask for permission from the French Data Protection Authority before pro-
cessing biometric data and data protection impact assessment must be done and 
submitted to the authority.243 Employers using biometric access controls have to 
justify their choice of a biometric device and explain why the use of other 
measures (e.g. badges) is not sufficient given the level of security required.244 In 
addition to biometric monitoring, other types of monitoring methods have been 
addressed in EU member states’ legislation, such as video surveillance. In 
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Portugal, recorded images and other personal data recorded through video systems 
or other technological means of remote surveillance may only be used in criminal 
proceedings.245 In Belgium, monitoring of electronic communications or camera 
surveillance is permitted only for the objectives stipulated in a collective 
agreement.246 A new approach has been enacted in Spain, where the concept of 
‘digital rights’ sets limits on the use of digitally enabled monitoring.247 The law 
recognizes the right of employees to privacy in regard to the use of digital devices 
provided by their employer and stipulates that employers must establish criteria 
for the use of digital devices for employee monitoring. In this sense, the employer 
must implement a policy for the use of digital devices subject to the minimum 
privacy standards, where employees’ representatives must be involved in the 
drafting.248 Also, several member states have included the ‘right to disconnect’ 
into their legislation.249 In addition, many countries promote bargaining and con-
sultation on employee monitoring, giving employee representatives or work 
councils powers in this area. For example, involvement or even consent of 
employee representative, work council or a trade union is often mandatory when 
implementing measures related to employee monitoring.250As seen above, several 
member states have found that more versatile and specific rules are needed to 
regulate new digital monitoring methods.  
To conclude, t is currently not sufficiently clear when employers may rely on 
legal obligations to justify data collection during monitoring under the GDPR. 
Employers may use this legal basis under the GDPR only whenever processing 
is necessary and inevitable for fulfilling legal obligations. Unfortunately, there is 
confusion how the obligations need to be enacted to allow data processing in the 
case of employee monitoring. For example, it is unclear whether a general health 
and safety obligation justifies monitoring and data gathering or more specific 
rules need to be put in place for specific data collection, as several member states 
have done. Necessity and irreplaceability of using digital monitoring technologies 
is often difficult to argue under general legal obligations (such as verifying 
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applicant qualifications and values, or investigating workplace discrimination 
claims in social media, not to mention monitoring measures such as micro-
chipping or contact tracing). Therefore, although legal obligations justify the 
processing of employee data under the GDPR, this legal basis should only be 
applied if national law is specific and clearly regulates employee monitoring 
using digital monitoring technologies. The mere fact that employers are required 
by law to carry out numerous obligations does not justify the use of digital moni-
toring technologies.  
 
 
4.4 Processing of personal data based on employee consent  
The possibility to control personal information is a cornerstone of informational 
privacy and data protection.251 Researchers have described privacy as individuals’ 
right to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others.252 However, as discussed by Otto, granting 
greater freedom to individuals to structure their privacy in employment has brought 
us to situation wherein the threat of intrusion into employees’ private lives is 
potentially greater and less controllable’.253 In the GDPR, the control of infor-
mation is manifested in Article 4(11) of the GDPR that provides consent as a 
legal basis allowing the processing of personal data if the data subject has indi-
cated ones wishes – either by a statement or a clear affirmative action. Hence, if 
employees agree to the use of their personal data, all discussions about the 
lawfulness of data processing are more or less obsolete. Still, if consent is used 
as a legal basis for workplace monitoring, it should be restricted to situations 
where the employee is genuinely able to exercise free choice without any negative 
consequences254. Thus, in accordance with the GDPR consent should not be 
regarded as freely given if the data subject is unable to refuse or withdraw consent 
without detriment (GDPR recital 42). More specifically, in order for consent to 
be valid, it has to be freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous. If any of 
these requirements as present in Article 4(11) of the GDPR prove to be impossible 
or difficult to demonstrate, employer should rely on other grounds for data pro-
cessing. Unfortunately, in an employment relationship these basic prerequisites 
(e.g. freely given, informed) may be difficult to prove conclusively.  
According to recital 43 of the GDPR, consent ‘should not provide a valid legal 
ground for the processing of personal data in a specific case where there is a clear 
imbalance between the data subject and the controller’. For example, in order for 
the employee’s consent to be effective, it should be given in the context where 
the employee has the possibility to negotiate regarding a possibly privacy invasive 
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digital monitoring technology. Researchers, however, are reluctant to recognize 
consent as a fair ground for data processing in employment.255 Scholars have 
argued that consent is powerless in circumstances where a data subject requires a 
certain good256 and due to the imbalance of power that exists in the employment 
relationship, consent is likely to turn into an empty ritual257. As noted by Bygrave 
and DW, consent is problematic when it comes to ensuring strong data protection, 
mainly because information asymmetry between the data controller and the data 
subject, and inability of the data subject to fully evaluate the substance and con-
sequences of what he is consenting to.258 Moore calls this ‘thin consent’ because 
an employee must agree to surveillance.259 The requirement of the consent to be 
freely given with no imbalance in the relationship between controller and 
individual is also one of the manifestations of the principle of fair processing of 
personal data.260 This has led researchers to argue that if employee monitoring is 
based on consent, it will not only be unlawful but also unfair as the employer 
should not be given the opportunity to use its disciplinary powers to persuade 
employees into agreeing to be subject to monitoring.261  
The challenges of using consent in an employment relationship have also been 
raised multiple times by the Article 29 Working Party and later EDBP and 
according to their guidance, in most types of workplace processing activities, the 
legal basis cannot and should not be the employees’ consent due to the nature of 
the employment relationship.262 Similarly, some national data protection authori-
ties263 and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the European Data 
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Protection Supervisor and the Council of Europe264 have questioned the validity 
of consent as a legal basis for processing data about employees and indicated that 
employers should avoid over-reliance on consent. As a result, consent given in 
circumstances where ‘there is risk of deception, intimidation, coercion or signi-
ficant negative consequences if data subject does not consent’, should be quali-
fied as invalid.265 Nevertheless, reliance on consent as a legal basis to process 
employees’ data is allowed under the GDPR and therefore often suggested by 
data protection experts266 and national data protection authorities267 as a suitable 
legal basis for data processing where digital monitoring technologies are used at 
work. This has led employers to also use consent as a legal basis that justifies 
employee monitoring. 
 Thus, if the employer wants to use consent as a legal justification for sur-
veillance, the exact circumstances of the case should be taken into account and it 
should be up to the employer to surpass the burden of proof and demonstrate that 
data processing was consented freely. Although consent can be linked to privacy 
as a means for individuals to achieve particular ends according to their will,268 in 
the case of digital monitoring technology, it may be hard or even impossible to 
distinguish freely given and not freely given consent. This can be complicated 
because not every employee is in a situation of clear imbalance of powers  
(e.g. managers, specialists with certain qualifications and employees in small 
enterprises might have more room for negotiation) and it is possible that some 
employees are willing to accept a lower degree of privacy in order to enjoy the 
benefits brought by new technologies. For example, as discussed in publication 
III, employees may desire microchip implants to be early adopters of new 
technology and appreciate the conveniences of the microchips (e.g. microchips 
granting access to workplace, releases the employee of the burden of having to 
carry and not forget or lose their access card used for same reasons). 
However, as discussed above, employees may feel that their refusal not to 
adopt microchip implants or to disclose data from social media can result in a 
career limiting move (e.g. not getting hired for a job). In these situations: how-
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ever, according to article 7(4) of the GDPR, their consent should be invalid. This 
article states that when assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account 
shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the 
provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data 
that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. As analysed by Mangan, 
this provision appears to contemplate an employment situation in which a job 
offer is made by way of a standard form contract on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.269 
Therefore, employment should never be made contingent on a willingness to 
download a contact tracing app or implant a microchip. If the employee refuses, 
dismissal upon these grounds could be judged unlawful. Unfortunately, it is hard 
to prove that the loss of a job opportunity resulted from refusing or withdrawing 
consent.  
As argued in publication III, the technology may also limit the employee’s 
options to choose from, disallowing or making it difficult to withdraw the consent 
or refuse to give consent. For example, in case of microchips implanted under the 
employee’s skin, withdrawing consent is truly possible only if the employer 
covers the cost of the surgery to remove the microchip. Moreover, in case of 
social media monitoring, the withdrawal of consent has no considerable effect. 
As discussed by Solove, information once known by others, cannot be eradicated 
from their minds.270 Other factors also influence the quality of the consent given 
by employees, for example, the existence of facilitating conditions. If the work-
places decided to support only one form of technology (e.g. employers using 
services that cater only to microchip implants), the infrastructure would lead the 
individual to support the perceived usefulness of the technology and, as a result, 
consent to the technology. For instance, refusing a microchip that is used for 
monitoring can be difficult if the same chip also gives access to work premises. 
In these situations, the possibility to refuse or withdraw consent in a microchip 
authentication enabled workplace seems difficult to achieve without exiting or 
limiting the microchip-enabled service provided by the microchips in the work-
place. Therefore, for employees to truly have a choice, companies should provide 
infrastructure supporting the use of different technologies. For instance, Onspota’s 
team, the developers of the Shield For Business app that helps employers to track 
possible COVID-19 exposures in work premises by collecting data on a employees’ 
location, movements and proximity to others, also offers non-consenting 
employees, an alternative solution: scanning various QR codes all across the 
factory floor instead.271 Hence, employers should ensure that the removal of 
microchips or other digital monitoring technologies does not lead to a decrease 
in the level of service offered, avoiding digital discrimination among their 
employees. 
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Sometimes, it is also difficult for the employee to refuse consent, i.e. refusing 
becomes somehow ‘abnormal’272 as the wider use of technology in workplace may 
influence the employee’s decision making. As discussed by Gauttier, colleagues 
who have implanted microchips can set the trend for others, thus decreasing 
scepticism towards the technology,273 and therefore generating a culture where 
employees are expected to endorse this technological solution. According to 
Gauttier, employees may feel that technology allows them to use services 
conveniently, enables them to explore the potential of the technology and be part 
of the future that is promoted by the company.274 As discussed in publication III, 
these triggers of digital monitoring technologies, e.g. the spread of individual 
cases, peer pressure, different affordances provided by the chip and the infra-
structure in a workplace, have an impact on the quality of the consent given by 
the employee and may reduce employees’ organizing and negotiating powers. As 
a consequence, employees may often be conditioned when giving consent to make 
a calculated and rational decision about digital monitoring technologies.  
Furthermore, as Ajunwa, Crawford and Ford argue, employers may present 
digital technology as a benefit to employees.275 Employees are encouraged and 
often rewarded for providing their information. For instance, about 90% of com-
panies in the US offer wellness programs, some of which encourage employees 
to use Fitbit and other devices that measure the quantity and intensity of their 
workouts and to employ simple visual and motivational tools to track their 
progress and help sustain their engagement.276 For example, a major corporation 
in the US, Target, is using activity and sleep-tracking devices to promote health 
habits for employees.277 Digital monitoring technologies may also contribute to the 
gamification of work, making employees feel that they are constantly in com-
petition with one another.278 These practices discussed above may also lead to 
implications for consent quality and reduce employees’ organizing and negotiating 
power.  
In addition, the world of work has been profoundly affected by the COVID-19 
pandemic during which digital contact tracing and other digital monitoring 
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technologies have been increasingly put into use in the hopes of slowing the 
spread of the virus279 and for enabling employees to return to work safely. For 
example, various smartphone contact tracing apps enable real-time tracing of a 
massive number of potentially infected individuals.280 However, one concern is 
that contact tracing apps, although explicitly voluntary in many countries281, 
might become mandatory in workplaces.282 As discussed in publication V, given 
that it is unlikely that the app will be adopted so extensively in a given workplace 
if it is merely voluntary, many employers may want to encourage its use among 
employees to make it effective. It is likely that many businesses will promote the 
relevant app as part of the organization’s health and safety strategy and highlight 
the benefits of everyone using it. Although this measure may be justified during 
a health and safety crisis, it also raises new concerns as the practice may lead to 
overall acceptance of different intrusive digital monitoring technologies after the 
pandemic ends and therefore reduce the employee’s consenting power con-
siderably. In fact, not all countries are willing to leave the decision-making in the 
hands of the employers, which is the case under the GDPR. For example, Australia 
passed legislation that prevents private sector actors from requiring use of the 
contact tracing app.283 The situation is the opposite in the US, where employers 
would be permitted to require employees to use a contact tracing app as a con-
dition of employment.284 In India, a national contact tracing app has been made 
mandatory for government and private sector employees, some of whom need to 
download the app in order to access their workplaces or get paid.285  
In addition to the criteria that consent must be freely given, specific and un-
ambiguous, it also has to be informed. The informed consent requirement brings 
a certain degree of transparency: consent should be based on comprehensive 
notification and be explicit (e.g. given in writing).286 Thus, as argued by Mitrou, 
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consent needs a clearly defined scope of action, i.e. the consenting employee 
needs to have the relevant information so that they would know what they are 
consenting to.287 However, in the case of digital monitoring technologies, an 
informed decision is hard to make as employees may be unable to understand the 
consequences of consent. As noted by Moreham, in practice it is difficult or even 
impossible to have absolute control over information, especially in the con-
temporary, digital, networked world.288 The extent of data collected about 
employees, especially in the context of digital monitoring technologies and 
greater connectivity, enhances data processing capabilities, which make the  
issue of informed consent even more challenging. According to the European 
Fundamental Rights Agency, individuals often lack a clear understanding of the 
extent of the data collected, of the technical functioning of the processing and 
therefore of what they are consenting to.289 As discussed in publication V, 
informed consent should include proper knowledge about the use of the data from 
the technology. For example, in case of microchip implants, the employee should 
be informed about the placement of possible readers that trace employees’ 
movements and whether the data from the chip is combined with other data. 
Employees should also know that the design of the technology does not allow the 
chips to be turned off and it is impossible to shield one’s personal data on the 
devices from being read. 
Furthermore, attempts to meaningfully inform employees may also be in-
adequate. Research suggests that highly technical, long, and complex privacy 
notices, policies or contract clauses often fail to inform data subjects about the 
true nature of data processing practices.290 Research shows that even if a company 
has guidelines and policies in place, employees are not properly informed about 
the content of these documents (see also publication II). In addition, employers 
often rely upon the employment contract for consent to a range of matters. For 
example, as discussed by Mangan, speech may be curbed remarkably through the 
expansive wording of employment contract clauses that confer unilateral authority 
on employers to determine ‘offending’ speech291 (e.g. in social media). According 
to Solove, an employer’s notices or policies often fail to make it clear to 
employees what data is collected and for what purposes, how the data is analysed, 
and which decisions result from the analyses.292 Also, as discussed by Padi, in a 
bid to avoid liability and take account of future data uses, it is foreseeable that 
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employers may draft vague privacy policies to cover any unforeseen eventuality 
of processing.293 Therefore, I believe that consent gathered by such contract 
clauses, privacy notices or policies is meaningless as broad and permissive infor-
mation fails to genuinely inform the employee about all aspects and consequences 
of digital monitoring technology. Furthermore, as the employers do not usually 
develop technologies (e.g. apps, wearables, microchips) themselves, they often 
do not know enough about how data will be collected, stored, shared or used294 
and therefore are not able to communicate this information to their employees.  
Concerns around the legal feasibility of consent have led researchers to argue 
that consent cannot automatically validate the employers’ privacy invasive 
practices and considered necessary to move from the legal basis of consent to the 
legal basis of legitimate interest that fits best to the new technologically-driven 
workplace.295 Also, the Article 29 Working Party has recognized the specific 
features of the employment relationship, and concluded that, bar exceptional 
situations, employers will have to rely on a legal ground other than consent – such 
as the necessity to process the data in their legitimate interest.296  
To conclude, consent as a legal basis may be used by employers to justify 
employee monitoring under the GDPR; however, this legal basis may also 
potentially invade privacy and data protection rights of employees. Due to 
GDPR’s complex and vague rules related to consent, digital monitoring techno-
logies are likely to expand without clear direction in workplaces, which may 
cause further deterioration in employee privacy protections. Employees and 
employers would benefit from a clear and stable approach concerning these 
technologies. Thus, due to the imbalance of power between employers and 
employees and the features of digital monitoring technologies, I argue that it 
would be necessary for EU legislation to strengthen employees’ ability to reject 
digital monitoring technologies and stipulate specific rules for these technologies. 
EU legislation should prohibit the use of consent as a sole legal basis for 
employee monitoring (e.g. consent could be used together with another legal 
basis such as legitimate interests). However, as agreement and relevant infor-
mation remains the mechanism through which employees can exercise control 
over their personal data, the legal basis for processing should be accompanied by 
the obligation to carry out information and consultation among employees and 
seek their approval of these technologies (e.g. by way of negotiations with work 
councils or other employee representatives). Also, legislation should always 
require companies to provide the infrastructure supporting the use of different 
technologies and employers should not rely on one specific digital monitoring 
technology (such as microchip implants) exclusively. 
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4.5 Processing of personal data based on  
the legitimate interests of the employer  
4.5.1 Legitimate interests as a balance of different elements 
On the grounds of legitimate interests, employers can process their employees’ 
data when their commercial interests are so strong that they prevail over 
employees’ rights such as privacy, data protection, etc. The application of this 
lawful ground therefore calls for balancing the interest of the employer with 
interests and fundamental rights of employee, similarly to the exercise carried out 
by the ECtHR (e.g. in Bărbulescu v Romania) referred in subchapter 2.3 of this 
dissertation. Although possibly a good alternative in employment relationship for 
other legal grounds discussed above, this basis is also not without its faults. 
Researchers have indicated that legitimate interest as a legal basis is formulated 
broadly and therefore is too ambiguous.297 For example, Otto has argued that 
neither the GDPR nor the CJEU provides clear guidance concerning the types of 
interests that may legitimize the free processing of personal information, the 
conditions of under which such interest may be considered to override data 
subjects’ rights, or who should be entitled to make such a decision.298  
It is important to note that reliance upon Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR does not 
automatically validate any kind of processing implemented by the employer. As 
mentioned, processing under this legal basis is possible if it is necessary for the 
purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the employer, except where such 
interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the employee which require protection of personal data. The notion of the interest 
in Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR relates to benefits the employer derives from the 
processing. An interest should be considered legitimate as long as it is in 
accordance with the law in its broadest sense, specific enough and represents an 
actual interest.299 Under the GDPR, all sorts of possible interests seem to be 
covered.300 In its Opinion, the Article 29 Working Party lists prevention of fraud, 
employee monitoring for safety or management purposes and physical security 
or IT and network security as examples of situations that may amount to 
legitimate interests of the employer.301 As discussed in publications IV and V, 
collection of employee data during the outbreak of COVID-19 for health and safety 
purposes (e.g. using contact tracing apps or other similar technologies), appear to 
be aligned with the employees’ individual interests in their well-being, so it is 
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unlikely that there would be overriding compelling individual rights that would 
invalidate the processing. Other possible situations in which legitimate interest 
could be used are extremely broad, such as positioning employees using micro-
chip implants in sectors where a constant knowledge of their whereabouts is 
needed (e.g. ambulance teams).  
Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the employer also has to evaluate the 
impact of the monitoring activities on the employee. The objective of this 
‘balancing test’ is to ensure that the degree of intrusion on the employee’s privacy 
is proportionate to the goals pursued by the employer. The purpose of this 
assessment under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR is not to erase any possibility of 
negative consequences for the employee but to ensure that the impact is pro-
portionate.302 As stated by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, the 
employer has to establish interests that provide justification for employee surveil-
lance, but also take into account that its actions ‘cannot unjustifiably prejudice 
the rights and freedoms of the data subjects’.303 Otto has criticized this concept 
by saying that ‘from the employer’s perspective, establishing the required nexus 
between the privacy invasive measure/policy and the relevant interest represents 
in practice pure formality.’304 She emphasizes that ‘in order to protect the 
employees’ privacy from pervasive and endless interference’ based on apparently 
legitimate interests, the concepts ‘individualization’ and ‘relevance’ should be 
incorporated into the assessment of the legitimacy of a privacy-invasive 
measure.305  
During the balancing test under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the employer 
needs to establish the potential consequences for the employee by identifying the 
possible privacy risks of monitoring, and their likelihood of materialising and 
severity.306 Possible privacy related risks can be found in recital 75 of the GDPR. 
In accordance with the recital, evaluation of personal aspects may be damaging 
(the recital refers to physical, material or non-material damage) as it leads to 
‘analysing or predicting aspects concerning performance at work, economic 
situation, health, personal preferences or interests, reliability or behaviour, location 
or movements, in order to create or use personal profiles’. The Article 29 Working 
Party goes even further, stating that ‘broader emotional impacts’307 on the 
employee must also be duly considered, as well as the employee’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the reasonable expec-
tations of the employees should be considered as established by the ECtHR or as 
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rooted in the US case law.308 It therefore remains to be seen how the potential 
consequences for the employee and their reasonable expectations should be 
evaluated during a balancing exercise in the context of digital monitoring techno-
logies under the GDPR. To complicate the matter, this legal basis also requires a 
necessity test,309 which means that the employer needs to show that the use of 
digital monitoring technology is necessary and that there are no other means of 
monitoring less intrusive to the employee.  
To summarize, the balancing exercise under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR has 
been criticized due to its broadness and lack of understanding as the test leaves 
much room for interpretation.310 As seen above, the balancing test consists of 
several components and considerations, such as the employer’s interests, potential 
consequences for the employee, possible privacy risks and their likelihood of 
materialising, reasonable expectation of privacy and intensity of monitoring. 
Unfortunately, these components and considerations have not been indicated in 
the GDPR but have been generally explained in the Article 29 Working Party’s 
guidance311. Therefore, it is unclear if the mentioned list is exhaustive or open, 
and how these elements should be interpreted in the context of digital monitoring 
technologies. The difficulty with the balancing test is that a balancing of rights is 
never clear-cut and depends on the specifics of the case. As the balancing test is 
carried out by the employer, it is questionable if the test strikes a fair balance 
between the parties of the employment relationship and is not biased. The 
balancing test also needs a strict and substantive analysis that may be complicated 
for employers to carry out. To better illustrate the difficulties that accompany 
balancing of interests and necessity test, the next subchapter looks at some 
examples of national jurisprudence concerning digital monitoring technologies. 
 
4.5.2. Possibly intrusive monitoring under the legitimate interests 
Examples of balancing employer’s and employee’s interests can be found in the 
case law of the ECtHR and national courts. Helpful guidance in this matter comes 
from Bărbulescu v Romania312, where the court conducted a proportionality 
analysis and shed light on a number of relevant criteria for domestic courts to 
assess when dealing with employee privacy (see subchapter 2.3). Most impor-
tantly, the ECtHR requires an examination of ‘the extent of the monitoring by the 
employer and the degree of intrusion into the employee’s privacy’ as well as an 
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assessment of the possibility for the implementation of less invasive monitoring 
techniques.313 Furthermore, examples of this balancing test can also be found 
from other parts of the world. The Federal Court in Australia, for example, gave 
a four-part test that can also be used to assess the appropriateness of using digital 
monitoring technologies at work. The test asks the following questions: if the 
measure is demonstrably necessary for meeting a specific need; is it likely to be 
effective in meeting that need; is the loss of privacy proportional to the benefit 
gained, and is there a less privacy-invasive way of achieving the same end?314 
National jurisprudence shows that there are situations in which intrusive 
monitoring may be justified and legitimate. For example, in one peculiar case in 
Italy, an employer persuades a human resources manager to create a fake 
Facebook account to chat with the employee during his working time, in order to 
collect the evidence that the employee frequently leaves his workstation un-
attended to chat on Facebook, thereby leaving a dangerous machine uncontrolled. 
As the employee, indeed, started the conversation on Facebook, the employer 
dismisses him on serious breach of contract. In this case, the judge said the 
interference with the employee’s private sphere was not a violation of the right 
to privacy because of the purposes of the employer’s interference: defending the 
employer from the employee’s wrongdoing.315 Concerning this case, researchers 
Topo and Razzolini refer to an Italian regulation that allows interference with the 
employee’s privacy only when strictly necessary316 and say that these concealed 
‘defensive controls’ should be justifiable only if there is no other possibility to 
detect the employee’s misdeeds. They explain that defensive controls are con-
sidered to be lawful only to the extent that there is a legitimate aim and the means 
used to achieve this aim are proportionate and necessary.317 Furthermore, the 
limits of defensive controls in Italy also lie with the general employer’s duty of 
good faith and with the duty to respect, as far as possible, the employee’s dignity 
and privacy in accordance with data protection principles.318 This judgement 
clearly shows that even very intrusive monitoring methods, such as faking a 
Facebook account to communicate with the employee under a false name, may 
be considered acceptable if an employer is able to show that the interests of the 
company prevail over the interests of the employee. Unfortunately, these and 
similar cases also leave ample room for interpretation and lack clarity for future 
decisions.  
Also, as discussed in publication III, in a hypothetical case concerning micro-
chips, the employer may have the right to monitor employees. For example, a 
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company may implant microchips into employees to provide them with access to 
rooms and lockers containing hazardous chemicals. The purpose of the chip is to 
block unauthorized access to chemicals and monitor their use by the worker to 
guarantee employee safety and preclude the misuse (e.g. theft, misplacement) of 
chemical substances. In this case, if microchipping employees has substantial 
safety benefits, the use of microchips might be considered lawful under the GDPR, 
especially for possibly preventing an accident and loss of lives. Here, the impos-
sibility to be able to detach the microchip from the body can be a positive aspect 
as it prevents employees from taking off the chip and causing dangerous 
situations. I believe that in case of microchipping, the specific nature of the sector 
and the job position will play an important role in determining whether the rights 
of employment parties are balanced, and the level of intrusiveness is reasonable. 
As the employer’s responsibility is to ensure the safety and health of professionals 
and clients, microchipping might be more easily accommodated for certain 
occupations, e.g. locating police officers, soldiers or firefighters who need to be 
rescued in an emergency, providing secure restricted access to vaults containing 
highly sensitive data or preventing accidents in laboratories or mining sites, or in 
settings such as psychiatric clinics. In these cases, employer may argue that 
implanting microchips in an employee’s hand is necessary and the least intrusive 
means for employee monitoring, and that alternative solutions are not that 
effective. Unfortunately, it will remain for future case law to determine, whether 
this practice is in accordance with the GDPR. Despite the guidance given by the 
Article 29 Working Party and ECtHR, there is still no readily available annotated 
guide to assist employers who plan to use digital monitoring technologies. I argue 
that such explanations are needed as addressing these issues allows employers to 
determine whether it is appropriate to use digital monitoring technologies (such 
as microchip implants) in the workplace and fosters the development of good 
practices before privacy-invasive ones become entrenched.  
Therefore, the question arises: what monitoring may be considered too 
intrusive and out of balance under a ‘balancing test’. To answer this question, it 
would be useful to analyse another case concerning a different digital monitoring 
technology. For example, the Federal Labour Court of Germany concluded that 
installing keystroke-tracking software on the company’s devices to record every 
keystroke and regularly take screenshots was an unlawful way to monitor 
employees, as it violates employees’ right to informational self-determination and 
is too intrusive on the employee’s right to privacy.319 Although the case was based 
on Section 32(1) of the BDSG, which allows an employer to process employee 
data for the purposes of the employment relationship if this is necessary for its 
establishment, implementation or termination, the discussion also focused on the 
balancing of interests, therefore serving as a relevant example in the context of 
Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR. In its ruling, the court stated that the fact that the 
employee admitted to using the company computer for private purposes during 
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working hours did not justify the circumstances of the dismissal. This was not 
changed by the fact that the employee was aware that the company computer 
systems would be logged and that company also had a policy that forbade private 
use of computers. Therefore, the court determined that because the evidence used 
to dismiss the employee had been obtained illicitly, the termination of employment 
contract was void. The measures initiated by the employer were therefore dis-
proportionate. The judges added that using such software could be legitimate if 
there was a pre-existing concrete suspicion of a criminal offence or serious de-
reliction of work duties. In this case, the use of digital monitoring technology and 
the continuity of employer’s activities rightly tilted the decision of the court in 
favour of the employee. In another dispute in Ireland, the balance was swung in 
the favour of the employer. In this case the employer had installed a camera on 
the truck of a driver working for him. The video recorded only the fuel usage and 
showed the driver had been siphoning fuel for private use and as a result, he was 
dismissed. The Commissioner ruled that the dismissal in this case was lawful, 
stating that covert surveillance – as in this case – may be justified when there is 
a concrete suspicion of fraud or serious dereliction of duty.320 As these decisions 
illustrate, the balance of interests often relies on the details and facts of the case.  
The opinion of the Article 29 Working Party also explores a number of 
possible monitoring scenarios and their lawfulness. For example, in screening 
candidates’ social media profiles during the recruitment process, the collection of 
data must only take place to the extent ‘necessary and relevant to the performance 
of the job’.321 Keystroke logging and screen capture technology, particularly 
when deployed in order to monitor home or remote working, on the other hand, 
is unlikely to be permissible under the GDPR. As the Working Party concludes, 
‘the processing involved in such technologies are disproportionate and the 
employer is very unlikely to have a legal ground under legitimate interest’.322 As 
discussed in publication III, monitoring microchipped employees may also lead 
to very serious consequences for the employee. For example, this could be the 
case if an employer starts to gather real-time data from chips and capture exit and 
entry sequences, location, speed and movement of the employee. This kind of 
systematic reading of a chip can expose the habits of employees and thus possibly 
establish a profile for them. Continuous monitoring of employees constitutes 
serious interference with their right of privacy and as a consequence, employee 
monitoring should be prohibited.  
Regardless of the Article 29 Working Party guidance, there are still several 
shortcomings in the context of reconciliation the competing interests. For example, 
the Working Party’s recommendations also exhort employers to ensure that in 
order to prevent monitoring of private information, appropriate measures must be 
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in place to distinguish between private and business use of the device.323 Given 
the increasingly fluid boundaries between work and the private sphere, however, 
it is not immediately clear how such lines might be drawn. In addition, critics of 
the concept of legitimate interests have said that ‘[p]privacy will not be weighed 
appropriately when balanced against employers’ interests unless the socio-eco-
nomic counterparts of civil and political rights of employees are recognized.’324 
Therefore, indicating that ‘social rights (such as the right to dignity at work, just 
conditions of work, health and safety) should be used to determine the scope of 
coverage of employees’ privacy rights and to delineate the scope of permissible 
infringements on employee privacy.’325 Furthermore, the role of the principle of 
fairness is debatable if legitimate interest is used as a legal basis for processing 
employee data harvested from monitoring activities. Unfortunately, it is unclear 
under what circumstances monitoring of employee’s personal data can be 
considered fair. In addition, researchers have expressed their doubts concerning 
this legal basis as it rules out control of the data by the subject and puts employees 
in a situation of having to trust employers to take care of their rights and to 
conduct the balancing test in a way that strikes a fair balance.326 
To conclude, it is advisable to rely on legitimate interests as a legal basis for 
monitoring employees. However, this legal ground is not without its faults. 
Similarly to ECtHR case law, the employer is required by the GDPR to carry out 
a balancing exercise which takes into consideration different elements. However, 
these elements are not clearly regulated in the legislation but rather given in a 
guidance of the Article 29 Working Party and derive from national jurisprudence. 
For better understanding, these elements should clearly be defined in a legal 
instrument. In the case of digital monitoring technologies, the employer should 
take into consideration the necessity of monitoring, the means of monitoring 
(whether an access card or implanted microchip), specific characteristics of the 
technology and the harm which the monitoring may cause to employees’ privacy. 
In addition, it should be further discussed how the role of fairness, social rights 
at work, good faith, right to health and safety (e.g. right to working environment 
that is suitable for employee’s mental health), freedom of speech (e.g. right to 
express opinions on the internet and social media) and the need to respect 
employee’s dignity also influence the balancing test. Furthermore, the specific 
nature of the sector and the job performed should play a large role in determining 
the level of intrusiveness allowed for monitoring systems. It also seems that 
digital monitoring technologies (such as microchip implants) will find greater 
legitimation in more dangerous and adverse working sites prone to accidents. As 
it is left for the employer to decide which interest may be considered as overriding 
employee’s rights and therefore sufficient justification for data processing, EU 
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legislation should clarify which overriding compelling individual rights would 
invalidate the processing or as a second possibility, legislation should regulate 
what interests or purposes justify monitoring of employees. EU legislation should 
also specify what other factors or steps need to be considered before monitoring 
is lawful. Perhaps an employer might be required to inform employees about 
digital monitoring methods and be obliged to hear their views in this matter. 
Employee’s representatives could also be involved in an implementation and use 





5. Protection through principles of data processing 
5.1 Significance of principles of data processing 
In the next subchapters, I focus on principles of data processing (Article 5) as 
they form the backbone of the GDPR and help to interpret the other data 
protection provisions. In conjunction with the ECtHR’s case law on employee 
monitoring, these principles serve to shape and safeguard workplace privacy. As 
principles must be respected by ‘all processing of personal data’327, they give 
guidance to employers who process data related to employees. The GDPR 
strengthened and detailed the principles328 and today, as argued by researchers, 
these privacy principles should apply to all types of use of personal data in a 
modem workplace.329 Nevertheless, substantial doubts have been expressed as to 
whether the attempt to enforce the data protection principles through legislation 
has actually protected privacy.330 Scholars have identified issues that should be 
resolved in order to accommodate privacy principles in different environments331 
and they argue that these principles have increasingly been reduced to narrow, 
legalistic principles that place the burden of protection on the individual rather 
than on society and its institutions.332 In addition, extensive use of digital moni-
toring technologies and the spread of COVID-19 have sparked a discussion on 
this matter and raised the need to revisit these principles. According to Newlands 
et al., principles of data protection are key to the successful deployment and 
adoption of digital monitoring technologies during the spread of COVID-19.333 
Similarly, as discussed in publications IV and V, most EU data protection 
agencies334 have underlined the importance of general principles of data 
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processing in cases where an employer monitors employees to limit the spread of 
COVID-19. However, scholars have also raised concerns. For example, Custers 
and Ursic argue that adapting digital monitoring technologies to the sometimes 
rigid rules of data protection law is not always easy.335 In the same manner, 
scholars from the US have also stated that digital technology may pose challenges 
to traditional privacy principles.336 Due to the importance of data protection 
principles and possible concerns related to technological advances, in the next 
subchapters, I focus on these principles and ask what protection they offer if an 
employer monitors employees in a digital workplace. I have not analysed all 
principles enacted in the GDPR but concentrated on principles of purpose limi-
tation, fairness and transparency that are vital for the implementation of digital 
monitoring technologies and at the same time raise concerns in the context of 
these technologies.  
 
 
5.2 The principle of purpose limitation 
As many authors have observed, privacy is not only an absence of information, 
but about ensuring that personal information is used for the purposes one desires 
(decisional privacy).337 Thus, it is understandable why purpose limitation is one 
of the core principles of data protection.338 It requires personal data to be ‘col-
lected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in 
a manner that is incompatible with those purposes’.339 Furthermore, designating 
a purpose to the monitoring is vital for defining lawful basis under the GDPR and 
for achieving compliance with the other data protection principles.340 One impor-
tant reason behind the purpose of data processing is that any use of data should 
remain within a data subject’s reasonable expectations and be in compliance with 
the principle of transparency as the employees need to be provided with precise 
information about the purposes of the monitoring in clear and concise form to 
avoid any ambiguity.341 Unfortunately, the principle of purpose limitation is often 
disregarded or sometimes even in contradiction with digital monitoring techno-
logies, as discussed below.  
One problem with purpose limitation is that both employees and employers 
may get used to digital monitoring technologies and view their use as a common 
practice that needs no purpose. As discussed in publication II, the use of digital 
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monitoring technology may become such a routine task that monitoring is carried 
out without having a clear aim in mind. For example, employers often carry out 
social media monitoring with the hope of finding some new information about 
the applicant. Interviewed employers justified their practice by emphasising that 
the applicant needed to ‘fit in’ with the rest of the staff. This practice is in-
consistent with the GDPR; however it is a good example of digital monitoring 
technology becoming normalized as a tool for human resource management.  
Additional problems with the principle of purpose limitation are caused by the 
potentially wide range of purposes legitimizing the collection and processing of 
data in the employment context. For example, contact tracing apps were used 
during the spread of COVID-19 to ensure a safe work environment and prevent 
the virus from spreading. One of the functions of the purpose limitation principle 
is to limit the further data processing in a manner incompatible with the initial 
purpose. However, the precise purpose(s) often depend on the functionalities of 
these technologies. As discussed in my publication V, data processing during 
COVID-19 must be specific enough to exclude further processing for purposes 
unrelated to the management of the COVID-19 health crisis (e.g. for monitoring 
the behaviour and performance of employees). Examples of illegitimate further 
processing include using wearables or apps to prevent the spread of COVID-19 
in the workplace, only to repurpose them afterwards to monitor how employees 
are performing, how much time they spend at their workstations or which 
colleagues are holding a meeting, etc. The concern is that contact tracing apps 
will increase the amount of data generated in the workplace environment and that 
existing technologies will covertly be used to monitor employees, although 
initially intended for different purposes. For example, some employers are 
integrating AI software into existing security cameras to make it possible to count 
individuals in a room and track employee compliance with social distancing and 
mask-wearing regulations and send alerts when employees are not practicing 
social distancing.342 In these cases employers need a suitable legal basis to 
process employees’ data (see chapter 4). Employers may also combine different 
technologies used in a workplace to combine multiple data sources and gain 
comprehensive insight across an entire company and to reduce virus transmission 
in the workplace. Considering the fact that contact tracing is easier to justify in a 
workplace, the power imbalance in an employment relationship makes it easier 
for the employers to mandate employees to use apps or other technologies for 
health and safety purposes. Hence, on the one hand, the use of different technical 
solutions may help employers to create effective contact tracing programs, and to 
reinforce social distancing practices as part of a digitized working environment. 
On the other hand, however, this brings forth the inevitable rise of surveillance 
in a workplace. It is important to note that as these technologies can be endorsed 
during a time of crisis, they can be problematic in a post-pandemic work 
environment.  
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The above practices may lead employers to use technologies for the purposes 
other than originally planned and bring with illegitimate further processing of 
employee data, generate the risk of ‘function creep’ and use of data purposes 
unintended by the employee. As a result, if the consequences of monitoring are 
not reasonably expected by the employees, they would most likely be in breach 
of the principle of purpose limitation. For example, data used for contact tracing 
is later used to control employees’ attendance and observance of working and rest 
time.343 Because of these concerns, both EU data protection agencies344 and 
researchers345 have emphasized that digital infectious disease surveillance and 
related measures need to be ceased at the end of the pandemic. Therefore, any 
personal data collected to combat COVID-19 pandemic must be deleted once it 
no longer serves the purpose for which it was collected – i.e., when the pandemic 
has ended or is sufficiently contained. For example, this means that a contact 
tracing app should be discontinued once the pandemic has ended, and residual 
personal data stored should be destroyed permanently. Also, some of the 
authorities managing contact tracing apps have indicated that the app data 
collected would be removed once the system gets de-activated at the end of the 
pandemic346. However, the ‘end of the pandemic’ is a vague term and researchers 
have already before the spread of COVID-19 expressed their doubts that employers 
may hide secondary purposes in long, legalistic texts of privacy policies that no 
one reads.347 Also, there is no specific knowledge what will happen to techno-
logies used in a workplace after the virus has receded as the principle of purpose 
limitation is in conflict with the very idea of the data economy, which is to reuse 
data. Due to new monitoring methods and the widespread use of different 
technologies at work to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, there is inherent pres-
sure for more efficient use of data that often comes at the expense of employees’ 
privacy.348 When the real need for the technology to keep employees safe has 
receded, it is important that regulations and guidance prevent future harms and 
ill-use by employers, such as function creep if these digital monitoring techno-
logies are used. Similar examples of possible threats to employees’ privacy and 
data protection rights can be constructed with other digital monitoring techno-
logies. For example, via the use of digital technology in wellness programs, 
employers may wish to use, for other purposes, data originally collected under 
the guise of helping employees achieve their personal health goals. Research in 
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the US has revealed that employee data collected as part of workplace wellness 
programs are frequently sold to third parties without the employee’s knowledge 
or consent.349  
Therefore, as there is a high risk of further use of data in case of digital moni-
toring technologies, it can be argued that the principle of purpose limitation is 
broadly worded and allows for monitoring practices that are in line with the 
GDPR but still invade data protection rights and privacy of employees. Due to 
the imbalance of power in an employment relationship, legislation is needed to 
strengthen employees’ ability to reject digital monitoring technologies and the 
purposes that allow for employee monitoring should be more specifically regu-
lated. For example, some member states have allowed specific digital monitoring 
technologies only if their use is permitted for the purposes enacted in legislation 
or collective agreements. For example, monitoring of electronic communications 
or camera surveillance is permitted in Belgium only for the objectives stipulated 
in a collective agreement.350 A similar approach should be used in EU legislation.  
 
 
5.3 Principle of fairness 
The provision in Article 5(1)a) of the GDPR sets out that personal data shall be 
‘processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data 
subject’, thus intertwining the principle of fairness with other principles such as 
lawfulness and transparency of processing and overall compliance of the norms 
enacted in the GDPR.351 The principle of fairness is therefore linked with 
numerous procedural safeguards that should, as a whole, result in fair processing 
of data. For example, in accordance with the GDPR, in order to be fair, the pro-
cessing should be transparent. As argued by Koops, only after employees are 
provided with information concerning data processing will they be able to 
question the dataveillance practices of their employers352 and properly exercise 
the prerogatives granted to them by the GDPR. However, according to Custers 
and Ursic, this approach focuses on procedural fairness rather than substantive 
fairness. They contend that even if companies are compliant with EU data pro-
tection law, people may still perceive interference with their privacy.353 Similarly, 
other researchers argue that legal basis and transparency should not be the only 
notions that determine whether the activities are considered privacy-invasive and 
therefore unfair. For example, Otto states that a ‘fairness requirement, by its very 
nature, includes a more sensitive value judgment, namely on pertaining to 
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perceived equity in the given practice’.354 Furthermore, in her opinion, the court 
should intervene in a situation where an employer’s exercise of power forces 
employees to trade away more of their rights to privacy than would normally be 
acceptable in the given employment context.355 As also discussed in publications 
I and II, the importance of context when assessing if the processing is fair is 
crucial. 
Therefore, adhering to the principles and other provisions of the GDPR does 
not necessarily mean that processing should be considered fair. Fairness should 
be examined in a more substantive way taking into account the theory of ‘con-
textual integrity’ introduced by Nissenbaum, who argued that privacy norms in 
semi-public spheres (such as employment relationship) must respect contextual 
norms.356 Nissenbaum gives relevant parameters, such as the nature of infor-
mation in question, its appropriateness to the context, and the general contextual 
norms of flow/distribution.357 In publication II, I refer to interviews with Estonian 
employers, which indicate that employers’ actions often breach contextual 
integrity and result in unjustifiable negative consequences for employees. For 
instance, some of the interviewed employers who had had previous negative 
experiences with employees’ alcoholism took special notice during social media 
background checks of various party photos and photos in which alcohol was 
displayed. This may lead employers to judge employees or applicants unfairly. 
Therefore, although not required by the GDPR, employers should refrain from 
monitoring employees’ social media activity at all or if they do so (e.g. use 
LinkedIn for its intended professional purposes) consider the role of context and 
abstain from any unjust activities (e.g. eliminating an applicant from the list of 
candidates). 
Also, features of digital monitoring technologies highlight that the context of 
data processing should be taken into consideration when assessing whether 
employer’s surveillance practices can be considered fair. A good example here 
again is social media monitoring. Conversations taking place on social media are 
usually meant for a group of friends or acquaintances as social media can be a 
place to share opinions. However, messages, texts, videos and pictures visible on 
a social media profile may impact an employment relationship in many ways. For 
example, different services are offered to employers that allow to analyse the 
content and information posted on the site by applicants or employees. This enables 
employers to evaluate a candidate for a particular job or assess employee’s 
behaviour or commitment to work. As argued by Poullet, the data from social 
networking sites enables employers to potentially profile the employee and take 
advantage of the knowledge thus acquired, including use of the knowledge 
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outside of its original context. She further states that, ‘it is troubling to see how 
‘private’ and ‘public’ spheres are intermingled on these sites’.358 Indeed, social 
networks make it easy to communicate so that a flow of information invades 
everyday life. As has been pointed out the overflowing of information has 
cancelled the ‘right to ignore’.359 Situations that would be insignificant outside 
social networking community are amplified, because they are available to a wide 
audience and with this comes the increase of responsibility of the employees who 
post online. As explained by Mangan, courts in UK also do not do much to draw 
a line between on- and off-duty conduct as it remains advisable for employers to 
discipline (even terminate) for social media usage. According to Mangan, the 
‘benchmark for harm (anything that could reflect poorly on the employer) remains 
robust’.360 In this regard, Topo and Razzolini state that it is important to leave 
room for an employee’s right to express opinions on social media whenever the 
behaviour does not seriously offend decency and the dignity of others and does 
not disclose business information.361 
Another example of using technology out of context may be seen in the case 
of monitoring employees with microchip implants. As microchip readers can be 
placed anywhere and log everything employees do in their daily lives, their move-
ments, their working time and use of office supplies or even what employees 
purchase at the work cafeteria. These pieces of information separately are not that 
revealing but can be combined to form a bigger portrait of the employee. In his 
works, Solove highlights the potential of this kind of practice to cause harm to 
dignity as it upsets one’s expectations. In his view, people do not expect that small 
bits of information may reveal much.362 Furthermore, as argued by Hildebrandt, 
concerns around ‘ubiquitous’ technology can be aggravated when the knowledge 
derived from the profiling activity does not aim to ‘single out’ an employee from 
all others, but rather identify them as a member of a certain group of employees 
with whom they shares a set of correlated attributes, a process commonly referred 
as ‘group profiling’.363 In those cases, a properties of the group may be imposed 
as traits to all individual employees which may lead to the creation of ‘false 
positives’ or ‘false negatives’ and illegitimately exclude those employees for a 
promotion, for instance.364  
In the light of the above, it can be argued that the principle of fairness is broadly 
worded, therefore allowing for monitoring practices that are in line with the 
GDPR but could still potentially invade data protection rights and privacy of the 
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employee. Fairness should be examined in a more substantive way and the 
processing to be fair, needs to be evaluated within the given context. This means 
that employers may monitor employees only in ways the employees would 
reasonably expect and not use the data in a manner that unjustifiably has a 
negative effect on employees. For example, employers should consider the context 
when assessing social media profiles or collecting data from microchip implants. 
Also, profiling groups of employees to combine a bigger portrait of the workforce 
might lead to out-of-context conclusions and attribute to a single employee with 
characteristics not related to them. The actions mentioned above should be 
considered unfair. The ambiguity and narrow scope of fairness principle show the 
weakness of EU legislation in the context of employee monitoring and reveal the 
need for more specific rules for monitoring at work.  
 
 
5.4 Principle of transparency 
The principle of transparency is central to ensuring privacy and adequate data 
protection. As discussed in subchapter 2.2, according to the ECtHR, the employee 
must be notified in advance of the existence of the monitoring measures and their 
nature and extent.365 Providing information about the data processing activities 
has also an important role in the GDPR as it gives the employee the opportunity 
to act upon the received knowledge, including the possibility to exercise the rights 
provided by the GDPR such as the right to request access to all of the information 
gathered through the monitoring practices, the right to erasure of personal data 
and the right to object to being the subject of monitoring.366 The principle of 
transparency is specified through the requirement to provide required information 
under Articles 13 and 14 of the GDPR. To meet the transparency requirement of 
the GDPR, employees should be informed of some key aspects of data processing 
(e.g., the purposes for which personal data are to be processed).367 Together with 
transparency employers also need to keep the focus on data minimization368 to 
foster employees’ control of their personal data. Hence, there must be no secret 
and covert processing of personal data and such processing should not have 
unforeseen negative effects. However, in the case of digital monitoring techno-
logies, this aim is often difficult to achieve, as explained below.  
Although inconsistent with the GDPR, many employees experience secret and 
excessive data processing due to digital monitoring technologies as discussed in 
publication II. Transparency is also endangered by the features of these techno-
logies and the use of AI. Researchers argue that digital monitoring technologies 
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lack transparency and are difficult to challenge.369 For example, an employer 
might have invited people for interviews after their CVs and social media infor-
mation were ranked by algorithms. Those that did not succeed may never find out 
what factors the algorithm took into account when making the decision and how 
their applications were assessed. Or in another case, employers may encourage 
employees to use wearables or microchip implants to monitor attendance in the 
workplace, offering discounts to those who meet certain goals. As argued by 
Custers and Ursic, the use of a multi-factor, multilevel analysis of employee data 
makes it hard to determine precisely what kind of performance leads to results 
(e.g. bonuses, getting hired).370 Therefore, where digital monitoring technologies 
are concerned, it is important to remember Koops’s advice that quality of 
information that must be provided to data subjects is more important than the 
quantity.371 
The transparency requirement should act as a deterrent on employers seeking 
to implement overly intrusive monitoring activities. If they know that employees 
must be notified in detail of the existence of monitoring activities, employers will 
be more reluctant to introduce highly intrusive measures.372 However, as 
explained by Poullet, ‘the new monitoring technology is largely invisible in two 
ways; it operates in a largely hidden way (we do not know what information is 
collected, when or for whom), but also, as a natural extension of an activity or 
movement (a door opens and the computer comes on) assisting us in our choice 
of activities’.373 The same problem can be noted by the Article 29 Working Party. 
According to their guidelines, owing to the capabilities of such technologies, 
employees may not be aware of what personal data are being processed and for 
which purposes, while it is also possible that they are not even aware of the 
existence of the monitoring technology itself.374 Possible examples can be drawn 
from social media monitoring and using microchips to monitor employees as 
these technologies also enable the employer to covertly observe employees. As 
discussed in my publication III, microchips enable covert monitoring thanks to 
the electromagnetic waves’ ability to travel easily and silently through almost 
every kind of material, without implanted employees being aware of the 
monitoring taking place. Employees may therefore suffer from the inability to be 
aware of the surveillance taking place and eventual profiling that might occur 
through the aggregation of the different data from chip readers present in the 
workplace. For this reason, the Article 29 Working Party highlights the idea that 
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being informed of the geographical or digital vicinity of sensors/readers, when 
the collection of data refers to them or their environment, represents a crucial 
expectation of those users.375 However, these details of monitoring are not regu-
lated in the GDPR. Although the list of information that has to be given to the 
data subject is long in the GDPR, additional information, falling outside the scope 
of the Regulation, should be given to employees when workplace monitoring is 
conducted using digital technologies. For example, in case of some digital 
monitoring technologies (e.g. RFID enabled microchips, AI enabled workplaces) 
it is important to understand the specific times, actions and methods performed 
to process data obtained by monitoring activities. The additional information that 
should be explained to the employees therefore includes information on what 
digital monitoring technologies are used, their specific features and details of 
monitoring, such as what times and where specifically monitoring is taking place, 
what security safeguards have been put in place and what will be the con-
sequences of the monitoring activities (might monitoring lead to disciplinary 
decisions or dismissal of the employee).  
According to the GDPR, the employee should be notified ‘at the time the 
personal data are obtained’, meaning no later than the beginning of monitoring 
activities. This means, for example, that if the social media activities or employees’ 
movements are subject to monitoring, the employer should notify its employees, 
without undue delay, during their very first day of employment. Researchers have 
been critical of this solution, stating that notification obligation is required at a 
time where it is not yet clear for the employee how they will be affected by the 
monitoring.376 According to Esfola, if the burden of providing information is 
imposed only at the beginning of the processing operation, real-time transparency 
is arguably inexistent.377 Therefore, employees might not be told about moni-
toring until judicial proceedings against them. In this regard, Esfola argues that 
while the GDPR provides ‘more’ information to the employees, it seems to have 
missed an opportunity to provide them with ‘better’ information. He claims that 
the possibility to give information at the beginning of the processing activity allows 
a certain degree of ‘function creep’, enabling use of the data beyond the initially 
collected purpose for which it was intended in the first place, with very little 
accountability.378 As argued by Solove, it is not clear what the notified employee 
can, in reality, do with the knowledge that monitoring is taking place, besides see 
their privacy disappear. According to Solove, if individuals are aware that moni-
toring might take place, the feelings of anxiety and discomfort become more 
prominent, which may ultimately result in self-censorship, impairing employees’ 
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self-determination.379 Therefore, it can be argued that the employer’s obligation 
to inform employees under the GDPR, although extensive, occurs at a moment 
when monitoring activities have no effect on the employee and therefore lose 
their relevance and timeliness. If the deployment of a digital monitoring measure 
renders it difficult for one to assess its impact in the workplace, more 
transparency is necessary to hold employers accountable.  
Additionally, the need to give employees information concerning monitoring 
has been stressed in the ECtHR judgement in Barbulescu v. Romania.380 In his 
partly dissenting opinion, Judge De Albuquerque holds that a comprehensive 
policy in the workplace must be put in place, including specific rules on the use 
of email, instant messaging, social networks, blogging and web surfing.381 
Similarly, it is a standard practice for the information required by the GDPR to 
be delivered in the form of a privacy policy. To be compliant with the GDPR, the 
privacy policy needs to be in a ‘concise, transparent, intelligible and easily 
accessible form, using clear and plain language’.382 Still, this approach in the 
GDPR has been characterized by researchers as procedural and formalistic.383 
Researchers argue that the current way these obligations are established in the 
GDPR seem to enable employers to conduct ‘box-ticking’ exercises, providing a 
false sense of security to the employees384 and leading to ‘transparency illusion’.385 
However, transparency should be more than ticking a box and checking if every 
aspect has been included on the list in an employer’s privacy policy. According 
to Koops, for transparency to be relevant, a shift is necessary from (i) process to 
event transparency, (ii) retrospective to real-time transparency and (iii) nominal 
to effective transparency. He explains that procedural components of transparency 
should be replaced by some measurements like inputs, outputs and outcomes, 
organizations should be subject to periodical scrutiny and effective measures 
should be applied to increase transparency.386 Therefore, clear and comprehensive 
policies can be helpful for employees to understand and exercise their rights. 
However, unambiguous, complicated and lengthy privacy policies may also not 
offer sufficient protection. It is also unreasonable to describe details of specific 
monitoring activities in a general policy, mainly because different aspects of 
monitoring (such as the placement of sensors) might be too specific to add into a 
document that usually focuses on general rules. Furthermore, activities, times and 
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subjects connected to monitoring might change over time, which makes the 
policy rapidly obsolete.  
Furthermore, employers often use these privacy policies or contract clauses to 
legitimize disciplinary action if monitoring reveals traits and behaviours of 
employees. For example, there is a permissive attitude toward employers disci-
plining employees for remarks on social media. Cases where employees are fired 
due to social media posts often focus around trust; suggesting that if the employer 
contends it has lost trust in the employee, dismissal will be found to be justified.387 
To avoid an excessive response to employees’ activities on social media, re-
searchers advise employers to ‘put in place transparent and appropriate procedures 
ensuring arrangements for the proportionate and independent investigation of 
facts reported.’388 Other scholars argue that by accepting contractual clauses, 
employees are understood to have consented to the broad constraint placed on 
their social media activity.389 As explained by Mangan, the possibility of losing a 
job may be one of the most potent of the chilling effects in these cases and may 
give employers the role ‘as gatekeepers of online speech’.390 He further explains 
that the acceptability of an employer’s response in case of dismissal is challenged 
on the basis that speech stands out as an important element of democracy and 
should not be casually set aside based upon a contract clause or a policy. The 
above shows the weakness of privacy policies or contract clauses in regulating 
aspects of employee monitoring. Therefore, it has to be agreed that a contract 
clause or notification in the privacy policy cannot legitimize any privacy-intrusive 
monitoring measure and employers should refrain from surveilling the social 
media activities of their employees without a just cause (such as doubts about 
possible fraudulent or criminal behaviour).  
To avoid possible infringements on employee privacy and data protection 
rights through monitoring, several member states have enacted legislation that 
mandates the employer to consult or ask prior consent of the employee’s repre-
sentatives, trade unions or work councils if the employer intends to adopt new 
employee monitoring practices in the workplace.391 In Austria, Finland, Germany, 
the Netherlands and Sweden, employees and employers are required to reach 
agreement on the monitoring rules.392 Information and consultation is required in 
other countries such as Belgium, France and Romania.393Consultations and nego-
tiations can be helpful to mitigate the risks of monitoring. However, lack of 
cooperation between employer and employees may hinder the employee’s rights. 
Unfortunately, the practice of involving employee representatives is not enshrined 
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in the GDPR and today must be agreed in each member state. This hinders the 
protection of employees in countries where collective bargaining and employee 
representation is not prevalent (such as eastern EU member states).  
To conclude, it can be argued that the principle of transparency is broadly 
worded, therefore allowing for monitoring practices that are in line with the 
GDPR but still invade data protection rights and privacy of employees. In light 
of the above analysis, it is evident that under the GDPR, employees do not receive 
adequate information at the right time concerning digital monitoring technologies 
and therefore are not able to understand how monitoring is carried out. Due to the 
possibility of hidden monitoring, legislation in the EU should be enacted to oblige 
employers to periodically inform and communicate monitoring activities to 
employees. Furthermore, it should be mandatory for employers to consult 
employee representatives if they plan to implement digital monitoring techno-
logies. If the monitoring is continuous, employers should require the consent of 
employee representatives before implementing such a measure and carry out 
regular consultations on the issue. In addition, information concerning employees’ 
data and monitoring should not only be added to privacy policies, but the employer 
should be obliged to carry out training courses and visualize monitoring activities 
(such as signs at a workplace that indicate places were monitoring is taking place). 
Also, additional information should be given to employees such as specific details 
of monitoring, information on whether the private use of the company’s techno-
logy is allowed and to what extent (such as internet use), what technological 
safeguards have been put in place and what will be the consequences of the moni-
toring activities. Employees should also be aware of the specific times, actions 
and methods performed to process data. Therefore, employees should be informed 
when and how they are being monitored and, for example, know the location of 
sensors and readers and their monitoring radius. If employer is basing its decisions 
on monitoring results, employees should have detailed knowledge what effect the 







6.1 Extending the protection of privacy  
Digital technologies used at work will lead to new legal controversies in the field 
of privacy and data protection. As shown by the analysis in the present dissertation, 
although the ECHR and its case law is extensive and deals with employee’s 
privacy protection, its scope and content are limited. The ECtHR’s judgements 
do not cover digital monitoring technologies and are largely dependent upon 
sometimes formalistic criteria. For that reason, the broad case law of the ECtHR 
is unlikely to be enough to effectively protect employees from privacy intrusions 
in the context of digital monitoring technologies. The argumentation and findings 
of this dissertation show that due to digital monitoring technologies, imbalance 
of power in an employment relationship, ambiguities and lack of specificity con-
cerning employee monitoring in the ECHR and the GDPR, EU legislation is 
needed to strengthen employees’ ability to reject privacy-invasive monitoring 
technologies and give employers clarity under what conditions employee moni-
toring is allowed. 
Although the ECtHR has expanded the scope of Article 8 of the ECHR in 
employment matters, the question how to determine whether the monitoring was 
excessive and in contradiction with employees’ privacy is still unsettled in case 
law. In Bărbulescu vs Romania, the ECtHR reduces the ambiguity surrounding 
the legality of employee monitoring and carries out a proportionality test by 
balancing the interests at stake, and in doing so provides instructions on the factors 
that need to be considered when balancing the interests of employers and 
employees. However, the test given in Bărbulescu is not the solution for extensive 
monitoring practices taking place at work.  
Similar to previous cases, the court in Bărbulescu emphasizes prior notice as 
one of the first and main criteria when considering whether monitoring is privacy-
invasive or not. Therefore, the role of the privacy notice in future cases is unclear – 
will it be only one element discussed in the case or will it still have a significant 
impact on the court’s decision. As discussed in the present dissertation, although 
clear policies and instructions are necessary for monitoring, it is unjust to strip 
employees of privacy protection merely on the basis of a notice given by 
employer. An existence of a policy cannot justify invasive technologies that enable 
covert and continuous monitoring (e.g. such as microchip implants, wearables, 
contact tracing apps). For these reasons, reliance on prior notice should lose its 
importance in future cases. 
The ECtHR also takes into consideration the intrusiveness of the monitoring 
measure and whether there are other equally effective ways for the employer to 
monitor employees. In the context of digital monitoring technologies, this seems 
to be a crucial factor. However, the notion of intrusiveness can be criticized as 
being too vague in the context of digital monitoring technologies. It is unclear 
how an employer should ascertain the intrusiveness of digital monitoring techno-
logies (such as microchips), which are used to enter the premises in lieu of keys, 
89 
access cards or other similar devices. The broadness of the concepts, such as 
intrusiveness of monitoring, point to a need to regulate employee monitoring 
practices in a more precise and comprehensive way.  
Furthermore, the harm that may be caused by digital monitoring technologies 
when privacy protection is compromised is alarming. The issue is even more 
relevant as employers rely on AI tools to extract and sort the information. For 
these reasons I suggest that the ECtHR should take into consideration possible 
harms of digital monitoring technology when assessing whether a monitoring 
activity intrudes on an employee’s privacy. Possible harms that should be con-
sidered include information injustice – i.e. information presented in one context 
is used in another – digital monitoring technologies are an extensive source of 
information that may possibly reveal job-irrelevant information, data obtained by 
digital monitoring technologies may vary considerably and be inaccurate. Also, 
the question of necessity – whether the information available from digital moni-
toring technology is even relevant to the work performance – should have greater 
weight when discussing these technologies. 
 
 
6.2 Specifications for the processing of employee data  
As discussed in the present dissertation, the GDPR is broadly worded, therefore 
allowing monitoring practices in the digital workplace that are in line with the 
GDPR but still could potentially invade privacy and data protection rights of 
employees. Also, there are monitoring practices used by employers in the digital 
workplace that do not fall under the scope of the GDPR but should be regulated 
to protect employee privacy rights. These findings indicate the need for EU legis-
lation that regulates monitoring in the digital workplace.  
The GDPR does not distinguish processing activities where data collection is 
limited from other activities where increasingly powerful tools enable processing 
and analysis of information concerning employees and spotting patterns or 
correlations in their data. As the rise of AI enables algorithmic management of 
employees, the traditional boundary between the workplace and individuals’ 
private lives is also rapidly breaking down and new sources of information can 
reveal patterns far beyond traditional monitoring methods. In addition, the 
increasing trend of self-monitoring with the use of fitness trackers or health apps 
on telephones has created possibilities to combine the result of self-monitoring 
with data gathered in the digital workplace. This trend significantly influences 
employment relationships and communication between employer and employee, 
therefore making it important to consider possible new rules in EU that protect 
employees from unnecessary and excessive monitoring activities. For example, 
all the data processing activities often associated with digital monitoring techno-
logies, such as collecting location data of employees, compiling patterns in work 
settings, gathering information concerning employee’s private life (e.g. health 
information from a contact tracing app) and using AI-generated datasets and 
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algorithmic management, fall under the scope of the GDPR and therefore in 
principle are allowed if employer has a legitimate grounds for processing.  
It is questionable whether all these processing activities and data received as 
a product of such monitoring should be allowed in the context of employment. 
EU legislators should clarify the scope of employee data processing and employee 
monitoring. For example, EU legislation should clearly indicate that if not neces-
sary, employers should refrain from the use of digital monitoring technology. The 
exception to this rule might be allowed only in case of criminal activities or 
serious malpractice or other just causes such as prevention of accidents at work. 
One possibility is to distinguish different monitoring activities from least invasive 
to most invasive and set clear and more stringent rules to monitoring measures 
that strongly interfere with employees’ rights.  
In addition, identifying which information constitutes personal data or even 
understanding when employers obtain personal data in the context of digital 
monitoring technologies is a complicated exercise. Today it is possible to distin-
guish between primary and secondary digital identifiers, where the first is relatively 
easy to identify as it is directly connected to the person (e.g. name, address, 
mobile phone number, password), but the latter identifiers are much more hidden 
as they are indirect (e.g. ‘cookies’, IP addresses, RFID tag numbers). Digital identi-
fiers are not necessarily known to the employee; however, they can be associated 
with an employee or a site or object with which the employee is connected. 
Contact tracing apps, microchips and other technological solutions that use these 
secondary identifiers may also process various amounts of other data (e.g. health 
data, location data, social/proximity graphs, interactions between users and the 
people they came into close contact with) and do so covertly. These different 
identifiers make opaque monitoring a possibility in the work environment and 
therefore new EU legislation should be considered that enable employees to 
ascertain when and how monitoring is taking place. The monitoring activity 
should entail stricter obligations for employers (e.g. the employer’s obligation to 
give more detailed instructions to employees; special signs in a workplace to 
indicate where monitoring is taking place) or prohibition on using some moni-
toring (e.g. prohibition of covert monitoring or the inability to gather movement 
data inside the workplace). Employees should also have a possibility to choose 
between the ‘new’ and more ‘traditional’ monitoring methods (e.g. instead of apps 
that gather location data, employees may be identified by scanning a card at the 
entrance and exit). Also, employers should not be allowed to combine different 
sources of data obtained by way of digital monitoring technologies to build large 
employee databases that might reveal the employee’s identity even if anonym zed.  
There are also monitoring activities that do not fall under the scope of the 
GDPR but should be regulated to protect employee’s privacy rights. Employees 
are deprived of clear protection concerning their data or privacy if their employer 
uses the data from cookies or RFID tags without seeking to identify the employee 
concerned but simply to profile a computer, tool, room or chip owner so as to 
decide on certain actions in the employee’s regard. As employees are left without 
protection, EU legislation should regulate monitoring activities where the 
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employer profiles employees without using their personal data. For instance, 
employers should generally be prohibited to carry out monitoring of an employee’s 
life and behavioural patterns without a specific purpose (such as health and safety) 
that is clearly stated in legislation.  
In the case of digital monitoring technology, personal data collection may not 
be dictated by the employer but dealt with by a third party. In fact, often the 
employer only partially or not at all controls the data and employees’ data is 
handled by an employing enterprise or software developers or service providers. 
Furthermore, the role of controller is not always clear-cut if an employer uses 
employees’ self-tracking tools or third-party-owned technologies (e.g. contact 
tracing apps developed by governments or large corporations for wider use during 
COVID-19) at workplaces to encourage or compel employees to use this techno-
logy. The extent of an employer’s responsibility for privacy in relation to such 
apps will depend on the role the employer takes. If the employer is relying on its 
employees to voluntarily pass on relevant information generated from contact 
tracing government-launched contact tracing apps, they are probably not control-
lers of data as defined by the GDPR as they do not determine the purposes and 
means of the processing. However, the role of employers inevitably becomes 
more complicated if they insist that employees download and use government 
apps as a workplace safety measure. In the latter case, employers have a more 
active role; however, it is questionable whether they define the purpose and means 
of the processing. In these cases, the employer might not obtain any data from the 
technology (e.g. employer only monitors the existence of an app on the employee’s 
or company’s phone) and therefore is not considered to be the controller of data 
under the GDPR. Such monitoring activity, even if it does not fall under the scope 
of the GDPR, should be regulated to protect employee’s privacy rights. The 
requirement to monitor one’s health, working speed and time using wearables or 
apps seriously invades the employee’s privacy as it interferes with the employee’s 
right to escape and withdraw as she desires. Therefore, the employer should not 
have the right to require employees to use digital monitoring technologies such 
as apps, wearables or microchips to carry out self-monitoring without a serious 
reason (e.g. to prevent accidents in dangerous work environments or mitigate the 
spread of a contagious disease). I suggest that EU legislation should specify in 
which situations and under what conditions employers may require employees to 
use digital monitoring technologies such as apps or wearables (e.g. smart watches). 
To avoid ambiguities, EU legislation should clearly state that data collection from 
employee-owned sources (e.g. self-tracking app) is prohibited. 
 
 
6.3 Appropriate legal bases for employee monitoring 
Although in principle, employers may use several of the legal bases enacted in 
the GDPR such as employment contract, legal obligations, consent and legitimate 
interests, these grounds could potentially invade privacy and data protection 
rights of employees and do not offer adequate protection to employees or clarity 
to employers on their possible use. 
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Under the GDPR, an employment contract is a valid ground to use for 
processing an employee’s data, however, it should not be applied in the case of 
workplace monitoring. The mere fact that an employment contract is concluded 
should not justify any type of monitoring of employees, especially when making 
use of digital monitoring technology. Monitoring activities are not indispensable 
for performing an employment contract and therefore obligations arising from the 
employment contract cannot justify data collection during monitoring activities. 
This should be the case even if data processing is taking place during trivial ope-
rations such as turning on/logging in to computers and entering facilities. There-
fore, any kind of monitoring via apps, wearables, microchips or using employees’ 
phones or computers should not be based on the sole existence of a contractual 
obligation. Hence, contract clauses or policies at work should not entitle employers 
to carry out monitoring activities and should not justify employment decisions 
based on such monitoring (e.g. disciplinary actions against employees). For these 
reasons, EU legislation should remove contractual obligations as a possible legal 
basis for employee monitoring. 
In addition, it is currently not sufficiently clear when employers may rely on 
legal obligations to justify data collection during monitoring in digital workplace. 
Employers may use this legal basis only whenever processing is necessary and 
inevitable for fulfilling legal obligations. Unfortunately, there is confusion around 
how the obligations need to be enacted to allow data processing in case of employee 
monitoring – for example, whether a general obligation of health and safety 
justifies monitoring and data gathering or more specific rules need to be put in 
place for specific data collection. The necessity and irreplaceability of using digital 
monitoring technologies is often difficult to justify under general legal obligations 
(such as verifying applicant qualifications and values or investigating workplace 
discrimination claims on social media, not to mention monitoring measures such 
as microchipping or contact tracing). Therefore, although legal obligations justify 
the processing of employee data under the GDPR, this legal basis should only be 
applied in case national law is specific and clearly regulates employee monitoring. 
The mere fact that under legal acts, employers need to carry out numerous obli-
gations does not justify the use of digital monitoring technologies. 
Consent as a legal basis is allowed under the GDPR but might still invade data 
protection rights of employees, and for these reasons should not be used in the 
case of workplace monitoring. The main reason this legal basis fails to offer strong 
data protection is information asymmetry between the employer and the employee 
and the inability of the employee to fully evaluate the substance and con-
sequences of what they are consenting to. This imbalance in the employment 
relationship changes consent into an empty process as employees’ possibilities to 
negotiate are limited. Also, it is hard to distinguish when data processing was 
done because of the employer’s wishes and when the processing was voluntarily 
accepted by the employee. The technology may also limit the employee’s options 
to choose whether to accept or decline, disallowing or making it difficult to 
withdraw the consent or refuse consent. Other factors also influence the quality 
of the consent given by employees, for example, the spread of individual cases in 
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a workplace and accompanying social pressure to accept the technology. Further-
more, attempts to meaningfully inform employees may also be inadequate as 
highly technical, lengthy and complex privacy notices, policies or contractual 
clauses fail to inform employees about the true nature of data processing practices 
in a digital workplace. Due to the complex and vague rules related to consent in 
the GDPR, digital monitoring technologies (such as microchips implants) are 
likely to expand without clear direction in workplaces, which may cause employee 
privacy protections to deteriorate further. I believe that employees and employers 
would benefit from a clear and stable approach concerning these technologies. 
Thus, due to the imbalance of power between employers and employees and the 
features of digital monitoring technologies, I argue that EU legislation should 
strengthen employees’ ability to reject digital monitoring technologies and give 
specific rules for use of these technologies. EU legislation should prohibit the use 
of consent as a sole legal basis for employee monitoring (e.g. consent could be used 
together with another legal basis such as legitimate interests). However, as 
agreement and relevant information remains the mechanism through which 
employees can exercise control over their personal data, legal basis of the pro-
cessing should be accompanied by the obligation to carry out information and 
consultation among employees and seek their approval of these technologies 
(e.g. by way of negotiations with work councils or other employee representatives). 
Also, legislation should always require companies to provide the infrastructure 
supporting the use of different technologies and employers should not rely on one 
specific digital monitoring technology (such as microchip implants) exclusively.  
It is advisable to rely on legitimate interests as a legal basis to monitor 
employees. However, this legal basis is not without its faults. Legitimate interest 
as a legal basis is formulated broadly and is too ambiguous. The balancing exercise 
under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR lacks clarity, leaving much room for inter-
pretation. The balancing test consists of several components and considerations, 
such as potential consequences for the employee, possible privacy risks and their 
likelihood to materialize, severity of monitoring and reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Unfortunately, these components and considerations have not been spe-
cified in the GDPR but have been generally explained in the Article 29 Working 
Party’s guidance and derive from national jurisprudence. It is unclear whether the 
mentioned list is exhaustive or open and how these elements should be interpreted 
in the context of digital monitoring technologies. The difficulty with the bal-
ancing test is that a balancing of rights is never clear-cut and depends on specifics 
of the case. As the balancing test is carried out by the employer, it is questionable 
whether the test strikes a fair balance between the parties to the employment 
relationship and is not biased. The balancing test also needs a strict and sub-
stantive analysis that may be complicated for employers to carry out. For better 
understanding, the elements of a balancing test should clearly be defined in a 
legal instrument. Also, if digital monitoring technologies are used, the employer 
should take into consideration the necessity of monitoring, the means of moni-
toring (whether it is an access card or microchip implanted under one’s skin), 
specific characteristics of the technology and the harm which the monitoring may 
94 
cause to employees’ privacy. As it is left up to the employer to decide which 
interest may be considered to override the employee’s rights and therefore justify 
data processing, EU legislation should clarify which overriding compelling indi-
vidual rights would invalidate the processing or, as a second possibility, legis-
lation could regulate what interests or purposes justify monitoring of employees. 
In addition, it should be further discussed how the role of fairness, social rights 
at work, good faith, right to health and safety (e.g. right to working environment 
that is suitable for employee’s mental health), freedom of speech (e.g. right to 
express opinions on the internet and social media) and the need to respect the 
employee’s dignity also influence the balancing test at hand. Furthermore, the 
specific nature of the sector and the job performed should play a large role to 
determine the level of intrusiveness allowed for monitoring schemes. It also 
seems that digital monitoring technologies (such as microchip implants) will find 
greater legitimation in more dangerous and adverse working sites prone to 
accidents. EU legislation should also specify what factors or steps need to be 
considered before monitoring is lawful. For example, the employer might be 
obliged to inform employees about digital monitoring methods and hear 
employees’ views in this matter. Employees’ representatives should also be in-
volved in implementation and use of a privacy-invasive monitoring technology 
in workplace.  
 
 
6.4 Special regulation on data processing principles 
As discussed in my dissertation, the principles of data processing, specifically 
purpose limitation, fairness and transparency are broadly worded. This allows for 
monitoring practices in a digital workplace that are in line with the GDPR but 
still invade employee data protection rights and privacy. 
Technological enhancements together with the spread of COVID-19 have 
contributed to an increase of monitoring in digital workplaces and volume of data 
generated in the work environment, which may lead employers to use techno-
logies for purposes other than the ones originally planned and result in illegitimate 
further processing of employee data, generating the risk of ‘function creep’ and 
use of data purposes unintended by the employee. As a result, if the consequences 
of the monitoring are not reasonably expected by the employees, they would most 
likely be in breach of the principle of purpose limitation. This means that any 
monitoring activities and personal data collection that has been used to combat 
the COVID-19 pandemic must be ceased once it no longer serves the purpose of 
protecting employees’ health. However, as discussed in the present dissertation, 
the end of the pandemic is a vague term and in addition, employers may hide 
secondary purposes in long, legalistic privacy policy fine print that is not un-
ambiguous. Also, there is no specific knowledge what will happen to techno-
logies used in a workplace after the virus has receded as the principle of purpose 
limitation conflicts the very idea of the data economy, which is to reuse data. 
Therefore, as there is a high risk of further use of data collected through digital 
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monitoring technologies, it can be argued that the principle of purpose limitation 
is too broadly worded and allows for monitoring practices that are in line with the 
GDPR but still invade data protection rights and privacy of employees. Due to 
the imbalance of power in an employment relationship, legislation is needed to 
strengthen employees’ ability to reject digital monitoring technologies and the 
purposes that allow for employee monitoring should be more specifically regulated. 
For example, some member states allow specific digital monitoring technologies 
only if their use is permitted for the purposes enacted in legislation or collective 
agreements. A similar approach should be used in legislation at the EU level.  
The principle of fairness is linked with numerous procedural safeguards that 
should support fair processing of data, however, the principle focuses on pro-
cedural fairness rather than substantive fairness. In order for the processing to be 
fair, it should be transparent and have a legal basis. However, these should not be 
the only criteria that determine whether the activities are considered fair. As 
argued in the present dissertation, the importance of contexts is crucial when it 
comes to assessing whether processing is fair. Mere adherence to the principles 
and other provisions of the GDPR does not necessarily mean that processing is 
fair. Digital monitoring technologies highlight that fairness should be examined 
in a more substantive way and for processing to be fair, fairness needs to be 
evaluated within the specific digital monitoring context, meaning that employers 
may monitor employees only in ways the employees would reasonably expect 
and not use the data in a manner that unjustifiably has a negative effect on 
employees. Also, employers should leave room for the employee’s right to express 
opinions on these profiles whenever the behaviour does not seriously violate 
standards of decency and dignity of others and does not disclose business infor-
mation. In addition, profiling groups of employees to assemble a larger portrait 
of the workforce might lead to out-of-context conclusions and attribute to a single 
employee characteristics not related to that individual and should therefore be 
considered unfair. Overall, it can be argued that the principle of fairness is too 
broadly worded, allowing for monitoring practices that are in line with the GDPR 
but still invade data protection rights and privacy of the employee. The ambiguity 
and narrow scope of the principle of fairness brings out the weakness of EU 
legislation in the context of employee monitoring and highlights the need for 
more specific rules for monitoring in the digital workplace.  
Similarly, it can be argued that the principle of transparency is broadly worded 
and allows for invasive monitoring practices. Under the GDPR employees do not 
get adequate information at the right time concerning digital monitoring techno-
logies as the employer is required to make the notification only a time (beginning 
of the monitoring) where it is not yet clear for the employees how they will be 
affected by monitoring. Also, employees are usually not consulted in the context 
of digital monitoring technologies and therefore are not able to understand how 
monitoring is carried out. On one hand, digital monitoring technologies enable 
covert monitoring as they often form the hidden part of a workplace and seam-
lessly overlap with work or rest time activities (e.g. allowing employees to carry 
out their work by starting up computers and equipment, reminding employees to 
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take rest breaks and allowing them to access cafeterias), which means that 
employees might not be aware of the monitoring or profiling taking place. On the 
other hand, if employees are aware that monitoring is taking place, they might 
feel anxiety and discomfort and self-censor their behaviour unnecessarily and 
unjustly. Due to the possibility of hidden monitoring and discomfort of employees, 
EU legislation should be enacted that obliges employers to periodically inform 
and communicate monitoring activities to employees. Furthermore, it should be 
mandatory for employers to consult employee representatives if they plan to 
implement digital monitoring technologies. If the monitoring is continuous, 
employers should require the consent of employee representatives before imple-
menting such a measure and carry out regular consultations on the topic. In 
addition, information concerning employees’ data and monitoring practices should 
not only be added to privacy policies, but the employer should be obliged to carry 
out trainings and visualize monitoring activities (such as signs posted at a work-
place that indicate places where monitoring is taking place). Likewise, additional 
information should be given to employees such as specific details of monitoring, 
information on whether the private use of the company’s technology is allowed 
and to what extent (such as internet use), what technological safeguards have 
been put in place and what the consequences of monitoring activities will be. In 
case employer uses digital monitoring technologies (e.g. RFID-enabled micro-
chips, AI enabled workplaces) employees should also be aware of the specific 
times, actions and methods performed to process data. Therefore, employees 
should be informed when and how they are being monitored and, for example, 
know the location of sensors and readers and their monitoring radius. If employer 
is basing its decisions (e.g. performance bonuses, warning) on monitoring results, 
employees should have detailed knowledge about the effect the monitoring has 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Töötaja privaatsuse kaitse digitaalsel töökohal 
1. Eesmärk ja uurimisküsimused 
Tänapäeva töökohad digitaliseeruvad üha enam.394 Digitaliseerumine on loonud 
tööandjatele ja töötajatele mitmeid majanduslikke ja ühiskondlikke eeliseid, 
sealhulgas on suurenenud paindlikkus ja autonoomia töösuhetes ning tekkinud 
paremad võimalused töö- ja eraelu ühildamiseks. Teisalt on tehnoloogia areng 
töö kontekstis tekitanud ka mitmeid eetilisi ja õiguslikke probleeme. Üheks välja-
kutseks on töötajate jälgimine ja nende kohta andmete kogumine digitaalsete 
tehnoloogiate abil. Digitaalseid jälgimistehnoloogiaid arendatakse järjepidevalt 
ja nende funktsioonid muutuvad aina mitmekülgsemaks. Uued rakendused ja 
nutiseadmed võimaldavad tööandjatel koguda hulgaliselt töötajate isikuandmeid 
paljudest erinevatest allikatest, tehes seda tööandja jaoks mõistliku aja jooksul ja 
taskukohase hinnaga. Taoliste tehniliste võimaluste olemasolu võib kergelt viia 
töötaja isikuandmete kaitse reeglite rikkumise ja privaatsust riivava käitumiseni. 
Tuues näiteid erinevatest digitaalsel töökohal kasutatavatest tehnoloogiatest 
uurib käesolev doktoritöö, kuidas Euroopa Liidu privaatsus- ja andmekaitse-
raamistik tuleb antud väljakutsega toime ning kuivõrd suudab kaitsta töötajat 
privaatsust riivava jälgimise eest töökeskkonnas.  
Doktoritöö põhineb viiel eelretsenseeritud teadupublikatsioonil ja keskendub 
privaatsuse ning andmekaitse küsimustele, mis käsitlevad kolme digitaalset 
jälgimistehnoloogiat – töötaja sotsiaalmeedia jälgimine (publikatsioonid I–II), 
mikrokiibistatud töötajate jälgimine (publikatsioon III) ja kontaktide tuvastamist 
võimaldavate rakenduste abil töötajate jälgimine COVID-19 leviku ajal (publi-
katsioon IV–V). Publikatsioonid hõlmavad eeltoodud jälgimispraktikaid nende 
uudsuse tõttu ja seetõttu, et need võimaldavad koguda hulgaliselt andmeid, seal-
hulgas eraelulisi andmeid töötaja kohta ning teha seda varjatult. Viidatud tehno-
loogiad lisavad vaieldamatult täiendava mõõtme töösuhetele, tuues esile tööandja 
ja töötaja vastuolulised huvid, näiteks tööandja kontrolliõiguse ja töötajate õiguse 
privaatsusele ning andmekaitsele. Publikatsioonid IV ja V käsitlevad töötajate 
jälgimist COVID-19 leviku ajal. Pandeemia tõi paljudes töökohtades ohutuse 
tagamiseks kaasa töötajate jälgimise intensiivistumise ja uute tehnoloogiate 
                                                                          
394  Digitaalse töökoha kontseptsioon pärineb 1990ndatest. Viimastel aastatel on digitaalse 
töökoha mõiste pälvinud uut tähelepanu tulenevalt tehnoloogia kiirest arengust ning olles 
osana laiemast teemaderingist, mis käsitleb tulevikutööd. Digitaalset töökohta on näiteks 
selgitatud kui integreeritud tehnoloogiaplatvormi, mis sisaldab digitaalseid tööriistu ja teenu-
seid võimaldamaks töökohta paindlikult kontrollida ja tehtavat tööd tõhustada. Vt näiteks 
Williams, S. P., Schubert, P. Designs for the Digital Workplace. – Procedia Computer Science 
2018/138; Köffer S. Designing the digital workplace of the future – what scholars recommend 
to practitioners. International Conference on Information Systems 2015; Marks, A., Briken, K., 
Chillas, S., Krzywdzinski, M. The New Digial Workplace: How New Technologies Revo-
lutionise Work. Macmillan Publishers Limited 2017. 
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kasutuselevõtu, mis omakorda tekitas küsimusi tööandja kontrolliõiguse ja töö-
taja privaatsuse kohta. 
Olgugi et Euroopa Liit omab ühte kõige hiljutisemat ja olulisemat privaatsuse 
ja andmekaitse raamistikku maailmas, ei ole töötajate jälgimine selgesõnaliselt 
ning üheselt reguleeritud, mistõttu on Euroopa Liidu riikides tekkinud hulgaliselt 
erinevaid siseriiklikke norme ja praktikaid. Käesolevas doktoritöös analüüsitud 
põhiprobleem seisnebki selles, et privaatsuse ja andmekaitse regulatsioon Euroopa 
Inimõiguste ja põhivabaduste kaitse konventsioonis (EIÕK) ja isikuandmete kaitse 
üldmääruses (IKÜM) ei sisalda selgeid ja konkreetseid reegleid digitaalsete 
jälgimistehnoloogiate kasutamise kohta.  
Doktoritöö eesmärk on kindlaks teha, kas Euroopa Liidus on vaja kehtestada 
õigusakt (nt direktiiv või määrus), mis reguleerib töötaja privaatsust ja andme-
kaitset juhul, kui tööandja rakendab digitaalseid jälgimistehnoloogiaid, ning 
uurida millistel tingimustel peab olema lubatud nimetatud tehnoloogiaid töökesk-
konnas kasutada. Doktoritöös on kasutatud meetoditena dogmaatilist ning võrd-
levat ja sotsiaal-õiguslikku lähenemist. 
 
Doktoritöös otsin vastust järgmistele uurimisküsimustele: 
1) Millist kaitseb pakub EIÕK töötajale, kui tööandja kasutab digitaalseid jälgi-
mistehnoloogiaid?  
2) Millistel tingimustel kuulub IKÜM kohaldamisele, kui tööandja kasutab 
digitaalseid jälgimistehnoloogiaid? Millised tööandja jälgimispraktikad digi-
taalses töökeskkonnas on kooskõlas IKÜM-iga, kuid võivad rikkuda töötaja 
privaatsus- ja andmekaitseõigust? Millised tööandja poolt kasutatavad jälgimis-
praktikad ei kuulu IKÜM-i reguleerimisalasse, kuid mille korral tuleks ette 
näha reeglid töötaja privaatsuse kaitsmiseks? 
3) Millised IKÜM-ist tulenevad õiguslikud alused, mida tööandja kasutab 
digitaalsel töökohal töötaja jälgimiseks, võivad rikkuda töötaja privaatsus- ja 
andmekaitseõigusi?  
4) Millist kaitset pakuvad IKÜM-ist tulenevad andmekaitse põhimõtted töötajale 




2.1 Laiendades töötaja privaatsuse kaitset  
EIÕK artikkel 8 näeb ette privaatsuse kaitse ja selle reguleerimisalasse kuulub ka 
Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohtu (EIK) praktika kohaselt töötajate privaatsuse riivete 
tuvastamine. Sellest hoolimata on EIK kohtupraktikast tuleneva kaitse ulatus 
küllaltki piiritletud, kuna tugineb teatud jälgimistehnoloogiatel (nt e-kirjade jälgi-
mine ja kaamerate kasutamine), keskendub konkreetsetele kaasustele ja paneb 
paljuski töötaja privaatsusõiguse sõltuma formaalsetest kriteeriumitest (enne-
kõike töötaja eelnev teavitamine). Seetõttu ei ole seni EIK kohtupraktika raames 
väljakujunenud põhimõtted piisavad, et tagada töötajate privaatsus digitaalsete 
jälgimistehnoloogiate kasutamisel.  
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EIK kohtuasjas Bărbulescu vs Rumeenia vähendab kohus töötajate jälgimisega 
seonduvat ebaselgust ja kaalub töötaja ning tööandja huvisid erinevatele kri-
teeriumitele tuginedes, et välja selgitada, kas töötaja privaatsust on rikutud. Kohtu 
selgitustest hoolimata ei ole Bărbulescu kohtuasjas leitud kriteeriumid alati sobi-
vad ja selged otsustamaks, kas tööandja ja töötaja huvid on tasakaalus ning töötaja 
õigused kaitstud, kui töökeskkonnas kasutatakse digitaalseid jälgimistehno-
loogiaid. Antud kaasuses tõstab EIK ühe peamise kriteeriumina esile töötaja eel-
neva teavitamise, kaalumaks, kas tööandja poolt läbiviidav jälgimine on privaat-
sust rikkuv või mitte. Doktoritöös toon esile, et kuigi tööandja kontrollimeetmete 
korral on selged põhimõtted ja juhised vajalikud, ei tohiks töötaja jääda privaat-
suse kaitseta seetõttu, et tööandja on teda võimalikust jälgimisest teavitatud. Eel-
nev teavitamine (nt töölepingu, teatise vormis) ei tohi õigustada invasiivsete 
jälgimistehnoloogitate kasutamist, mis võimaldavad varjatud ja pidevat jälgimist 
(nt mikrokiibid, kontaktide jälgimiseks mõeldud rakendused, kaasaskantavad 
tehnoloogiad nagu nutikellad/käevõrud/kiivrid). Eelneva teavitamise roll tule-
vastes EIK kohtuasjades jääb kahjuks ebaselgeks – kas tegemist on vaid ühe 
kriteeriumiga, mida kasutatakse poolte huvide kaalumisel või mõjutab see ikkagi 
märkimisväärselt kohtu otsust. Eelnev teavitus ei õigusta töötaja privaatsuse 
riivet digitaalse jälgimistehnoloogia kasutamisel, mistõttu peab vastav kriteerium 
tulevikus kaotama oma olulisuse tööandja ja töötaja huvide kaalumisel. 
Lisaks võtab kohus Bărbulescu kaasuses kriteeriumina arvesse järelevalve-
meetme invasiivsust ja seda, kas tööandjal on muid samavõrd tõhusaid viise 
töötajate jälgimiseks. Hoolimata kohtu selgitustest jääb ebaselgeks, kuidas peab 
tööandja tegema kindlaks digitaalsete jälgimistehnoloogiate (nt mikrokiibid) 
invasiivsuse. Samuti tekitab küsimusi, kuidas võrrelda uusi tehnoloogiaid võt-
mete, juurdepääsukaartide või muude sarnaste seadmetega. EIK üldised suunised 
ja digitaalsetest tehnoloogiatest tulenevad võimalused toovad siinkohal esile 
vajaduse reguleerida töötajate jälgimist täpsemalt ja põhjalikumalt Euroopa Liidu 
tasandil. Euroopa Liidu õigusakt suurendaks töötajate võimalusi keelduda inva-
siivsete jälgimistehnoloogiate kasutamisest ja annaks selgust, millistel tingi-
mustel on töötajate jälgimine digitaalses töökeskkonnas lubatud.  
Kusjuures murettekitav on kahju, mis võib ilmneda digitaalsete jälgimistehno-
loogiate kasutamisel ja seda paljuski ka seetõttu, et tööandjad saavad toetuda 
andmete töötlemisel tehisintellekti pakutavatel võimalustel (nt andmete alusel 
töötajate kategoriseerimine, ülesannete jagamine ja isikuomaduste ning võimete 
tuvastamine). Üheks kriteeriumiks, mis aitaks tuvastada töötaja privaatsuse riivet 
pean seetõttu võimalikku kahju, mis võib tekkida digitaalsete jälgimisviiside 
kasutamisel. Näiteks tuleks kaaluda, kas jälgimine hõlmab informatsioonilist eba-
õiglust, st ühes kontekstis esitatud teavet kasutatakse teises, kas digitaalseid 
jälgimistehnoloogiaid kasutatakse niivõrd ulatuslikult, et need võivad esile tuua 
tööga mitteseotud teavet (nt suhted kolleegidega, käitumismustrid) või kas jälgi-
mine võib olla töötajate osas erinev ning tuua esile ebatäpset informatsiooni. 
Samuti peaks digitaalsete jälgimistehnoloogiate puhul panema põhilise rõhu 
küsimusele, kas selliste tehnoloogiate kasutamine on ettevõttes vajalik ning arut-
lema ennekõike selle üle, kas digitaalsest jälgimistehnoloogiast saadav teave on 
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töö tulemuslikkuse seisukohast oluline või mitte. Eeltoodud põhimõtted peaksid 
selguse huvides olema reguleeritud õigusakti tasandil.  
 
2.2 Erireeglid töötaja andmete töötlemisele  
Doktoritöös toon esile, et tööandjad saavad täna kasutada jälgimisviise, mis on 
küll kooskõlas IKÜM-iga, kuid kahjustavad töötajate privaatsus- ja andmekaitse-
õigust. IKÜM ei erista olukordi, kus andmete kogumine töötaja jälgimise käigus 
on piiratud, nendest olukordadest, kus üha võimsamad digitaalsed jälgimistehno-
loogiad töötlevad ja analüüsivad teavet töötajate kohta, märgates ning luues and-
metest mustreid ning korrelatsioone. Kuna tehisintellekti levik võimaldab tööta-
jate algoritmilist juhtimist, laguneb kiiresti traditsiooniline piir töökoha ja üksik-
isiku eraelu vahel ning uued teabeallikad paljastavad tavapärastest jälgimis-
meetoditest palju enam informatsiooni. Lisaks on levimas üha kasvav trend, kus 
inimesed jälgivad enda tervist, heaolu ja muid näitajaid digitaalsete vahendite 
abil, laadides selleks näiteks telefoni erinevaid rakendusi. Taolisi enda jälgimise 
võimalusi saab ühendada digitaalsel töökohal kogutud andmetega, mõjutades 
seeläbi tööandja ja töötaja vahelist suhtlust. Digitaalsete jälgimistehnoloogiatega 
seonduvad andmete kogumise võimalused, näiteks töötajate asukohaandmete 
kogumine, töötajate käitumismustrite koostamine, töötajate eraelu puudutava 
teabe kogumine ja tehisintellekti abil loodud andmekogumite haldamine kuulu-
vad IKÜM reguleerimisalasse ja on seetõttu põhimõtteliselt lubatud, kui töö-
andjal on töötlemiseks õiguspärane alus. Eeltoodud praktikate valguses on oluline 
kaitsta töötajaid tarbetu ja liigse jälgimise eest. Seejuures on küsitav, kas taoline 
andmete kogumine töökeskkonnas peab olema lubatud.  
Doktoritöös väidan, et invasiivsete jälgimispraktikate tõttu tuleb Euroopa Liidu 
tasandil täpsustada töötajate andmetöötluse ja jälgimise võimalusi. Õigusaktiga 
tuleb ette näha, et tööandja ei tohi töötajat jälgida ja tema andmeid töödelda, kui 
selleks puudub vajadus. Sellest reeglist võib erandi teha näiteks kuriteo, tõsise väär-
käitumise või muude õigusaktis üheselt esitatud põhjuste korral (nt tööõnnetuste 
ärahoidmine). Üks võimalus on õigusaktis eristada jälgimistegevusi lähtuvalt 
nende invasiivsusest ning kehtestada rangemad reeglid jälgimismeetmetele, mis 
sekkuvad tugevalt töötajate õigustesse (nt mikrokiibid, biomeetrilisi andmeid 
töötlevad seadmed, kontaktide jälgimiseks kasutatavad rakendused). 
Digitaalsete jälgimistehnoloogiate kasutamisel on sageli keeruline tuvastada, 
millal tööandjad töötlevad töötaja isikuandmeid ja millal mitte. Tänapäeval on 
võimalik eristada esmaseid ja teiseseid digitaalseid identifikaatoreid. Esmased 
identifikaatorid on kergesti mõistetavad, kuna need on inimesega otseselt seotud 
teave (nt nimi, aadress, mobiiltelefoni number, parool). Teisesed identifikaatorid 
on palju varjatumad, kuna need on kaudsed (nt veebibrauseri küpsised, IP-aad-
ressid, RFID395-märgendite numbrid). Teisesed identifikaatorid ei ole töötajale 
                                                                          
395  RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) on raadiolainetel töötav identifitseerimistehno-
loogia, mis võimaldab esemete või objektide automaatset tuvastust (nt kasutusel mikro-
kiipides).  
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tingimata teada, kuid neid saab seostada töötaja ja töökohaga või konkreetse 
objektiga, mis on omakorda töötajaga seotud. Kontaktide jälgimise rakendused, 
mikrokiibid ja muud tehnoloogilised lahendused, mis taolisi identifikaatoreid 
kasutavad, võivad töödelda ka mitmesuguseid muid andmeid (nt terviseandmed, 
asukohaandmed, samuti andmed, mis ilmestavad kontakte ja suhtlust töötajate 
vahel) ning teha seda varjatult. Kuivõrd tehnoloogiad, mis taolisi identifikaato-
reid kasutavad, võivad muuta jälgimise läbipaistmatuks ja salajaseks, tuleks 
kaaluda Euroopa Liidu õigusakti loomist, mis võimaldab töötajatel kindlaks teha, 
millal ja kuidas jälgimine toimub. Jälgimise läbiviimisel peab tööandjale panema 
senisest rangemad kohustused. Näiteks peab tööandja andma töötajatele üksik-
asjalikud juhised jälgimise läbiviimise kohta ja töökohal, kus jälgimine toimub, 
peavad olema vastavad märgised. Samuti võiks teatud jälgimisviisid keelata, nt 
keelata salajase jälgimise või liikumisandmete kogumise töökohal. Lisaks peab 
töötajal olema võimalus valida nii „uute” kui ka „traditsiooniliste” jälgimis-
meetodite vahel. Näiteks peab töötajal olema võimalik töökohale sisse- ja välja-
pääsu saamiseks valida erinevate rakenduste vahel, st kasutada mikrokiibi asemel 
uksekaarti. Samuti ei tohiks tööandja kombineerida erinevaid digitaalsetest 
jälgimistehnoloogiatest saadud andmeid ühte mahukasse andmebaasi, mis sisal-
dab hulgaliselt teavet töötajate kohta ning võimaldab töötajaid tuvastada isegi 
juhul, kui andmed on algselt anonüümiseeritud. 
Tööandjad kasutavad ka jälgimistegevusi, mis ei kuulu IKÜM-i reguleerimis-
alasse, kuid mida tuleks ikkagi reguleerida, et kaitsta töötajate privaatsust. Täna 
ei ole töötaja kaitstud olukorras, kus tööandja ei kasuta veebibrauseri küpsiste või 
RFID-märgiste abil saadud andmeid töötaja tuvastamiseks, vaid loob profiili 
arvuti, töövahendi, ruumi või kiibi omaniku kohta, et tema suhtes tegevusi 
rakendada (nt töötajate puhkeruumi kasutuse jälgimise andmete põhjal kõigile 
töötjatele juhiste koostamine). Kuna töötajad jäävad sellises olukorras õigusteta, 
mida pakub IKÜM, peaks Euroopa Liidu õigus reguleerima tööandja jälgimis-
meetodeid, kus töötaja kohta koostatakse profiil ilma tema isikut tuvastamata. 
Näiteks tuleb õigusaktis üheselt sätestada, et tööandjatel on üldjuhul keelatud 
töötajate käitumismustrite jälgimine ilma konkreetse eesmärgita (nt tervis ja 
ohutus) ja seda ka juhul, kui töötaja ei ole tuvastatav.  
Digitaalsete jälgimistehnoloogiate korral ei pruugi isikuandmete kogumine 
olla alati tööandja korraldada. Näiteks võib andmete töötlemisega tegeleda ka 
kolmas isik, mistõttu ei pruugi tööandja olla andmete vastutavaks töötlejaks, 
kellel lasuvad IKÜM-ist tulenevad kohustused. Tööandja võib kontrollida andmeid 
ainult osaliselt või üldse mitte ja töötaja andmeid käitleb näiteks lepingupartner 
teenusedisainerina või tarkvara arendajana. Vastutava töötleja roll võib tekitada 
segadust ka olukorras, kus tööandja kasutab või suunab töötajaid kasutama enese 
jälgimisvahendeid (nt tervise jälgimiseks mõeldud rakendus) või kolmanda 
osapoole omandis olevaid tehnoloogiaid (nt valitsuste või ettevõtete poolt  
COVID-19 ajal laialdaseks kasutamiseks välja töötatud kontaktide jälgimise 
rakendused). Tööandja vastutuse ulatus selliste rakenduste suhtes sõltub tööandja 
rollist. Juhul kui tööandja loodab, et töötajad edastavad talle vabatahtlikult 
näiteks valitsuse käivitatud rakendustest saadud asjakohast teavet, ei ole ta 
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vastutav töötleja IKÜM tähenduses, kuna ta ei otsusta töötlemise eesmärke ja 
vahendeid. Tööandja roll muutub aga paratamatult ebaselgemaks, kui ta nõuab, 
et töötajad laeksid alla ja kasutaksid valitsuse loodud rakendusi töökohal ohutuse 
tagamiseks. Sellisel juhul on tööandjatel aktiivsem roll, kuid on küsitav, kas nad 
määratlevad töötlemise eesmärgi ja vahendid. Nendel juhtudel ei pruugi tööandja 
saada rakenduselt mingeid andmeid (nt tööandja jälgib ainult rakenduse 
olemasolu töötaja või ettevõtte telefonis) ja seetõttu ei peeta teda IKÜM kohaselt 
andmete vastutavaks töötlejaks. Doktoritöös toon esile, et taolist jälgimistegevust 
tuleks reguleerida, et kaitsta töötajate privaatsust. Nõue, et töötaja kontrolliks 
iseenda tervist, töökiirust ja tööle kuluvat aega rakenduste abil, rikub tõsiselt 
töötaja privaatsust. Tööandjal ei tohi olla õigust nõuda töötajatelt ilma olulise 
põhjuseta (nt õnnetuste vältimine ohtlikus töökeskkonnas või nakkushaiguse 
leviku tõkestamine) enesekontrolli teostamist digitaalsete jälgimistehnoloogiate 
(nt telefoni rakendused, nutikellad ja -käevõrud) kaudu. Euroopa Liidu õigusakt 
peab täpsustama, millistes olukordades ja millistel tingimustel võib tööandja 
nõuda töötajalt digitaalse jälgimistehnoloogia, näiteks rakenduste või nutikellade 
kasutamist. Ebaselguste vältimiseks tuleb Euroopa Liidu õigusaktis selgelt 
sätestada, et andmete kogumine töötaja omandis olevatest allikatest (nt 
enesejälgimise rakendused) on keelatud. 
 
2.3 Töötaja jälgimiseks kohased õiguslikud alused  
Kuigi tööandjad saavad kasutada mitut IKÜM-is sätestatud õiguslikku alust (nt 
andmete töötlemine töölepingu täitmiseks, seadusjärgse kohustuse täitmiseks, 
töötaja nõusolekul või tööandja õigustatud huvi korral), võivad need õiguslikud 
alused riivata töötaja privaatsus- ja andmekaitseõigust. 
Tööandja võib IKÜM-i kohaselt töödelda töötaja andmeid töölepingu täit-
miseks. Doktoritöös toon esile, et tööandja ei tohi seda õiguslikku alust töötajate 
jälgimisel rakendada. Ainuüksi asjaolu, et tööleping on sõlmitud, ei anna alust 
töötajate jälgimiseks, eriti juhul kui tööandja kasutab digitaalset jälgimistehno-
loogiat. Töötaja jälgimine ei ole töölepingu täitmiseks hädavajalik ja seetõttu ei 
saa töölepingust tulenevad kohustused õigustada andmete kogumist. Seda ka 
juhul kui andmetöötlus toimub lihtsate ja igapäevaste jälgimistoimingute raames, 
nt arvutite sisselülitamisel, töökohta sisenemisel. Seetõttu ei tohi jälgimine nt 
mikrokiipide, nutikäevõrude ja töötaja telefonis olevate rakenduste kaudu põhi-
neda ainuüksi töölepingulise kohustuse olemasolul. Taolisel jälgimisel põhinevad 
otsused (nt töösuhte ülesütlemine, töötaja hoiatamine) peavad olema ebaseadus-
likud. Doktoritöös toon esile, et Euroopa Liidu õigus peab tulevikus selgelt 
sätestama, et töötaja jälgimine ei ole lubatud töölepingu täitmiseks. 
Tööandja võib IKÜM-i kohaselt töödelda töötaja andmeid seadusjärgse 
kohustuse täitmiseks. Seejuures ei ole üheselt arusaadav, millal võib tööandja 
sellele õiguslikule alusele tugineda, kui soovib koguda töötaja andmeid digi-
taalsete tehnoloogiate vahendusel. Tööandja võib seda õiguslikku alust kasutada 
juhul, kui töötlemine on seadusjärgse kohustuse täitmiseks vajalik ja vältimatu. 
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Samas ei ole selge, kuidas peab seadusjärgne kohustus olema kehtestatud, et 
õigustada jälgimist. Näiteks, on küsitav, kas üldine töötervishoiu ja -ohutuse 
tagamine õigustab töötaja jälgimist ja andmete kogumist või tuleb konkreetsete 
andmete kogumiseks kehtestada täpsemad reeglid. Digitaalsete jälgimistehno-
loogiate kasutamise vajalikkust ja asendamatust on sageli raske põhjendada 
üldiste seadusjärgsete kohustuste alusel (nt tööle kandideerijate kvalifikatsiooni 
ja väärtuste kontrollimine sotsiaalmeedias, rääkimata jälgimismeetmetest nagu 
mikrokiibid või kontaktide jälgimise rakendused). Seega, kuigi seadusjärgsed 
kohustused õigustavad IKÜM-i alusel töötajate andmete töötlemist, tuleb seda 
õiguslikku alust kohaldada ainult juhul, kui siseriiklik õigus on konkreetne ja 
reguleerib selgelt töötajate jälgimist. Ainuüksi asjaolu, et õigusaktide kohaselt 
peavad tööandjad täitma arvukalt kohustusi, ei õigusta digitaalsete jälgimistehno-
loogiate kasutamist. 
Töötajate andmete töötlemine võib toimuda ka nõusoleku alusel. Samas võib 
see õiguslik alus rikkuda töötajate privaatsust, kui seda kasutatakse digitaalsel 
töökohal jälgimise õigustamiseks. Nõusolek ei kaitse töötajaid jälgimise korral 
peamiselt teabe ebasümmeetria tõttu töötaja ja tööandja vahelistes suhetes ning 
töötaja võimetuse tõttu täiel määral hinnata, millega ta nõustub ning mõista nõus-
oleku andmise tagajärgi. Osapoolte ebavõrdsus töösuhetes muudab nõusoleku 
andmise sisutühjaks tegevuseks, kuivõrd töötaja võimalused sisulisteks läbirääki-
misteks on piiratud. Doktoritöös toon esile, et tööga seonduv (edutamine, tasusta-
mine, ülesütlemine jne) ei tohi sõltuda sellest, kas töötaja on nõus telefoni 
rakendust alla laadima või mikrokiipi siirdama.  
Töösuhetes on raske eristada, millal toimub andmete töötlemine tööandja 
soovide tõttu ja millal töötaja vabal tahtel. Tehnoloogia võib veelgi piirata töötaja 
valikuvõimalusi, raskendada nõusoleku tagasivõtmist või nõusolekust keeldu-
mist. Töötaja nõusoleku kvaliteeti võivad mõjutada erinevad tegurid, näiteks 
tehnoloogia kasutuselevõtt kolleegide seas ja sellega kaasnev sotsiaalne surve 
tehnoloogia aktsepteerimiseks.  
Töötaja peab andma informeeritud nõusoleku, kuid tööandja katsed töötajat 
mõtestatult teavitada võivad olla ebapiisavad, kuivõrd ülimalt tehnilised, pikad ja 
keerulised töökorralduse reeglid ja lepingupunktid ei anna töötajale piisavat ja 
sisulist infot digitaalse töökoha andmetöötluse tegelikust olemusest. IKÜM-is 
töötaja nõusolekuga seotud keerukate ja ebamääraste reeglite tõttu võetakse 
digitaalseid jälgimistehnoloogiaid (näiteks mikrokiipe) töökohtadel kasutusele 
ilma selge suuniseta, mis võib omakorda halvendada töötajate privaatsuse kaitset.  
Doktoritöös toon välja, et töötajad ja tööandjad vajavad selget ja konkreetset 
lähenemisviisi digitaalsete tehnoloogiate kasutamisel. Väidan, et tööandja ja 
töötaja vahelise alluvusvahekorra ja digitaalsetest jälgimistehnoloogiatest tule-
nevate võimaluste tõttu tuleb Euroopa Liidu õigusaktiga tugevdada töötaja õigusi 
nimetatud tehnoloogiatest keelduda. Samuti tuleb jälgimistehnoloogiate kasu-
tusele töökeskkonnas kehtestada konkreetsed reeglid. Euroopa Liidu õigus peab 
keelama eraldiseisvalt nõusoleku kasutamise õigusliku alusena, mis võimaldab 
töötajaid jälgida. Samas võib endiselt kaaluda nõusoleku kasutamist koos muu 
õigusliku alusega, näiteks koos tööandja õigustatud huviga. Teisalt ei tohi eirata 
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ka asjakohase teabe vajalikkust, kuivõrd selle kaudu saavad töötajad oma isiku-
andmete töötlemist kontrollida. Seetõttu peab töötlemise õigusliku alusega kaas-
nema tööandja kohustus töötajaid juhendada ning töötajate ja nende esindajatega 
konsulteerida, kui töökohal võetakse kasutusele digitaalsed jälgimistehnoloogiad. 
Samuti peab Euroopa Liidu õigus nõudma, et tööandja rakendab lahendusi, mis 
toetavad erinevate tehnoloogiate kasutamist töökeskkonnas, jättes sellega töötajale 
valikuvõimalused. 
Tööandjal on soovitav töötajate jälgimisel tugineda õigusliku alusena õigus-
tatud huvile. Samas kaasnevad ka selle õigusliku alusega teatavad probleem-
kohad. Õigustatud huvi on IKÜM-is sõnastatud laialt ja mitmetähenduslikult. 
Tööandja peab selle õigusliku aluse rakendamiseks viima läbi huvide kaalumise 
testi, mis võimaldab hulgaliselt tõlgendamisruumi. Huvide kaalumise test koosneb 
mitmest komponendist ja kaalutlusest, näiteks võimalikud tagajärjed töötajale, 
võimalikud privaatsusriskid ja nende realiseerumise tõenäosus, jälgimise inten-
siivsus, töötaja põhjendatud ootus privaatsusele. Kahjuks ei ole need testi osised 
ja kaalutlused IKÜM-is sätestatud vaid neid on selgitatud Artikli 29 töörühma396 
üldistes juhistes ning analüüsitud liikmesriikide kohtupraktikas. Ei ole üheselt 
selge, kas nimetatud elementide loetelu on ammendav või avatud ja kuidas neid 
elemente tuleks digitaalsete jälgimistehnoloogiate kasutamisel tõlgendada. Huvide 
kaalumise testi keerukus seisneb selles, et õiguste kaalumine ei ole kunagi üheselt 
tõlgendatav ja sõltub paljuski juhtumi eripärast. Kuna huve kaalub tööandja, on 
küsitav, kas testi läbiviimisel saavutatakse õiglane tasakaal töösuhte osapoolte 
vahel, kuna võib eeldada, et test on läbi viidud eelkõige tööandja huve arvestades.  
Huvide kaalumise test vajab ranget ja sisulist analüüsi, mida võib tööandjal 
olla keeruline läbi viia. Parema mõistmise eesmärgil tuleb huvide kaalumise testi 
elemendid õigusaktis selgelt määratleda. Näiteks peab tööandja digitaalsete 
jälgimistehnoloogiate kasutamisel arvestama jälgimise vajalikkuse, konkreetsete 
jälgimismeetodite, tehnoloogia eripärade ja nende kasutamisega kaasneva kahjuga 
(erinevad andmed töötajate lõikes, andmete ebatäpsus, teabe käsitlemine vales 
kontekstis). Euroopa Liidu õiguses tuleb reguleerida, millised üksikisiku õigused 
kaaluvad üle tööandja huvid, muutes andmete töötlemise ebaseaduslikuks või 
teise võimalusena võib õigusaktiga reguleerida, millised tööandja huvid või ees-
märgid õigustavad töötajate jälgimist. Täiendavalt tuleb analüüsida, kuidas 
õigluse roll, sotsiaalsed õigused tööl, heausksus, õigus töötervishoiule ja -ohu-
tusele (nt töötaja õigus töötada sobivas töökeskkonnas, mis arvestab tema vaimse 
tervisega), sõnavabadus (nt töötaja õigus avaldada arvamust internetis ja sotsiaal-
meedias) ning vajadus austada töötaja väärikust mõjutavad huvide kaalumise 
testi. Lisaks peavad sektori eripära ja tehtav töö mängima olulist rolli otsustamaks 
jälgimismeetme invasiivsuse ja seetõttu nende lubatavuse üle. Digitaalsed jälgimis-
tehnoloogiad leiavad eelduslikult rohkem aktsepteerimist ohtlikel töökohtadel, 
kus on suurem õnnetusoht. Samuti tuleb Euroopa Liidu õiguses sätestada, millised 
                                                                          
396  Artikkel 29 töörühm oli Euroopa sõltumatu töörühm, mis kuni 25. maini 2018 (kuni isiku-
andmete kaitse üldmääruse jõustumiseni) käsitles eraelu puutumatuse ja isikuandmete kaitse 
küsimusi.   
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on tööandja kohustused enne jälgimist. Näiteks peab tööandja teavitama töötajaid 
digitaalsetest jälgimismeetoditest ja kuulama ära nende arvamused seoses jälgi-
misega. Töötajate esindajad peavad olema kaasatud privaatsust riivava jälgimis-
tehnoloogia rakendamisse töökohal.  
 
2.4 Täiendatud andmetöötluse põhimõtted 
Andmetöötluse põhimõtted, täpsemalt eesmärgikohasus, õiglus ja läbipaistvus on 
sõnastatud üldiselt, võimaldades tööandjal rakendada digitaalsel töökohal jälgi-
mist, mis on küll kooskõlas IKÜM-iga, kuid rikub töötajate andmekaitseõigusi ja 
privaatsust.  
Eesmärgikohasuse põhimõte jääb liiga üldiseks, et kaitsta töötaja õigusi jälgi-
mise korral. Tehnoloogiliste lahenduste areng koos COVID-19 levikuga on suuren-
danud töötajate jälgimist digitaalsetes töökohtades ja tõstnud töökeskkonnas 
kogutud andmete hulka. Taolised trendid võivad omakorda tuua esile tööandja 
soovi kasutada jälgimistehnoloogiaid muul otstarbel kui algselt kavandatud ja 
viia isikuandmete ebaseadusliku edasise töötlemiseni algsest erinevatel ees-
märkidel. COVID-19 levikuga võitlemiseks kasutatud jälgimistegevused ja isiku-
andmete kogumine tuleb lõpetada, kui see ei täida enam algset eesmärki ega kaitse 
töötajate tervist. Seejuures peab arvestama, et pandeemia ning viiruse leviku lõpp 
on ebamäärased terminid, mistõttu on andmete töötlemise aega ja eesmärki kohati 
keeruline määrata. Lisaks võivad tööandjad varjata teiseseid andmete töötlemise 
eesmärke privaatsuspoliitika pikkades ja keerukates tekstides, mis pole üheselt 
mõistetavad.  
Paljuski puuduvad konkreetsed teadmised, mis juhtub töökohal kasutatavate 
tehnoloogiatega pärast viiruse taandumist, kuna eesmärgikohasuse põhimõte läheb 
vastuollu andmemajanduses kasutusel oleva ideega, milleks on andmete taas-
kasutamine. Digitaalses töökeskkonnas valitseb suur tõenäosus andmete uuesti 
kasutamiseks, mistõttu võib väita, et eesmärgikohasuse põhimõte on liiga laialt 
sõnastatud, kaitsmaks töötajaid invasiivsete jälgimistehnoloogiate kasutamise eest. 
Doktoritöös toon välja, et Euroopa Liidu õiguses tuleb reguleerida eesmärke, mis 
võimaldavad töötajaid jälgida. Näiteks on mõned liikmesriigid lubanud kasutada 
tööl digitaalseid jälgimistehnoloogiaid vaid juhul, kui nende tehnoloogiate kasu-
tamine on lubatud õigusaktides või kollektiivlepingutes sätestatud eesmärkidel. 
Sarnaseid põhimõtteid võib kasutada ka Euroopa Liidu õiguses.  
IKÜM-ist tulenev õigluse põhimõte peab kujundama andmete õiglast töötle-
mist, kuid keskendub pigem menetluslikule õiglusele kui sisulisele õiglusele. 
Õiglase andmete töötlemisega on tegemist juhul, kui töötlemine on läbipaistev ja 
sellel on õiguslik alus. Samas ei peaks andmete töötlemise läbipaistvus ja õiguslik 
alus olema ainsad tegurid, mis määratlevad, kas andmete töötlemine on käsitletav 
õiglasena. Digitaalsed jälgimistehnoloogiad toovad esile vajaduse hinnata õiglust 
sisulisemalt. Andmete töötlemist tuleb pidada õiglaseks vaid juhul, kui andmeid 
hinnatakse asjakohases kontekstis, mis tähendab, et tööandja võib töötajat jälgida 
viisil, mida töötaja mõistlikult ootab ega tohi andmete töötlemisega tekitada töö-
tajale põhjendamatult negatiivset mõju. Näiteks ei tohi tööandja tutvuda töötaja 
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sotsiaalmeedia profiilidega, kui selleks ei ole olulist põhjust (töötaja käitumine 
sotsiaalmeedias rikub teise isiku õigusi või ta avaldab seal ettevõtte ärisaladusi). 
Õiglast andmete töötlemist võib mõjutada ka see, kui digitaalsed jälgimistehno-
loogiad võimaldavad teatud töötajate andmete põhjal teha järeldusi erinevate 
töötajate gruppide kohta, omistades ühele töötajale hoiakuid, mis pole temaga 
seotud. Taoliste järelduste tegemine võib kaasa tuua konkreetse töötaja eripärasid 
mitte arvestavaid lahendusi, mis on lõpptulemusena ebaõiglased.  
Sarnaselt eelmiste põhimõtetega on ka andmete läbipaistvuse põhimõte laialt 
sõnastatud, võimaldades invasiivseid jälgimispraktikaid. IKÜM-ist tulenevalt ei 
saa töötaja õigel ajal piisavat teavet digitaalsete jälgimistehnoloogiate kohta, kuna 
tööandjalt nõutakse töötaja informeerimist jälgimise alguses, kui töötajal pole 
veel selge, kuidas jälgimine teda reaalselt mõjutab. Samuti ei konsulteeri tööandja 
töötajaga digitaalsete jälgimistehnoloogiate kasutusele võtmisel ja seetõttu ei 
pruugi töötaja täielikult mõista, kuidas jälgimist teostatakse.  
Digitaalsed jälgimistehnoloogiad võivad tuua kaasa varjatud jälgimise sulan-
dudes sujuvalt tööga seotud tegevusteks (nt võimaldades andmete kogumist kui 
töötaja käivitab tööriistu ning siseneb töö- või puhkeruumidesse). Seejuures ei 
pruugi töötaja olla teadlik toimuvast jälgimisest või isegi võimalikust profileeri-
misest. Teisalt, kui töötaja ongi teadlik jälgimisest, võib ta tunda ärevust ja eba-
mugavust ning tsenseerida oma käitumist asjatult ja ebaõiglaselt. Varjatud jälgi-
mise välistamiseks ja selleks, et töötajad ei tunneks ennast töökeskkonnas halvasti, 
tuleb Euroopa Liidu õigusaktiga panna tööandjale kohustus töötajate regulaarseks 
teavitamiseks. Kui jälgimine on pidev, peab tööandja enne sellise meetme raken-
damist küsima töötajate esindajate nõusolekut ja korraldama enne jälgimis-
meetme kasutuselevõttu konsultatsioone töötajate ja nende esindajatega. Andmete 
töötlemise ja jälgimise tavad ei tohi ettevõttes sisalduda üksnes formaalsetes 
dokumentides. Tööandja peab viima läbi koolitusi jälgimisest teavitamiseks ja 
visualiseerima töökeskkonnas, kus jälgimine toimub. Samuti tuleb töötajale anda 
lisateavet, näiteks selgitada jälgimise spetsiifikat ja seda, kas tööandja poolt antud 
tehnoloogiat võib kasutada isiklikeks tegevustes ning millises ulatuses (nt arvuti 
või nutikella kasutamine eraelulisteks tegevusteks), millised kaitsemeetmed on 
ettevõttes kehtestatud ja mis on jälgimise tagajärjed. Juhul kui tööandja kasutab 
digitaalseid jälgimistehnoloogiaid, peab töötaja olema teadlik sellest, millal ja 
kuidas tema kohta andmeid koguti. Näiteks mikrokiipide jälgimisel peab töötaja 
olema teadlik, kus asuvad töötajat seiravad andurid ning mis on nende jälgimis-
raadius (seda saab ilmestada vastav märgistus töökeskkonnas). Kui tööandja 
lähtub oma otsustes (nt tulemustasud, töösuhte ülesütlemine) jälgimistulemustest, 
peavad töötajal olema üksikasjalikud teadmised, kuidas võib jälgimine teda 
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